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Su m m a r y
In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler asked, “[i]s the breakdown of gender binaries ... so 
monstrous, so frightening, that it must be held to be deflnitionally impossible and 
heuristically precluded from any effort to think gender?” (Butler, p. 1999, p.viii). 
Using this question as a starting point, I look at the way that gender is understood 
and challenged in contemporary fiction. Specifically, I examine novels and short 
stories that focus on finding one’s place in gender, and the way such narratives write 
gendered experiences outside of the traditional male/female binary.
In the first chapter, I look at females that live as males, exploring various 
ways of ‘doing’ gender, both on-stage and off, and the creation of cohesive gender 
identities. Chapter two looks at the way that sex and gender are medicalised. I argue 
that the male/female binary is protected by both the media and the medical 
establishment. This expands into a discussion of the way doctors attempt to preserve 
this binary in the face of increasing challenges to its very viability. In chapter three, I 
consider novels that focus on a male-to-female transition, as well as what is at stake 
in writing gender. Finally, I look at the emergence of ‘genderless’ characters, both in 
terms of the viability of the term ‘genderless’, and the difficulties in finding a 
suitable language with which to understand and quantify gendered experience.
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L is t  o f  A b b r e v ia t io n s
Throughout the thesis, the following abbreviations will be used:
TTV: Waters, Sarah (1998) Tipping the Velvet (London: Virago).
JMB: Duncker, Patricia (2000) James Miranda Barry (London: Picador).
Tr: Kay, Jackie (1999) Trumpet (London: Picador).
Mid: Eugenides, Jeffrey (2003) Middlesex (London: Bloomsbury).
SBB: Feinberg, Leslie (2003) Stone Butch Blues: A Novel (Los Angeles: Alyson 
Books).
SC: Tremain, Rose (1992) Sacred Country (New York: Washington Square Press).
Eve: Carter, Angela (2006) The Passion o f New Eve (London: Virago).
MS: Stace, Wesley (2005) Misfortune (London: Vintage).
WB: Winterson, Jeanette (1996) Written on the Body (London: Vintage).
Hunters: Messud, Claire (2003) “The Hunters” in The Hunters: Two Short Novels 
(London: Picador).
To more easily distinguish between several of Winterson’s works in chapter four, I 
will be using the following abbreviations:
AO: Art Objects 
BA&L: ‘Books: Art & Lies’
BB: Boating for Beginners 
Books: ‘Books: Written on the Body’
VWI: ‘Virginia Woolf Intro’
WB: Written on the Body
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In t r o d u c t io n
There are endless numbers and finite moves
But you can try them all, it's been proved
If you have the patience
Because there are infinite combinations. (Harding, 2007)
*
In Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler takes a pivotal role in 
interrogating gender, seeking “to counter those views that made presumptions about 
the limits and propriety of gender and restricted the meaning of gender to received 
notions of masculinity and femininity” (Butler, 1999, p.vii). Gender Trouble in 
particular, is one of the most influential texts in queer theory, especially in terms of 
Butler’s theories of how gender is constructed, and by whom, and for what purpose, 
which forms the basis of this thesis. Jagose explains that “queer describes those 
gestures or analytical models which dramatise incoherencies in the allegedly stable 
relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire” (Jagose, 1996, p.3). 
Throughout this thesis, ‘queer’ signifies identities that cannot be defined along 
simple binary lines; identities in which there are not necessarily connections between 
sex, gender and sexuality; identities which reveal how complex the entire issue of 
gender and sex is.
In this thesis, I draw primarily upon Butler’s (queer) theories of 
performativity and gender subversion -  specifically the way that “[t]he figure of the 
interior soul understood as ‘within’ the body is signified through its inscription on 
the body” (Butler, 1999, p. 172) -  to examine the ways in which gender is explored in 
contemporary fiction in the context of challenges to the male/female binary. 
However, I will also draw, on occasion, upon the work of the so-called ‘French 
feminists’ such as Cixous and Irigaray. Although it might seem unusual to use Butler 
(who, in many ways is at the forefront of queer theory) alongside French feminists
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such as Cixous, I believe it is a useful strategy. Donald E. Hall explains the way that 
Irigaray “strives to reimagine ‘desire’ in ways that operate outside of 
heterosexual/heterocentric norms” (Hall, 2003, p.63), while Cixous “challenges the 
stability of social meanings privileging maleness and masculine authority” (Hall, 
2003, p.63). Since part of the focus of this thesis is the way in which we understand 
gender, I feel it is important to include theorists who have questioned the very basis 
of sexuality and gender, “disrupting] notions of normality and stable, enduring 
meaning” (Hall, 2003, p.87).
Butler, in particular, argues against the notion of ‘true’ and ‘false’ gender 
expressions, and expresses distrust of “expressions of gender tha t... produce new 
forms of hierarchy and exclusion” (Butler, 1999, p.viii). This accords with Maijorie 
Garber’s belief that “one of the most important aspects of cross-dressing is the way 
in which it offers a challenge to easy notions of binarity, putting into question the 
categories of ‘female’ and ‘male,’ whether they are considered essential or 
constructed, biological or cultural” (Garber, 1992, p. 10). Where Garber chooses to 
subtly question the notion of ‘truth’, Butler explicitly attacks it as an untenable 
position, seeking an explanation for the refusal of society to admit to the limitations 
of gender boundaries: “[i]s the breakdown of gender binaries, for instance, so 
monstrous, so frightening, that it must be held to be definitionally impossible[?]” 
(Butler, 1999, p.viii).1
Part of Butler’s strategy to undermine the male/female binary involves stating
that
acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, 
but produce this on the surface of the body ... Such acts, gestures, 
enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense that the 
essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications
1 Judith Halberstam, in her book, Female Masculinity, argues that “masculinity must not and cannot 
and should not reduce down to the male body and its effects” (Halberstam, 1998, p.l): therefore it is 
no longer viable to conflate masculinity with maleness, or femininity with femaleness.
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive 
means. (Butler, 1999, p. 173)
This means that ‘gender’ (woman/man) is understood as a variety of behaviours,
quite separate from ‘sex’, which is understood as the anatomical designation
(male/female). Butler, like Judith Halberstam, believes gender to be unnatural;
masculinity and maleness (and femininity and femaleness) should not be conflated.
She further argues that, “there need not be a ‘doer behind the deed’” (Butler, 1999,
p. 181). This raises the question of whether “this construct called ‘sex’ is as
culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with
the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no
distinction at all” (Butler, 1999, p. 10).
An extension of this is that drag “fully subverts the distinction between inner
and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender
and the notion of a true gender identity” (Butler, 1999, p.174).3 She argues that “[t]he
performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the
performer and the gender that is being performed” (Butler, 1999, p. 175),
problematically assuming that such distinctions can be easily made. Butler believes
that “[i]n imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender
itself’ (Butler, 1999, p. 175), but also makes clear that
2 This means that “gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and 
masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male 
body as easily as a female one” (Butler, 1999, p. 10).
3 Karen Zivi responds to “[c]ritics o f Butler’s work [who] argue that drag or parody fails to address 
serious material concerns o f the world” (Zivi, 2008, p. 160). She claims that “[w]hile we may 
acknowledge that performances can have political overtones or implications, the common intuition is 
that performance is distinct from the ‘real’ politics of public policy making or institutional and 
material change. Performances are fictional representations of the real, but not the real itself; actors 
merely adopt a persona, take on a role that they can take up or leave behind at the stage door” (Zivi, 
2008, p. 161). However, in relation to this, Butler comments that “if I were to argue that genders are 
performative, that could mean that I thought that one woke in the morning, perused the closet or some 
more open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day, and then restored that 
garment to its place at night... [but] there is no subject who decides on its gender” (Butler, 1993, p.x).
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[t]he notion of gender parody defended here does not assume that there is an 
original which such parodic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is of the 
very notion of an original; just as the psychoanalytic notion of gender 
identification is constituted by a fantasy of a fantasy. (Butler, 1999, p. 175)
Drag “enacts and reveals the performativity of gender itself in a way that destabilizes
the naturalized categories of identity and desire” (Butler, 1999, p. 177).
The sex/gender distinction must not be allowed to overshadow the fact that there are
limits to gender choice (although it can be an active possibility), as I shall
demonstrate in this thesis.4 My intent, within this thesis, is to examine fiction that
focuses on finding one’s place in gender. In doing this, I will demonstrate the way
that such narratives write gendered experiences outside of the traditional male/female
binary. I will look at the limitations of language -  the lack of a suitable vocabulary
that makes it so difficult to envisage and describe these experiences -  and the way
writers transcend this to make ‘impossible’ bodies ‘possible’
Butler asks, “[i]f gender is constructed, could it be constructed differently, or
does its constructedness imply some form of social determinism, foreclosing the
possibility of agency and transformation?” (Butler, 1999, p.l 1). Her answer is to
suggest a new way of examining things:
[i]f it is possible to speak of a ‘man’ with a masculine attribute and to 
understand that attribute as a happy but accidental feature of the man, then it 
is also possible to speak of a ‘man’ with a feminine attribute, whatever that is, 
but still to maintain the integrity of the gender. But once we dispense with the 
priority of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as abiding substances, then it is no longer 
possible to subordinate dissonant gendered features as so many secondary 
and accidental characteristics of a gender ontology that is fundamentally 
intact. (Butler, 1999, p.32)
In other words, the categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are important, if only because
they create a space in which we can examine and define the characteristics that could
4 See the discussion of The Passion o f New Eve and Misfortune in Chapter 3.
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be said to form gender. It is equally important, however, to understand that gender 
expression should not be limited to ‘man’ and ‘woman’, as we shall see.
Gender-Play
The thesis is divided into four chapters, with each chapter focusing on a different 
aspect of gender issues. I look at the way that gender is inscribed, performed, 
enforced, and medicalised; understood and misunderstood. Chapter One examines 
three novels: Sarah Waters’s Tipping the Velvet, Patricia Duncker’s James Miranda 
Barry, and Jackie Kay’s Trumpet. The texts have in common protagonists who 
although anatomically female, live as men. This is not to say that the three novels 
cover the same ground: the protagonists of James Miranda Barry and Trumpet, 
James and Joss respectively, both live as men, but Joss almost completely breaks 
with his earlier female life. James, on the other hand, lives as a man in order to enjoy 
the greater opportunities it affords, but occasionally considers a return to his identity 
as a woman. This is a natural extension of the gender play of Tipping the Velvet, in 
which its protagonist, Nancy, starts performing as a man on the Victorian stage -  an 
exaggerated performance intended to mark as obvious the differences between 
actress and character -  but later she attempts to pass as a man on the streets of 
London.
One of Judith Butler’s focuses in Gender Trouble is “the fear of losing one’s 
place in gender” (Butler, 1999, p.xi). Most, if not all, of the texts I examine in this 
thesis look at the problems of finding one’s place in gender, and the difficulties 
inherent in this, when “people can only imagine woman or man, feminine or 
masculine. We’ve been taught that nothing else exists in nature” (Feinberg, 1996, 
p. 101). Although Butler refuses the idea that “one woke in the morning, perused the 
closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the
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day, and then restored the garment to its place at night” (Butler, 1993, p.x), the 
gender-as-clothes analogy remains relevant in the examination of these three novels 
that draw connections between gender and clothing. Riki Wilchins considers the 
gender-as-clothing analogy to have some uses: “[i]f my gender is a doing that has to 
be redone each day just like I pull on those clothes each morning, that would help 
explain why sometimes my gender ‘fails’. Even though I’ve felt like a man (and then 
later like a woman), people didn’t always recognize me as such. Even I couldn’t 
always recognize myself as such” (Wilchins, 2002b, p.24). What Wilchins 
demonstrates is that the problem of finding one’s place in gender often relates to the 
way in which people ‘recognize’ the gender of others as either successful or as a 
failure.
One of the main ways in which gender is expressed in Tipping the Velvet, 
James Miranda Barry and Trumpet is clothing. As the most visible means of 
determining gender, donning the clothes of “the gender of choice” (Butler, 1993, p.x) 
marks one of the first steps in gender transgression. This is not to say that such an 
activity can always be read in the same way: there is a marked difference in the way 
clothes are treated in each of the novels. In Trumpet, clothes are one of the ways in 
which Joss stakes his claim to masculinity; he feels “more comfortable once he was 
dressed” (7>, p.238) because his appearance and his identity match: he is a 
convincing male, and his clothes aid his performance. In James Miranda Barry, 
James dresses in male clothes, but this fails to cover the fact that his masculinity is 
unconvincing. Whereas Joss’s clothes set up the expectation that he is a man, for
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James the clothes are part of a much larger package -  occupation, behaviour, history 
-  that combine to give him a workable, if not wholly believable, identity as a man.5
Tipping the Velvet uses clothing in a different way. On stage, Nan and Kitty 
wear male clothes for their act as male impersonators. The clothes are worn to mark 
the discontinuity between appearance and anatomy of the performers. The audience 
is not asked to believe that Kitty and Nan are male -  Nan’s costume is actually 
altered because she initially looks too male, “[a]nd that ain’t quite the idea now, is 
it?” (TTV, p.l 18). Instead, the enjoyment of the act stems from the humour of women 
parodying maleness. This behaviour is distinct from the way Nan later behaves when 
she starts passing as a man off-stage; in this instance, believability is key. Like Joss, 
Nan is using clothes to look suitably male. Butler believes that “performativity must 
be understood not as a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and 
citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (Butler, 
1993, p.2). By putting on male clothes, and acting as men, Joss, James and Nan find 
that they create a form of maleness. And this maleness, in turn, is legitimised by their 
male behaviours and appearance.
The Medicalisation of Gender
From clothes and props, to surgery and hormones: Chapter 2 examines novels that 
explore the physical transformation of the body. Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex 
raises issues of the medicalisation of the body, via a pseudohermaphroditic 
protagonist, Cal; Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues details a butch woman’s 
attempts to use surgery to develop a safe space in which she can express both her 
masculine and feminine sides; Rose Tremain’s Sacred Country tells the story of a
5 In Orlando (which is discussed in more depth in Chapter 3), Virginia Woolf notes that “women are 
n ot... obedient, chaste, scented, and exquisitely apparelled by nature. They can only attain these 
graces, without which they may enjoy none o f the delights of life, by the most tedious discipline” 
(Woolf, 2006, p. 141).
girl who is desperate to become male, but finds that she does not need to complete 
her surgical transformation in order to find a degree of comfort in her identity.6
As recently as 2006, Louann Brizendine argued in her book, The Female 
Brain, that “[t]here is no unisex brain ... Girls arrive already wired as girls, and boys 
arrive already wired as boys” (Brizendine, 2006, p. 12). Such a point of view does not 
allow for the myriad forms of gender expression outlined in Middlesex, Stone Butch 
Blues, or Sacred Country. In fact, it does not allow for any deviation from the 
male/female binary. However, there is a potentially useful gap in Brizendine’s 
theories:
[cjommon sense tells us that boys and girls behave differently. We see it 
every day at home, on the playground, and in classrooms. But what the 
culture hasn’t told us is that the brain dictates these divergent behaviors. The 
impulses of children are so innate that they kick in even i f  we adults try to 
nudge them in another direction. (Brizendine, 2006, p. 12, my emphasis)
The belief that one has a gendered essence that is entirely separate from one’s body
is something considered throughout this chapter. The idea that such an essence is
‘fixed’, despite the efforts of society to preserve the status of male and female
identities, is explored through Sacred Country. From at least the age of six, Mary
Ward is convinced that she is a boy, and she retains this belief in spite of attempts by
her parents to feminise her through feminine pursuits (dancing) and attendance at an
all-girls school. Arguably, Mary’s life is made more difficult because she is not
allowed to express any masculinity. Judith Halberstam argues that “masculinity must
not and cannot and should not reduce down to the male body and its effects”
(Halberstam, 1998, p.l), but because masculinity and maleness are so widely
conflated, there is no room for Mary to perform masculinity until she takes on the
role of being-a-man.
6 The term ‘pseudohermaphrodite’ refers to someone who is genetically one sex, but appears to be 
another. As a male pseudohermaphrodite, Callie is “genetically male but appearing otherwise” {Mid, 
p.413). The term ‘intersex’ is now used in place o f ‘hermaphrodite’.
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The protagonist of Stone Butch Blues, Jess, also grapples with this. As a
n
‘stone butch’, she struggles to reconcile her gendered identity and her body. Subject 
to intense abuse (physical, sexual and mental) as a result of the visibility of her 
conflicted identity, Jess realises she needs to hide. By undergoing surgery (a 
mastectomy), and beginning hormone treatment, Jess starts passing as a man: hiding 
herself in herself. The once dangerous body becomes a refuge, and gives her entry to 
hitherto unsafe territory -  male bathrooms, barbershops, employment. It is important 
to note, however, that Jess begins the process of hiding by first making sure she can 
“go back to being a butch later, when it’s safe to come out” (SBB, p. 145). This aim -  
to one day return to her previous identity of ‘butch’ (an identity that Jess never really 
leaves completely behind) separates Stone Butch Blues from the category of 
transsexual narrative, and helps to draw a distinction between the gender crises that 
are explored in this novel, and that of Sacred Country. According to Jay Prosser, 
“transsexual has been conceived conventionally as a transitional phase to pass 
through once the transsexual can pass and assimilate as nontranssexual -  one begins 
as female, one becomes a transsexual, one is a man” (Prosser, 1998, p.l 1). From this, 
it is clear that Jess does not meet the criteria to be considered a transsexual: she never 
reaches the point where she considers herself ‘a transsexual’, preferring to think of 
herself as a passing woman, and there is no resolution of the crisis by reaching and
o
embracing the state of ‘man’. Thus, Prosser’s definition of Stone Butch Blues as “the 
story of a transsexual who turned back” (Prosser, 1998, p. 178), does not fully grasp 
the complexities of Jess’s journey. Describing Jess as “refus[ing] the refuge of fully
7 Halberstam defines ‘stone butch’ as “a dyke body placed somewhere on the boundary between 
female masculinity and transgender subjectivity” (Halberstam, 1998, p. 124).
8 At first glance, Sacred Country's Mary appears to also fail to live up to the ideal o f transsexualism. 
Although Mary is initially identified as female (by other people, even as she rejects it herself), and 
then moves towards transsexual, Mary ‘becomes’ a man without completing her surgery. The 
rejection of genital surgery emphasises the belief that essence is more important than physical 
perfection.
becoming the other sex and the closure promised by the transsexual plot” (Prosser, 
1998, p. 178) raises many questions. Is becoming a man really a refuge? How, and on 
whose terms? It becomes a refuge only if Jess leaves behind her female past and 
denies the viability and validity of the butch identity. In this chapter I focus on the 
reconciliation of the past with the promise of the future: Prosser therefore misses the 
point -  there is no destination of maleness that Jess aspires to reach. While Prosser is 
correct that “Jess’s identification as a stone butch profoundly dislocates her from the 
category ‘woman’” (Prosser, 1998, p. 182), this is not to say that she is therefore 
forced towards ‘man’. Such a closed reading of gender (if one is not female, one is 
male) goes against the spirit of the novel, the belief that the male-female binary is too 
narrow to adequately define human experience: “[t]here’s other ways to be than 
either-or. It’s not so simple. Otherwise there wouldn’t be so many people who don’t 
fit” 0SBB, p.218).
Middlesex demonstrates another mode of ‘not fitting’ -  the hermaphroditic
experience. Cal’s journey from girl to man explicitly medicalises gender and
examines how gender is assigned. Anne Fausto-Sterling explains that
[i]in the current intellectual fashion, men are made, not bom. We construct 
masculinity through social discourse ... In contrast, biological and medical 
scientists feel quite certain about their world. For them, the body tells the 
truth. (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p.109)9
This disjunction powers the novel. As a pseudohermaphrodite, Cal is a genetic male
who is socialised as a girl: his learned female behaviours mb up against his male
impulses, leaving him struggling to find a place where he fits. Deciding that the
presence of a penis means that he is unequivocally male, Cal comes to realise that it
is not that easy. Living as a man causes Cal to question the idea that “everything
9 Anne Fausto-Sterling is the forerunner of studies on the medicalisation of gender. Her views are 
particularly useful in the context of her roles as both scientist and gender theorist. See Chapter 2 for 
further details.
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comes naturally” {Mid, p.41), especially because “[i]t was all a bluff, but so was it on 
most men ... My swagger wasn’t that different from what lots of adolescent boys put 
on, trying to be manly. For that very reason it was convincing. Its very falseness 
made it credible” {Mid, p.449). Cal’s realisation that there is no ‘true’ masculinity or 
femininity, no ‘correct’ maleness or femaleness, is marked by the simultaneous 
recognition that there is no space outside of male or female in which he can be 
allowed to exist. Leslie Feinberg explains how difficult it can be “when the words 
woman and man, feminine and masculine, are almost the only words that exist in the 
English language to describe all the vicissitudes of bodies and styles of expression” 
(Feinberg, 1996, p.ix). Cal’s adoption of the male role is therefore also an acceptance 
of the limits of gender categorisation, something that the novel, and Eugenides as 
author, struggles with, as I will demonstrate.
The novels that I examine in this chapter have in common a commitment to 
looking at the issue of surgical/hormonal intervention in a serious light.10 This is in 
sharp contrast to John Irving’s 1976 novel The World According to Garp which 
features the character of Roberta Muldoon, a “six-foot-four [MTF] transsexual” 
(Irving, 1998, p.219). Roberta is used as a comedic device, with Irving attempting to 
elicit laughter from the disparity between her current life as a woman, and her 
hyperbolically masculine past as an American Football player.11
10 By this, I mean that the novels reach some important conclusions about what it means to be male or 
female, and how one can exist within such a binary after transforming one’s body. In comparison, Iain 
Banks’s The Wasp Factory, in which the female protagonist (Frank) is secretly fed male hormones 
and raised as a male, is deeply unsatisfactory. When Frank (a previously amoral character with a taste 
for murder), discovers that she is actually biologically female, she completely changes character in 
spite of her protests to the contrary, and develops an aversion to her crimes: “I am still me; I am the 
same person, with the same memories and the same deeds done, the same (small) achievements, the 
same (appalling) crimes to my name. Why? How could I have done these things?” (Banks, 2004, 
p.242).
‘Throughout the novel, Roberta is marked as ‘different’ because of her stature and strength. In one 
scene she protects Garp from a potential assassin: “she threw a magnificent cross-body block on Garp 
and belted him off the soft shoulder and down a twelve-foot embankment into a muddy ditch” (Irving,
15
A Performance of Womanhood
As each novel thus far explores a female-to-male journey, chapter 3 turns the focus 
onto male-to-female transformations, highlighting the perceived superiority of male 
identity over female identity. Evelyn, in Angela Carter’s The Passion o f New Eve, is 
kidnapped and surgery is performed on him, against his will, to transform him into 
‘Eve’. However, despite the bodily transformation, Eve retains his masculine 
viewpoint. Wesley Stace’s Misfortune details the life of Rose Old, a baby boy raised 
as a girl, who subsequently decides to exhibit female and male behaviours.
The Passion o f New Eve is a complex book, at times anticipating some of 
Butler’s arguments (particularly those of Gender Trouble) -  specifically, Butler’s 
argument that essence is an illusion created by performance (Butler, 1999, p. 173). 
The novel is caught up in “narrative anarchy” (Gamble, 1997, p. 103): “narrated 
retrospectively in the first person [it] immediately rais[es] the quintessentially 
modem question: who speaks?” (Suleiman, 1985, p.61). Evelyn tries to answer this 
question himself, first arguing that the loss of his genitals means “the end of Evelyn” 
{Eve, p.71), but eventually realising that it does not have to mark the end of his 
maleness. Refusing to accept his new female body as his own, Evelyn keeps his 
masculinity alive by refusing to acknowledge the female reality of his reflection. The 
Passion o f New Eve suggests that there is a clear distinction between anatomy and 
gender: surgery does not magically transform Evelyn into a woman.12 It is not until 
later in the novel, when he starts to adopt female behaviours as a means of survival, 
that he comes close to creating a cohesive performance of womanhood.
1998, p.528). Upon her death, it is remarked that her replacement had “big shoes to fill, as they say. In 
fact, size 12” (Irving, 1998, p.562).
12 Similarly, Paulina Palmer argues that Angela Carter “highlights the connections between gender 
and fantasy, gender and illusion” (Palmer, 1997, p.30).
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Misfortune is markedly less successful than The Passion o f New Eve in
dealing with sex and gender. Drawing on the work of Virginia Woolf, in particular
Orlando and A Room o f One’s Own, Wesley Stace latches on to Woolfs idea that
“the great mind is androgynous” (Woolf, 2004, p.l 13), expanding upon his own song
“Miss Fortune”, to create a novel.13 Issues of identity have informed much of Stace’s
career as a musician; song titles such as “Who You Really Are” highlight a theme of
trying to get to the heart of identity. “Infinite Combinations”, which I quoted at the
start of this introduction, suggests that there are many available options in the search
for an identity:
[t]here are endless numbers and finite moves 
But you can try them all, it's been proved 
If you have the patience
Because there are infinite combinations. (Harding, 2007)
“Me Against Me” focuses on multitudes of identity, and the splitting of the self:
“[b]ut now I can see that it’s me against me/Against me against me against me”
(Harding, 2007), while “You In Spite Of Yourself’ is a song that one could imagine
being addressed to Rose, questioning the way in which other people affect one’s
sense of identity:
What have they done to you, darling? ...
But give credit where it’s due
And you’ve had a big fakeover
It could be a big improvement
But I guess that you’re still you
You in spite of yourself. (Harding, 2007)
“Miss Fortune”, the song upon which Misfortune is based, tells the story of a baby
boy who was “found by the richest man in the world ... who brought me up as a girl”
(Harding, 2007), and reaches the conclusion that “[t]here are worse things I
confess/Than drinking tea in a pretty dress” (Harding, 2007). The protagonist of
13 Wesley Stace is perhaps better known as the musician John Wesley Harding. “Miss Fortune” was 
written in 1997 and first appeared on Harding’s album “Awake”.
Misfortune, Rose Old, discovers that he has been lied to, and suffers a fracturing of 
his identity, which is ultimately resolved by his decision to live as a man, but dress as 
a woman.14 Although the novel is a failure in many ways, I have chosen to include it 
in the thesis because the way that gender is misunderstood is as important as the way 
it is understood. Through Misfortune it is possible to see how the struggle for suitable 
gender expression can be trivialised and marginalised.
Genderless Characters
The final chapter takes the issue of gender representation to its logical conclusion: 
texts that move beyond sex to explore seemingly ‘genderless’ characters. Jeanette 
Winterson’s novel, Written on the Body, and Claire Messud’s novella, ‘The Hunters’, 
both contain protagonists who attempt to evade being labelled as either masculine or 
feminine, but in doing so, end up doubly-gendered. The limitations of Judith Butler’s 
theories, which I have already highlighted are evident in this chapter: because Butler 
completely ignores the issue of pronoun use, she consequently finds herself trapped 
within the male/female binary that she argues against.
Throughout Written on the Body, Jeanette Winterson is playing a game. By
not revealing any information about the narrator, except his or her relationships with
women, Winterson is trading on her previous autobiographical work to trick the
reader into reading the narrator as female, only to then disrupt expectations. Like
Leslie Feinberg, Winterson blurs the boundaries of not just male and female, but
fiction and autobiography: where Winterson admits “I prefer myself as a character in
14 The plot o f Misfortune shares certain similarities with that of Tahar Ben Jelloun’s novel The Sand 
Child. Jelloun’s work focuses on the life o f Mohammed Ahmed, a Moroccan girl who is raised as a 
boy by her father, who desperately needs a male heir. Jelloun recounts Ahmed’s situation with great 
sympathy, underlining the difficulties faced by someone who is forced to adopt an identity that is at 
odds with their anatomy: “I imagine him tom between the development of his body and his father’s 
determination to make him wholly and entirely a man” (Jelloun, 2000, p.28). My reluctance to 
examine this novel further stems from the fact that it was originally written in French. Fearful of 
losing something in translation -  specifically the nuances on which I demonstrate that gender and 
gendered language are built - 1 have limited my study to novels written in English.
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my own fiction” (AO, p.53), then, as narrator declares “I can’t be relied upon” (WB, 
p.92), Feinberg uses names to close the gap between author and narrator as Prosser 
also recognises:
the name s/he [gives her protagonist] encourages us to question the 
difference and partially read through the ‘novel’ to a fictional 
autobiographical narrative. In the ambivalent gendering of the first name 
(Jess) and the implicit Jewishness of the last (Goldberg), the narrator- 
protagonist’s proper name resembles the authorial signature. Jess Goldberg 
repeats Leslie Feinberg not differently or identically but similarly. (Prosser, 
1998, p. 196)
Jay Prosser also argues that “gendered contradiction has played a key role in making 
visible queer pride” (Prosser, 1998, p. 179). For Winterson, the contradiction between 
how the reader wishes to read the narrator, and how the narrator must be read -  “[w]e 
cannot refer to the narrator as a ‘she’ ignoring the text’s insistence that we use the 
slashed forms ‘s/he’ and ‘her/his’” (Onega, 2006, p.l 11) -  makes visible the way in 
which people are unconsciously bound by the male/female gender binary, and the 
language surrounding it.
In contrast, Claire Messud seems almost embarrassed by the attention her 
genderless protagonist has attracted, claiming he/she was an accident of writing. 
However, as the protagonist develops a fixation with his/her neighbour, Ridley, and 
through hatred tries to strip her of her gender, a link appears between ‘The Hunters’ 
and Written on the Body: in each text, the relationship between gender and 
humanness is debated. As characters are stripped of gender referents, they lose their 
identities, and it becomes increasingly easy to dehumanise them by using terms such 
as ‘it’ when discussing them. As such, the genderless characters enter the realm of
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the abject:15
the construction of gender operates through exclusionary means, such that 
the human is not only produced over and against the inhuman, but through a 
set of foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused the 
possibility of cultural articulation. (Butler, 1993, p.8) 6
Returning to the title of this thesis, Butler asks, “[i]s the breakdown of gender
binaries ... so monstrous, so frightening, that it must be held to be definitionally
impossible and heuristically precluded from any effort to think gender?” (Butler,
1993, p.viii). In Written on the Body and ‘The Hunters’, the breakdown of gender
binaries -  the breakdown of any visible category -  results in the loss of the human.
The problem is that “responses to the question ‘What is a human?’ come far too
easily ... defining difference invariably entails the violence of exclusion” (Salih,
2004, p.l).
Language is Power
Butler suggests that “gender identities that do not conform to the system of 
‘compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality’ expose how gender norms are socially 
instituted and maintained” (Salih, 2002, p.49); this explains why gender identities 
that do not fit within the male/female binary are considered dangerous by both the 
medical establishment, and society at large.17 Many of the texts I examine in this 
thesis look at the use of vocabulary to try and categorise, pin down, or cast out 
perceived ‘gender deviance’ -  drawing attention to such ‘attacks’ on the binarism
15 Like Butler, I use the term ‘abject’ as it has been defined by Kristeva (“what disturbs identity, 
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules” [Kristeva, 1982, p.4]).
16 Salih suggests that “readers should learn not to expect what Butler calls ‘radical accessibility’ when 
they encounter texts that have set themselves the difficult task of rethinking and reconfiguring the 
possible within political theorizing. By ‘possible’ Butler means the possibly ‘human,’ possible
configurations of the social world and possible modes of doing” (Salih, 2004, p.l).
17 Both the medical establishment and society at large appear to agree upon what constitutes 
‘maleness’: “[i]n the genetic male ... the gender of assignment is based on the infant’s anatomy, 
predominantly the size of the phallus ... [f]or proper masculine socialisation to occur, the little boy 
must have a sufficiently large penis. There must be no doubt in the boy’s mind, in the minds of his 
parents and other adult relatives, or in the minds of his male peers about the legitimacy of his male 
identification” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p.l 12).
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help to mark them as ‘wrong’ or ‘unacceptable’, and so perpetuate the cycle of
rejection and hatred. Even so, Butler remains unconvinced of the usefulness of what
Zivi terms “hate-speech codes, designed to censor injurious speech and further
progressive ends” (Zivi, 2008, p. 159), believing that they
assume that words have specific and unwavering harmful effects on 
individuals ... in asking the state for protection as a way to be free from 
harm, we fail to appreciate the instability of language and actually increase 
the control that the state has over our lives. (Zivi, 2008, p.159)18
For Butler, language is power: she
offers us a notion of the performative subject; instead of a subject with 
command over language, Butler describes a subject produced through 
language. In other words, Butler suggests that we are not sovereign subjects 
who use language as a tool, but, rather, we are beings who come into 
existence through language (Zivi, 2008, p. 161).
Despite realising the power of language, Butler fails to grapple with the issue 
of ‘language failure’ -  specifically what I will refer to here as ‘the pronoun problem’, 
and consequently finds herself trapped within the male-female binary that she argues 
against. It is difficult to find an appropriate pronoun to refer to persons who are 
transgressing traditional gender binaries, manipulating their bodies via surgery and 
hormones, etc., so throughout the thesis, I use ‘he’ and ‘she’ -  which are, of course, 
inadequate. Annabelle Willox claims that “language (for language, read gender) 
relies on prior citations of the term for its meaning; one can only describe one's 
gendered embodied position through culturally available terms if that description is 
to have any meaning” (Willox, 2003, p.3). If this statement were true, it would be 
impossible for the protagonists of my chosen texts -  indeed, for anybody who wishes 
to live outside of the gender binary -  to live a ‘meaningful’ or significant existence. 
Instead, this thesis explores the reality of bodies that exist often outside of language:
181 would like to thank Samuel Chambers for providing me with a copy of Zivi’s essay.
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bodies that subvert the current framework and cannot be easily defined, yet continue 
to exist.
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C h a p t e r  O n e : G e n d e r -P l a y
[0]ne of the most important aspects of cross-dressing is the way in which it
offers a challenge to easy notions of binarity, putting into question the
categories o f ‘female’ and ‘male,’ whether they are considered essential or
constructed, biological or cultural. (Garber, 1992, p. 10)
*
Judith Halberstam and Judith Butler state that the dominant views of gender are that 
“one must be readable at a glance” (Halberstam, 1998, p.23) and “the breakdown of 
gender binaries ... must be held to be definitionally impossible” (Butler, 1999, 
p.viii).
Meanwhile, Mary Hawkesworth explains Butler’s notion of the ‘definitionally
impossible’ as an attempt to work against a series of “‘unquestionable’ axioms”
about gender, including
the beliefs that there are two and only two genders; the male/female 
dichotomy is natural, being masculine or feminine is natural and not a matter 
of choice; all individuals can (and must) be classified as masculine or 
feminine -  any deviation from such a classification being either a joke or a 
pathology. (Hawkesworth, 1997, p.649)
It is Butler’s view that “gender is ‘unnatural’, so that there is no necessary
relationship between one’s body and one’s gender ... it will be possible to have a
designated ‘female’ body and not to display traits generally considered ‘feminine’”
(Salih, 2002, p.46, emphasis in original).
In this Chapter, I look at three texts, Sarah Waters’s Tipping the Velvet,
Patricia Duncker’s James Miranda Barry and Jackie Kay’s Trumpet which focus on
moments when the definitionally impossible is made possible: Tipping the Velvet
initially focuses on public performance of gender on stage, before widening its focus
to take into consideration private and personal performance. I explain how these
modes of performance are clearly distinct from one another, and what it tells us about
the complex relationship between gender and sexuality. The eponymous character in
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James Miranda Barry takes on a male role ostensibly to escape the limited 
opportunities open to women in the nineteenth century, and reveals the difficulties in 
passing as a man when not visibly convincing. Trumpet examines the life of jazz 
trumpeter Joss Moody, who is discovered (after his death) to have been bom 
anatomically female. I examine the way that Joss’s secret affects the identities of 
others: his wife’s heterosexuality and his son’s masculinity. Because James Miranda 
Barry and Trumpet focus on women who live as men, any study will inevitably 
encounter linguistic problems, particularly in a pronomined context, as Romaine 
points out:
[wjhere pronominal systems are sex differentiated, languages too, like the 
surgeon’s scalpel, impose a dichotomy into male (he) and female (she), 
compelling us to choose one or the other in referring to people. (Romaine, 
1999, p.45)
In writing about James Miranda Barry and Trumpet, I therefore have to take into
account the inadequacy of language to describe what James and Joss ‘are’, and I also
have to consider the implications of choosing either ‘he’ or ‘she’ to refer to them:
pronoun choice has also been an issue for gays, lesbians, and transsexuals ... 
On [Billy] Tipton’s death in 1989 the gay community claimed ‘her’ as a 
lesbian and passing woman, and the magazine Transsexual News Telegraph 
also claimed ‘him’ as a transsexual man. One way in which each group 
staked its opposing claims was through referring to Tipton as he or she. 
(Romaine, 1999, p.46)19
The issue of gendering after death will be discussed later in this chapter, but it is
important to note that, again in the words of Romaine, “pronouns are used to
represent not just anatomy, but a complex and varying concept of oneself as a
gendered person” (Romaine, 1999, p.47). In view of this, several options present
themselves: “[s]ome feminists have suggested new gender-neutral singular pronouns
such as tey to replace she and he, or combining them as s/he” (Romaine, 1999,
19 Billy Tipton is the real-life jazz musician whose story inspired Trumpet. His story is told in Diane 
Wood Middlebrook’s 1999 book, Suits Me: The Double Life o f Billy Tipton.
p. 105). From my own perspective, writing about Joss and James, none of these 
options seems appropriate. Using ‘tey’ removes ‘she’ and ‘he’ from the equation, 
suggesting an otherness, but throughout both novels James and Joss have fought to 
avoid otherness and be recognised in their chosen gender. I am also not comfortable 
using s/he because it implies that James and Joss are somehow in-between male and 
female, rather than having chosen one specific gender. For the purposes of this 
chapter, therefore, I am going to refer to James and Joss using male pronouns, 
because it is as males that they choose to be identified. In the case of Nan in Tipping 
the Velvet, although she performs as a man on stage, and later carries this behaviour 
into her personal life, she is very clear that she is still a woman, so she will be 
referred to as ‘she’.
Tipping the Velvet
In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler outlined her theory of gender performativity, thus:
acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, 
but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying 
absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as 
a cause. Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are 
performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise 
purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through 
corporeal signs and other discursive means. (Butler, 1999, p. 173, emphasis in 
original)
Tipping the Velvet is the first novel by Sarah Waters; the story of Nancy Astley -  
later Nan King -  an oyster girl who gets an opportunity to perform in music-halls as 
a male impersonator. In telling this story, Waters uses the opportunity to explore the 
validity of Butler’s writings on performativity, exploring the links and spaces 
between body and acts. In order to understand the way in which Nan moves through 
various performances in an attempt to create a cohesive identity, it is necessary to 
first identify the three modes of gender performance as delineated by Butler: public
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gender performance, private gender performance and personal gender performance.
In examining Nan’s life through these three lenses, it will become apparent that “on- 
and off-stage personae bleed into each other in unpredictable and even uncontrollable 
ways” (Halberstam, 1997, p. 105), so that the notion of a concrete performance is 
destabilized.
Nan’s public performance as a male impersonator is the result of her 
attraction to another male impersonator, Kitty Butler. Compared to impersonators 
like Nelly Power who had “worn tights and bullion fringe, just like a ballet-girl -  
only carried a cane and billycock hat to make her boyish” (7TF, p. 12), Kitty’s act is 
perceived as fresh because at first glance she seems to fully immerse herself in male 
costume:
[s]he wore a suit -  a handsome gentleman’s suit, cut to her size ... There was 
a rose in her lapel, and lavender gloves at her pocket. From beneath her 
waistcoat shone a stiff-fronted shirt of snowy white, with a stand-up collar 
two inches high. Around the collar was a white bow-tie; and on her head 
there was a topper. When she took the topper o ff ... one saw that her hair was 
perfectly cropped. (11V, p. 12)
The cropped hair recalls the appearance of women who “had spent time in hospital or
prison; or ... were mad” (VIV9 p. 13): short hair is synonymous with unfeminine
women, and more specifically, women who had ‘failed’ as wives and mothers.
Laurence Senelick has argued that “[w]hen the subservient sex wears the pants, such
behaviour is condoned only in anodyne modes which contradict the disguise by
emphasizing female allure” (Senelick, 1993, p.81), and this proves true of Kitty. Her
seemingly daring costume is actually cut in a way that accentuates her figure,
“rounded, vaguely but unmistakeably, at the bosom, the stomach and the hips, in a
way no real boy’s ever was” (7TF, p. 13), and her shoes have “two-inch heels” (TTV,
p. 13), arguably rendering her as feminine as other male impersonators. According to
Judith Halberstam’s definitions, Kitty would be more accurately described as a drag
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king rather than a male impersonator, because “the male impersonator attempts to 
produce a plausible performance of maleness ... the drag king ... makes the exposure 
of the theatricality of masculinity into the mainstay of the act” (Halberstam, 1998, 
p.232). Sara Maitland agrees that such an act “does not seek to confuse ... it does not 
really require deception. It pretends to be deceptive, and is thus, so to speak, doubly 
deceptive” (Maitland, 1986, p. 10).
Nancy is added to the act when Kitty’s manager, Walter, is “looking for 
something that will lift the act above the ordinary, and make it really memorable” 
(TTV, p.l 12), and has the idea of “[a] double act! A soldier -  and his comrade! A 
swell -  together with his chum!” (TTV, p.l 12). When Nancy puts on a suit, she 
makes an effort to look as male as possible, completely missing the point of male 
impersonation (only a quasi-plausible performance). Walter realises that “[ijt’s not 
quite right” (TTV, p.l 18) but is not sure why, until Mrs Dendy, the landlady, 
explains: “[s]he’s too real... She looks like a boy. Which I know she is supposed to 
-  but if you follow me, she looks like a real boy ... And that ain’t quite the idea now, 
is it?” (TTV, p.l 18). Senelick explains that “female assumptions of male identity 
appeared in the theatre as a novelty, a salacious turn, a secular Johnny-come-lately” 
(Senelick, 2000, p.326). The point of the act is not to ‘be’ men, insofar as such a 
thing is possible, but to parody them, using costumes to illustrate the type of man 
being imitated (“what think you of a policeman’s jacket? Or a sailor’s blouse? What 
think you of peg-top trousers or a pearly coat?” [TTV, p.83]). Of course, as Butler 
points out, “[pjarody by itself is not subversive ... for parodic displacement, indeed, 
parodic laughter, depends on a context and reception in which subversive confusions 
can be fostered” (Butler, 1999, p. 176).
Maijorie Garber, however, argues that
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one of the most important aspects of cross-dressing is the way in which it 
offers a challenge to easy notions of binarity, putting into question the 
categories of ‘female’ and ‘male,’ whether they are considered essential or 
constructed, biological or cultural. (Garber, 1992, p. 10)
In this novel, Waters is suggesting that the most important aspect of cross-dressing
for the stage is actually the way it confirms binaries. Kitty deliberately sabotages her
costume (that is, she makes it more feminine), to emphasise that she falls short of
being a ‘real’ man. In contrast, Nancy is considered “unpleasing” (TTV, p.l 18)
because her performance fails to “pla[y] upon the distinction between the anatomy of
the performer and the gender that is being performed” (Butler, 1999, p. 175).
To re-stabilise Nancy’s performance of gender, Walter modifies her costume
in order to accentuate her femininity:
[m]y new shoes looked quaint and girlish, like a principal boy’s in a 
pantomime. The trousers were shorter, their line rather spoiled. The jacket 
flared a little, above and below the waist, quite as if I had hips and a bosom -  
but it felt tighter than before, and not half as comfortable. (TTV, p.l 19)
As a result of Walter’s efforts, Nan finds herself “clad not exactly as a boy, but,
rather confusingly, as the boy I would have been, had I been more of a girl” (TTV,
p. 120). With a new stage name, Nan King is thus bom. Although Kitty and Nan are a
double-act, Nan is the weaker performer:
[t]he act, I knew, was still all [Kitty’s]. When we sang, it was really she who 
sang, while I provided a light, easy second. When we danced, it was she who 
did the tricky steps: I only strolled or shuffled at her side. I was her foil, her 
echo; I was the shadow which, in all her brilliance, she cast across the stage. 
(TTV, p. 127)
Butler has argued that the “notion of an original or primary gender identity is often 
parodied within the cultural practices of drag [and] cross-dressing” (Butler, 1999, 
p. 174). However, it is “the relation between the ‘imitation’ and the ‘original’”
(Butler, 1999, p. 175) that is the key feature of Kitty and Nan’s act. Even as Kitty is 
imitating men, she is also the ‘original’ that Nan is imitating. According to Butler,
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“the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated. This repetition is at 
once a re-enactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially 
established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation” (Butler, 
1999, p. 178). When Nan repeats Kitty’s actions, it is as an overtly-feminised ‘man’, 
whose female identity is at once readable: echoing Irigaray, the audience is “firmly 
convinced, without possible hesitation ... that there is no ambiguity possible” 
(Irigaray, 1985b, p. 14). Any fears that the audience may have about Kitty’s motives 
for appearing on stage dressed as a man, and any concerns they may have about 
Kitty’s on-stage activities overlapping with her private life, are assuaged by Nan’s 
appearance. Ironically though, Kitty’s life and work are conflated: Kitty’s off-stage 
femininity, already in evidence on stage through costume tricks, is magnified by her 
proximity to Nan’s overtly feminine male drag. Likewise, Nan’s role, “the one 
historically assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry” (Irigaray, 1985a, p.76, my
• • o nemphasis), draws attention to what Kitty is doing: mimicking rather than ‘being’. 
Thus, the doubling-effect of two women on stage actually serves to further 
undermine Kitty’s (and Nan’s) credibility as men.
Off-stage, Kitty is very aware of the possibility that people may confuse her
act with her private life, and goes to great lengths to mark the two as separate,
ensuring she is always “clad as a girl, and walk[ing] like a girl, with her plait
fastened to the back of her head and a parasol over her arm” (11'V, p.45). Kitty’s
concerns increase when she embarks upon a relationship with Nan, saying to her,
“[y]ou won’t let on, will you, to anyone? You will be careful -  won’t you?” {TTV,
p. 108). In contrast, Nan does not appreciate the need to keep their relationship
hidden, responding to Kitty’s request with teasing: “I am the Queen of Carefulness. I
20 Irigaray argues that “[o]ne must assume the feminine role deliberately. Which means to already to 
convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it” (Irigaray, 1985a, 
p.76).
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shall go on being careful for ever, if you like -  so long as I might be a bit reckless,
sometimes, when we are quite alone” (TTV, p. 108). When Nan suggests that she
“do[es]n’t think [she] should be able to keep from kissing” (TTV, p.l 14) Kitty, Kitty
tries to explain her fears: “[y]ou will have to get used to i t ... Otherwise -  well, what
a show that would be!” (TTV, p.l 14). At this point, Kitty is unwilling to explain the
specific consequences of her relationship with Nan being discovered, and neither will
she permit any discussion of what their relationship means. What Kitty does do is
blame her reticence on others: “Kitty had given me leave to love her; the world, she
said, would never let me be anything to her except her friend” (TTV, p. 127).
When Nan meets two women backstage whom she describes to Kitty as being
“like us” (TTV, p. 131), Kitty is horrified: “[tjhey’re not like us! They’re not like us at
all! They’re toms ... They make a -  a career -  out of kissing girls. We’re not like
that!”’ (TTV, p. 131). Despite being able to describe what she and Nan are not, Kitty
finds it difficult to explain what they are: ‘“ [y]ou would have to give up the stage,’
she said seriously, ‘and so would I, if there was talk about us, if people thought we
were -  like thaf ” (TTV, p .l31, emphasis in original). Nan is dissatisfied with this
non-answer, but her attempts to get clarification end in frustration:
‘We’re not like anything! We’re just -  ourselves.’
‘But if we’re just ourselves, why do we have to hide it?’
‘Because no one would know the difference between us and -  women like 
that!’ (TTV, p. 131)
Kitty’s terror of being identified as a lesbian is so great that it cannot even be 
vocalised. Therefore, Kitty’s construction of her off-stage persona -  a heterosexual 
‘normal’ woman — is actually what Butler identifies in her theory of performativity as 
“the construction of the gendered body through a series of exclusions and denials, 
signifying absences” (Butler, 1999, p. 172). Sagri Dhairyam expands this to argue 
that “the very impossibility of ‘being’ a gender initiates a belief in gender: the lack
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that structures gender identity provides the imperative for that identity. Identity is
precisely what it cannot be” (Dhairyam, 1994, p.28) -  and this is also true of sexual
identity: Kitty’s lesbianism exists only as a silence; when this silence is broken, her
act faces its biggest challenge.
A drunk audience member awakens to see Nan and Kitty on-stage. His
response (“Girls? You call them girls? Why, they’re nothing but a couple of -  a
couple of toms\” \TTV, p.140]) leads to an ‘Emperor’s New Clothes’ scenario; the
audience, previously reacting to the girls “graciously” (TTV, p. 13 8), have their eyes
opened to the reality in front of them:
Toms! At the sound of it, the audience gave a great collective flinch. There 
was a sudden hush; the shouts became mumbles, the shrieks all tailed away. 
Through the shaft of limelight I saw their faces -  a thousand faces, self- 
conscious and appalled. (TTV, p. 141)
Following this ordeal, Kitty makes several changes, designed to create a sense of
space between her on- and off-stage personas. Her first step is to “question Walter ...
about the other acts” (TTV, p. 143) she and Nancy have to share a bill with. Now
informed, Kitty refuses to work alongside certain acts that transgress gender
boundaries (such as a man touring under the name “Paul or Pauline?” [TTV, p. 143]),
for fear of being made to appear “freakish by association” (TTV, p. 143). A far more
acceptable engagement is a contract to appear in pantomime. Kitty plays the
Principal Boy -  the prince -  and does so with no fear of being judged, in contrast to
the dangers of her double-act with Nan:
[i]t was rather odd to see Kitty spooning with [Cinderella] upon the stage, 
kissing her while the clock showed a minute-to-midnight -  though it was 
odder still, perhaps, to think that no one in the audience called out Toms! 
now, or even appeared to think it: they only cheered when the Prince and 
Cinderella were united at the end. (TTV, p. 147)
There is no negative reaction here -  and no fear of a negative reaction in spite of the
Principal Boy being celebrated as “all boy and all girl at the same time” (Carter,
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1994, p. 107, emphasis in original). Sara Maitland would attribute the lack of 
negative reaction to the idea that “[t]he hallowed antiquity of Pantomime seems to 
have taken some of the moral danger out of cross-dressing on the stage” (Maitland, 
1986, p.26). Laurence Senelick’s claim that “the principal boy played by a woman 
and the dame played by a male comedian are not evading the standard gender 
binary” (Senelick, 2000, p.l 1) is better understood through Judith Butler’s 
explanation of heterosexuality as “operating] through the regulated production of 
hyperbolic versions o f ‘man’ and ‘woman’” (Butler, 1993, p.237). Kitty’s 
performance with ‘Cinderella’ is therefore actually a hyperbolic mirroring of 
heterosexuality -  a normative state -  that reaffirms the gender binary. This only 
works because the ‘maleness’ of the Principal Boy is taken seriously: as Angela 
Carter argues, “[t]he Principal Boy is a male/female cross, like the Dame, but she is 
never played for laughs. No. She is played for thrills, for adventure, for romance” 
(Carter, 1994, p. 107, my emphasis).21
The second and “biggest change” {TTV, p. 144) that Kitty makes is to move 
out of Mrs Dendy’s small room to “the top two floors” {TTV, p. 145) of a large house. 
Kitty instigates the move, claiming that “it looked queer, us still sharing a room, and 
a bed, when we had the money to live somewhere ten times the size” {TTV, p. 145). 
Sharing a room is understandable as a necessity for Kitty and Nan when struggling 
financially, but continuing to share when they are both earning a reasonable wage 
can only lead to the perception that they are sharing through choice, i.e. they are Tike 
that’.
Unbeknown to Nan, Kitty is cultivating a secret relationship with Walter.
Stumbling upon them together, Nan is stunned: ‘“ [i]t isn’t true!’ I said. ‘Oh tell me,
21 This is in direct opposition to the character o f Eve/Evelyn in The Passion o f New Eve, which will be 
explored in Chapter 3. Eve/Evelyn, who is arguably a “male/female cross” (Carter, 1994, p. 107) is 
mocked by various characters in the text.
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tell me -  say it ain’t true!’ ... At last, she met my gaze. ‘It’s true,’ she whispered” 
{TTV, p. 168). The conditions of silence have been reversed; now it is heterosexuality 
that cannot be spoken of: ‘“ I didn’t like to do itV she said miserably. ‘At times I 
could hardly bear it -  ’” {TTV, p. 170, my emphasis). Kitty explains her actions as the 
result of desperation: “I didn’t know what else to do” {TTV, p. 169). The gulf between 
Nan and Kitty’s different responses to the notion of socially acceptable behaviour 
widens: Nan asks “Why couldn’t we have gone on as we were...?” {TTV, p.170), and 
Kitty restates the code of silence that must surround their lesbian behaviour: “‘You 
know why! It is all right, that sort of thing, when you are girls. But as we got 
older.. .We’re not a couple of scullery maids, to do as we please and have no one 
notice it. We are known; we are looked at -  ’” {TTV, p.170, emphasis in original). 
Kitty is reiterating the argument she made regarding their living quarters -  their 
behaviour must be appropriate to their circumstances. The danger of not changing -  
of remaining in Mrs Dendy’s house, and being ‘careful’ -  is that they “should never 
be careful enough! You are too much -  Nan, you are too much like a boy” {TTV, 
p.171).
Although it is risky to appear “too much like a boy” {TTV, p. 171) on stage, it 
is even more dangerous to carry this behaviour off stage. However much effort Kitty 
puts into appearing ‘normal’, if she remains with Nan she will be, as she fears, 
“freakish by association” {TTV, p. 143). To counteract the gossip surrounding them, 
Kitty must boost her heterosexual credentials by marrying Walter and distancing 
herself from Nan:
‘Walter has a plan. For a new act. He wants to return to the halls... ’
‘To the halls? After thisl With you and me -  ?’
‘No. With me. Just me.’ {TTV, p. 171)
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Although Kitty plans to marry Walter, she is doing so only to draw attention away
from her relationship with Nan: “‘this is for the best[.] With Walter as my husband,
who would think, who would say -  ?’ I pulled away; she gripped me tighter -  then
cried at last, in a kind of panic: ‘Oh, you don’t think, do you, that I’ll let him take me
from you?”’ (TTV, p. 172).
Earlier in the novel, Nan is shown to be naive about the risks of being open
about her lesbianism. Here again, she would rather confess their relationship than
risk losing Kitty to Walter. So when Walter claims to know about Nan and Kitty’s
relationship, Nan makes sure he knows the exact terms of the romance:
‘I know,’ he said slowly, ‘that you were -  sweethearts, of a kind.’
‘Of a kind. The kind that -  what? Hold hands? Did you think, then, that you 
were the first to have her, in this bed? Didn’t she tell you that I fuck her?’ 
(77y,p.l73)
By explicitly revealing the facts of the relationship, Nan is challenging Walter to try
and measure up to her. However, as Judith Butler has argued, identity is produced
“along the culturally intelligible grids of an idealized and compulsory
heterosexuality” (Butler, 1999, p. 172). Butler develops this idea in her essay,
“Imitation and Gender Insubordination”, explaining that
[cjompulsory heterosexuality sets itself up as the original, the true, the 
authentic; the norm that determines the real implies that ‘being’ lesbian is 
always a kind of miming, a vain effort to participate in the phantasmatic 
plenitude of naturalized heterosexuality which will always and only fail. 
(Butler, 2001, p.20)
Therefore, Walter’s identity is endowed with so much more power than Nan’s that he 
does not need to utter a word in reply to her challenge: “[h]e was too much the 
gentleman to make me a foul-mouthed reply, but his expression -  a curious mixture 
of contempt, complacency, and pity -  was a speaking one. It said, That was not 
fucking, as the world knows itH (TTV, p. 173). Nan admits that Walter has “defeated” 
her (TTV, p. 173), a defeat based not on being ‘worse’ than Walter, but on not having
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her sexual preferences acknowledged in the same positive way as (and by) Walter.
For the first time, Nan realises the basis of Kitty’s fears that people would not be able
to understand and support their relationship.
Unable to compete with Walter, Nan looks for a situation where she can
safely express her sexuality, and ends up accepting the role of Diana Lethaby’s “tart”
{TTV, p. 248). In this role, Nan is forced to enact a private performance of an
‘appropriate’ gender: instead of being openly female, Nan is required to pass as a
man in public, so that Diana gains a sense of power from being the only person
aware of the ‘performance’. Nan’s first impression upon meeting Diana, is that Diana
has mistaken her for a real ‘man’. Trying to explain “I haven’t got what you’re after”
{TTV, p.233), Diana makes her control of the situation known by stating, “[y]ou have
exactly what I’m after” {TTV, p.233). For her new role, Nan is given a new (male)
costume: “a jacket and trousers of bone-coloured linen, and a waistcoat, slightly
darker, with a silken back ... three pique shirts ... collars, white as a new tooth;
studs, of opal, and cuff-links of gold” {TTV, p.269). Waters makes it clear that while
Diana is attracted to the dissonance of Nan’s female body in male clothing, it is the
female body that is the main attraction:
my breasts -  which had grown used to being as it were put aside with my 
corset and chemise -  seemed at her touch to rise and swell and strain against 
their wrappings. I felt like a man being transformed into a woman at the hand
of a sorceress. {TTV, p.239)
Diana particularly enjoys having the power to disrupt Nan’s performance by bringing 
into sharp focus the gap between Nan’s body and costume: “[i]n a moment she had 
her hand through the slit of my drawers, had seized a comer of the cravat, and began 
to tug at it. The silk uncurled, and squirmed and susurrated its way out of my 
trousers, like an eel” {TTV, p.240). It could be said, then, that as far as Diana is 
concerned, a man would not be ‘good enough’ for her.
35
Diana appropriates the male power role, and she inverts gender for her own
amusement. Nan’s fine clothes are revealed to have been picked “to match” (TTV,
p.272) the interior of Diana’s club, The Cavendish Ladies’ Club: Nan is intended to
fulfil the role of exhibit, a role that would normally be reserved for a woman in a
heterosexual arrangement. The club is a ‘safe’ place, bridging the gap between public
and personal: Nan is openly identified as a woman (“[t]his is Miss King, my
companion” [TTV, p.271]), but also displayed in her male guise. The other club
members join in the reading of Nan as a display, talking about her rather than to her,
and ignoring the fact that she is a human being: “‘it speaks!’ she cried. ‘All this’ -
she gestured to my face, my costume -  ‘and the creature even speaks!”’ (TTV,
p.273). Nan arouses interest for the club members, in part because she is a ‘creature’
-  neither male nor female, and in consequence, not human either. Here, Waters is
engaging with Judith Butler’s reference in Bodies that Matter to “those abjected
beings who do not appear properly gendered; it is their very humanness that comes
into question” (Butler, 1993, p.8).22 Subject to intense scrutiny from Diana’s friends,
Nan appears to subvert Laura Mulvey’s notion of the gaze:
[i]n a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split 
between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects 
its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly. In their 
traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and 
displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so 
that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness. (Mulvey, 1989, p. 19)
However, closer inspection reveals this not to be the case. Although it can be said
that the fantasy of a female gaze (Diana’s) is projected onto a male figure (Nan’s),
nevertheless, Nan’s male figure is one that is superimposed onto a female body. Nan,
as a woman, is still enacting a “traditional exhibitionist role” (Mulvey, 1989, p. 19),
22 This is something which I will examine in more detail in Chapter 4’s focus on genderless narrators 
within contemporary texts.
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but what is worse in this particular scenario is that Nan does not even realise what 
role she is playing. Mulvey asserts that “[tjhere are circumstances in which looking 
itself is a source of pleasure, just as, in the reverse formation, there is pleasure in 
being looked at” (Mulvey, 1989, p. 16); it is clear that Nan’s “pleasure in being 
looked at” (Mulvey, 1989, p. 16) is only possible as long as she does not understand 
how she is being perceived.
Nan remains in blissful ignorance of her powerlessness until forced to hear it 
from Diana’s lips: “[d]o you think it matters to me, how you feel about anything?
Get in my bedroom at once, you little bitch, and take your clothes off’ {TTV, p.296). 
Not only is Nan an exhibit, but also a servant, and her role can be summed up as “I 
posed and wore costumes” {TTV, p.301). Her role beyond the Cavendish and Diana’s 
home is very different. In public, Nan is introduced as Diana’s ward, “Neville King” 
{TTV, p.279). By renaming Nan, Diana is marking herself as an authority-figure 
within their ‘relationship’ because naming is “an act of power ... assigning the 
symbol, the act of T-am-he-who-tells-you-what-or-who-you-are’” (Gary Strankman, 
cited in Romaine, 1999, p. 121). In contrast to the club/home situations, Diana is not 
trying to be exhibitionist in the outside world, but is instead trying to remain 
unnoticed. This is because Diana has less power -  beyond the boundaries of her 
home and club, she is just a woman (worse, a widow), and cannot risk being 
embroiled in controversy, so it is important that Nan successfully passes as a man. 
When Nan draws attention to Diana’s group on a trip to the theatre, it makes Diana 
angry:
our seats were very good ones, in the centre of one of the front rows of the 
stalls. I had made us late, however, and the stalls were almost full: we had to 
stumble over twenty pairs of legs to reach our seats. Dickie spilled her wine. 
Satin snapped at a lady with a fox-fur around her throat. Diana, when she sat 
as last, was thin-lipped and self-conscious; this was not the kind of entrance 
she had planned for us, at all. {TTV, p.290)
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At the theatre, Nan sees Kitty’s new act, but fails to realise the parallels
between their new existences. Kitty is still part of a double-act, but she is no longer
the driving force, or the first name on the bill: “Walter Waters and Kitty” {TTV,
p.291). In this act, Kitty has lost her last name; she is just a secondary part of
Walter’s act. The role she is now playing is a degrading one -  Walter plays the role
of father, and Kitty plays his son:
she was dressed in a boy’s sailor-suit -  a baggy white blouse with a blue sash, 
white knickerbockers, stockings, and flat brown shoes; and she had a straw 
hat slung over her back, on a ribbon. Her hair was rather longer, and had been 
combed into a curl. {TTV, p.295)
The role is actually doubly degrading, because in “play[ing] the child, with her
husband” {TTV, p.295), Kitty is enacting Irigaray’s conception of women as “a
commodity ... marked phallicly by their fathers, husbands, procurers” (Irigaray,
1985a, p.31). A child-wife to her father-husband, Kitty has lost her own identity.
Walter, as father-husband-manager, owns all that Kitty is, and exercises his power by
taking over her act and forcing her to graphically display on-stage the multiple ways
in which he has ownership of her.
Nan makes the mistake of believing that her own performance of masculinity
gives her power, but the power she exercised on the stage alongside Kitty is
conspicuously absent from her interactions with Diana. In spite of the “terrible
shame” {TTV, p.295) Nan feels when watching Kitty’s act of powerlessness, she fails
to realise that she and Kitty are in the same position, controlled by someone else.
Attempting to mount a challenge to Diana’s authority, Nan finds her position made
clear: “do you think you are mistress here, to give orders to my servants? Why, you
are a servant! What is it to you, if I ask my girl to bare her backside for me? You
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have bared yours for me, often enough!” (TTV, p.315). Nan may be the actor, but it is 
Diana who writes and directs this private performance.
Ejected from Diana’s home, Nan tries to be accepted into a new home. 
Realising that her male impersonation act will not translate well to ordinary life, Nan 
adopts a brand new role. The role Nan chooses is that of housewife, and she uses her 
newly-discovered ‘female’ skills to try and persuade Florence, the homeowner, to let 
her stay: “I could clean and cook, like I did today. I could do your washing ... I 
could look after your little boy while you are at work” (TTV, p.368). Laying claim to 
a femininity she does not possess, Nan is trying to emphasise how ‘normal’ she is: “I 
met fifty women in your street today, all doing exactly those things! It’s natural, ain’t 
it” (TTV, p.371). When Florence acquiesces, Nan is pleased, admitting to herself the 
extent of her deception: “[w]hat did it matter, that I was not all that I pretended? I 
had been a regular girl once; I could be regular again” (TTV, p.373).
Nan regards being a ‘regular girl’ as just another act, remarking that “there 
were moments at Quilter Street, when I found myself handing out cups of tea, rolling 
cigarettes, nursing babies while other people argued and laughed, when I thought I 
might as well still be in Diana’s drawing-room, dressed in a tunic” (TTV, p.378). 
Nan’s stage is the ‘real’ world and she is moving towards a personal performance -  
transforming herself for herself, and examining the elements of her fractured 
identities to try and form a cohesive ‘true’ identity. Before she gets to this point, Nan 
is still playing with identities to try and find one that will help her fit in. However, 
the effort of trying “to be ordinary” (TTV, p.380) proves too great. Changed by her 
transgressive experiences, Nan finds she cannot just slip back into the role of 
‘woman’, especially having experienced liberty and power. This struggle is played 
out via costume. First, she trades her boots for “shoes with bows on” (TTV, p.381),
39
and then she gets “a hat with a wired flower and a dress with a ribbon at the neck”
{TTV, p.381). This desperate attempt to become a woman by looking feminine fails
because it is a role Nan is no longer suitable to play: “I only looked extraordinarily
awful... it was as if wearing gentlemen’s suits had magically unfitted me for
girlishness, for ever” {TTV, p.381). Nan finds that she is adopting masculine
characteristics without having to consciously think about it, “producing] the effect
of an internal core or substance” (Butler, 1999, p. 173) that Butler describes. Being a
‘girl’ no longer comes ‘naturally’ to Nan -  she has to work at it, as she once worked
at appearing as a man. The use of the word ‘magically’ to describe how Nan has
changed fits in with the theatrical/performance element of the novel, but it also
reflects the way Nan’s unconscious performance of gender is produced -  seemingly
instantly, with the audience left to guess at the ‘how’ and ‘why’ that they cannot see
now that Nan has mastered her own sense of self.
Although Nan accepts the female role, she finds herself needing an outlet for
the expression of her masculinity. To this end, Nan
bought a pair of moleskin trousers, and a set of drawers and a shirt, and a pair 
of braces and some lace-up boots; then, back at Quilter Street, I knocked on 
the door of a girl who was known for doing haircuts for a penny and said:
‘Cut it off, cut it all off, quick, before I change my mind!’ {TTV, p.404)
Nan finds the experience liberating, remarking that “it was not like she was cutting
hair it was as if I had a pair of wings beneath my shoulder blades, that the flesh had
all grown over, and she was slicing free” {TTV, p.405). Nevertheless, Nan promises
herself that “for the sake of the neighbours, I would only wear [my trousers] to do the
housework in” {TTV, p.405). Within a month, the lure of the trousers has proven as
strong as any drug, and it encroaches into other areas of her life:
the neighbours had all caught glimpses of me in them, and since I had 
become known in the district as something of a trouser-wearer, it seemed 
rather a fuss to take the trousers off at night and put a frock on. {TTV, p.406)
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In doing this, Nan faces some opposition: “Mrs Monk’s daughters, next door, would 
run squealing when they saw me. Ralph’s union colleagues tended to look me over, 
as they debated, and then lose the thread of their text” (TTV, p.407). Nan downplays 
the fuss, arguing that “in some houses in Bethnal Green ... it was a luxury to have 
any sort of clothes at all, and you regularly saw women in their husbands’ jackets, 
and sometimes a man in a shawl” (TTV, p.407). There is a difference in cross- 
dressing through necessity, and doing so through choice, and the issue goes back to 
Kitty’s decision to no longer share a room with Nan: in making a conscious decision 
to transgress, Nan is declaring herself ‘like that’ -  a cross-dresser, a lesbian, a 
“freak” (TTV, p.278) -  and bringing her personal gender performance into the realm 
of the public.
Accepting that she does not fit ‘normal’ definitions of what it means to be a 
woman, Nan feels able for the first time to face her memories of her on-stage career. 
Responding to someone asking whether Nan is “that Nan King gal, what used to 
work the halls with Kitty Butler” (TTV, p.419), Nan finds her sense of reality 
threatened even though she responds confidently: “‘I am Nan King.’ It was the truth, 
and yet I felt like an impostor -  as if I had just said, ‘I am Lord Rosebery’” (TTV, 
p.419). Butler argues “[t]hat the gendered body is performative suggests that it has 
no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (Butler, 
1999, p. 173). The appearance of a postcard featuring a picture of herself and Kitty in 
male drag makes Nan feel as if she is “gazing into someone else’s past” (TTV, 
p.420). Afraid of forgetting what performing (on stage) feels like, afraid of losing a 
part of herself that she can only access through performing, Nan asks if she can keep 
the photograph: “I lost a lot of stuff, and never cared to think of it till now. This,
41
however ... [w]ell, it won’t hurt me, will it, to have this little reminder?” (TTV, 
p.424).
Gaining strength from drawing on her past, Nan falters when she comes face- 
to-face with Diana once again. More specifically, it is Diana’s new companion, 
“Reggie” (TTV, p.450), who shakes Nan to the core by reminding her of the 
powerless depths to which she once fell. Reggie is a carbon copy of Nan, and 
suggests that Nan herself was an imitator rather than an original: “[t]he trousers were 
handsome, and bulged at the fork. The boy himself was tall and slight; his hair was 
dark, and cut very short. His face was a pretty one, his lips pink as a girl” (TTV, 
p.451). Nan has been replaced, as easily as an understudy taking on the main role, 
and she realises that she was only attractive to Diana because of her ability to pass as 
a man, rather than because of any individual traits.
Shaken, Nan reaffirms her new power when she joins Florence’s brother 
Ralph on stage at a Worker’s rally, not only helping him recite his speech on 
Socialism, but altering it to better fit the demands of her performance: “I found 
myself adding a few little rhetorical flourishes to the speech, as I went along” (TTV, 
p.457). She performs “as if I were a pantomime dame, and Ralph my cross-chat 
partner” (TTV, p.457). The interesting aspect of Waters describing Nan as a 
‘pantomime dame’ is the male undercurrent to such a role, emphasising that Nan has 
not completely abandoned her masculinity. She achieves a measure of happiness 
because she can perform on her own terms. When the novel ends with “a muffled 
cheer, and a rising ripple of applause” (TTV, p.472), it is only fitting that a book that 
is dedicated to pretence, performance and the lure of the stage, gives the last word to 
the stage.
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I have already argued that Nan and Kitty enact the role of drag king, rather
than male impersonator, on-stage. The drag king represents a complex relationship
between the on- and off-stage persona: Halberstam argues that
[t]he drag king might make no distinction between her off-stage and on-stage 
persona or she may make an absolute distinction; she may say that on- and 
off-stage personae bleed into each other in unpredictable and even 
uncontrollable ways. (Halberstam, 1997, p. 105)
Kitty tries to emphasise the distinction between her on-stage and off-stage persona: 
off-stage, she is “clad as a girl, small and slim and shapely, a false plait smothering 
the lovely, ragged edges of her crop” (TTV, p.36), and she chooses Walter over Nan 
to preserve her image as a heterosexual, ‘normal’ woman. By comparison, Nan’s 
relationship with her on- and off-stage image is a difficult one, affected by her 
growing feeling that the distinction between the two is perhaps not as great as she 
first expected: Nan, in an echo of Halberstam’s words, finds that her “on- and off­
stage personae bleed into each other” (Halberstam, 1997, p. 105). As a successful 
performer, Nan depends on stereotypes to construct (un)believable characters. 
Tipping the Velvet shows that cross-dressing on stage is not necessarily concerned 
with creating a perfect representation of gender, and constitutes an altogether 
different type of performance. Unlike James (James Miranda Barry) and Joss 
(Trumpet) Nan is able (on-stage) to show that her manhood is a construct, and is in 
fact encouraged to make this visible. She only encounters problems when she 
continues this behaviour off-stage, and finds the boundaries between her on- and off­
stage persona, and masculine and feminine behaviour blurred.
23 Kate Bomstein asks, “who can you fall in love with? Must we follow the unwritten law that ‘real 
men love women and real women love men’?” (Bomstein, 1998, p.98). But of course, this leads to the 
question of what marks people as ‘real men’ or ‘real women’: “‘real man’ and ‘real woman.’ They’re 
at once vital concepts and meaningless, useless terms. They’re vital concepts because nearly everyone 
believes there is such a thing as a real man or a real woman ... They’re meaningless, useless terms 
because of the nearly universal disagreement about what those terms actually mean” (Bomstein, 1998,
p.22).
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James Miranda Barry
There is no such blurring of ‘on-’ and ‘off-stage’ personas in James Miranda Barry 
because James is playing the same role ‘on-’ and ‘off-stage’. Indeed, it could be 
argued that James is constantly on-stage, never allowed to let his character slip for 
fear of the possible consequences. James Miranda Barry is a fictionalised account of 
the life of Dr James Barry, a woman who served as a man in the British Army during 
the 1800s. Maijorie Garber has recognised the proliferation of “stories of lifelong 
cross-dressers whose ‘true’ gender identities were disclosed only after death” 
(Garber, 1992, p.67).24 For Halberstam, writing in In A Queer Time and Place, the 
problem is that
[tjransgender biography [i]s a sometimes violent, often imprecise project that 
brutally seeks, retroactively and with the benefit of hindsight, to erase the 
carefully managed details of the life as a passing perdon, and recasts the act 
of passing as deception, dishonesty, and fraud. (Halberstam, 2005, p.48)
Garber explains this in another way, in terms of the way such stories “recuperat[e]
social and sexual norms ... reinstating the binary (male/female)” (Garber, 1992,
p.69), and thus detaching “[wjhatever discomfort is felt by the reader or audience”
(Garber, 1992, p.69) from the narrative. One of the main differences between
24 See, for example, Diane Wood Middlebrook’s Suits Me, which begins “[t]his is the story of a 
woman named Billy Tipton, a jazz musician who lived as a man from the time she was nineteen until 
‘he’ died at age seventy-four and was discovered to be female” (Middlebrook, 1999, p.xiii). 
Throughout the text, Billy’s female identity is kept at the forefront, his male identity dismissed: 
“[ajbout a year before she died, Billy explicitly told one of her cousins that she considered herself a 
‘normal person’ -  specifically, not a hermaphrodite, and by implication not a lesbian; certainly not a 
man” (Middlebrook, 1999, p.60). This view is challenged by Trumpet. Joss’s male identity is 
highlighted, and his female identity marginalised.
25 Jason Cromwell describes how “becoming invisible as transmen/FTMs and only visible as men is 
precarious and dependent upon how ‘out’ someone is. There is always some risk o f being found out 
and marginalized as a result. Often when discovered, regardless of how and irrespective o f the 
duration of their lives as men, they are turned back into women and again made invisible” (Cromwell, 
1999, p. 12). However, the real-life cases of James Barry and, more recently, Billy Tipton, show that, 
far from being “made invisible”, the after-death discovery that a man was bom a woman is followed 
by intense media speculation and investigation into the hows and whys of the situation. Jackie Kay 
references this with the character of Sophie Stones in Trumpet, a tabloid journalist who wants to write 
a lurid biography of Joss, and expose him not just as a woman, but “weird as fuck.. .a perv” (Tr, 
p. 127/8).
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Trumpet and James Miranda Barry is the physical presentation of the protagonists.
In Trumpet, Joss’s appearance is convincingly male: being “astonishingly handsome” 
(Tr, p.l 1) gives him an advantage when passing as a man. By contrast, James 
Miranda Barry operates from the assumption that it is impossible to convincingly 
appropriate a male role unless one is bom male. Duncker crafts her novel in order to 
expose James’s failures rather than successes. Where Joss is good-looking and 
charming, James looks “like a very well-dressed dwarf that had escaped, in full 
costume, either from the stage or from the circus” (JMB, p.74).26 James challenges 
perceptions by laying claim to maleness while appearing frail and child-like.
When James accepts the post of “Assistant Surgeon to the Forces at the Cape
of Good Hope” (JMB, p. 178), he is able to hide behind this impressive title as it
combines the traditionally male occupations of medicine and combat. Discussing
Freud’s lecture, “Femininity”, Luce Irigaray argues that, in terms of making a
distinction between male and female, “[t]he important point, it seems, is for you to be
firmly convinced, without possible hesitation, that you cannot be in error, that there
is no ambiguity possible” (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 14). This is not the case with James:
ambiguity follows him throughout his time at the colony, and he finds himself
subject to “openly inquisitive stares” (JMB, p. 182) from the colony’s inhabitants, due
to his unusual appearance, although his competence in medicine forestalls any direct
questioning of his sex. On arrival at the colony, James is presented with a horse from
the Deputy Governor: “a gigantic bay mare ... far too large for [James], who would
have looked odd on anything bigger than a child’s pony” (JMB, p. 191). In effect,
James’s presentation of maleness is unsuccessful; he has failed to live up to the
Deputy Governor’s expectations of maleness (an imposing physicality). Unable to
26 There are three characters in James Miranda Barry who share the first name James. To avoid 
confusion they will be distinguished in the following way: James = James Miranda Bany; Barry = 
James Barry; Loughlin = James Loughlin.
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rely on his physicality to boost his claims of maleness, James instead has to depend
on his reputation and behaviour to create a believable form of maleness. Boasting of
the four stallions he had when living in Cape Town, James impresses the Deputy
Governor with his apparent strength: “a man who has handled four stallions is a man
to be reckoned with” (JMB, p. 191).
During his first week at the colony, James makes an effort to promote his
masculinity to everyone:
he scandalised -  and delighted -  the assembled company at the banquet given 
in his honour by partaking of a very frugal amount and yet downing several 
bottles of claret single-handed. Without any trembling of the hands, 
reddening of the complexion or glazing of the eye. (JMB, p. 197)
The women of the colony “could not get enough of him” (JMB, p. 198), finding his
“delicate” (JMB, p. 194) nature attractive. In particular, James is aggressively pursued
by Charlotte Walden, the Governor’s daughter. This creates a destabilising role-
reversal, with James forced to occupy the role of chaste female as Charlotte acts
sexually aggressively: “I can bear it no longer. Forgive my frankness, Dr Barry. I beg
you to kiss me” (JMB, p.203). In response, James “raised her importunate fingers to
his lips and gently kissed them all” (JMB, p.203), an action the narrative voice
describes as requiring “great presence of mind” (JMB, p.203). When Charlotte asks
James to kiss her, she provides him with a challenge: if he refuses to respond to her
flirtations, he risks being gossiped about and having his sexuality and gender
questioned, but a positive response to her overtures could place him in danger of
discovery if the ‘relationship’ is furthered.
To avoid the attentions of Charlotte or any other woman who may have
designs upon him, James makes it known that “he’s not the kind of man you marry”
(JMB, p.212): he “flirt[s and] has such a winning way with women” (JMB, p. 187),
and his “impeccable bedroom manners” (JMB, p. 187) mean that “ladies sought him
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out” {JMB, p. 198), which cements his reputation as a ladies’ man. Charlotte refuses
to accept James’s lack of interest, and tricks him into having dinner with her; the
evening ends with Charlotte getting hopelessly drunk and James trying to put her to
bed, which she interprets as “the doctor’s authoritative approach to seduction” {JMB,
p.233). James struggles to carry Charlotte to her room: “[t]he door fell open and
[James] threw Lotte down into a gleaming pool of white linen, simply because he
was unable to carry her one step further” {JMB, p.233). She misreads James’s
weakness as part of his seduction technique, which forces him into action:
[t]here was only one way to end this. He pulled her face round towards him 
and kissed her ferociously on the lips ... He kissed her again, harder this time 
... With his left hand [James] pulled her skirts right up to her thighs and 
beyond, then reached down into her most secret places. She cried out, startled 
and amazed. The doctor’s expert knowledge of anatomy came into play. 
{JMB, p.234)
Duncker’s decision to focus on James’s “expert knowledge of anatomy” {JMB, 
p.234) makes the scene more mechanical rather than sexual, emphasising James’s
y n
lack of interest in women. She also reconfigures the notion of the doctor: James 
exploits his medical knowledge to aid his maleness, which puts an ironic twist on the
yt>
medicalisation of gender.
It is through the performativity of medical discourse that James performs 
‘authority’, which is read as masculine. This can be considered performative because 
it is a “fabricatiofn] manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other 
discursive means” (Butler, 1999, p. 173, emphasis in original), the corporeal signs in 
this case being James’s medical skills. The role of medicine in the novel is further
27 The mode of sex could be read as undermining James’s male identity, as it highlights that James 
cannot fulfil the male duty of “the procreator” (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 18). However, the mechanics of the 
scene could also be read as a type of performance of sexuality, and therefore traditional gender norms.
28 The medicalisation of gender will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 2.
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29underlined in the American version of the novel, which was entitled The Doctor.
As I have already pointed out, the role of ‘doctor’ is traditionally male. Matt Olson 
argues that “when we hear the word ‘doctor’, we reflexively picture a male, because 
as we see on T.V., in books, on commercials, and our own experiences in the 
doctor’s
o n
office, doctors are men while nurses are women” (Olson, 2005).
At this point I think it would be useful to look at another text written by
Duncker. In 1989, Duncker published the short story ‘James Miranda Barry 1795-
1865’, her first attempt at writing Dr James Barry’s story. The most striking
difference between the novel and the short story is the way James acknowledges
aspects of his femaleness in the short story. This is most evident in the short story’s
version of the relationship with Charlotte (reconfigured in the short story as an
unnamed woman). Where the novel portrays James as an unwilling participant in
Charlotte’s romantic plans, the short story reveals a James who wants to sleep with
the woman, and is willing to admit, at least partially, his secret:
this was the woman, who, after I had pleasured her so many times that the 
sheets were wet with her happiness, reached for the studs on my shirt. I held 
her at arm’s length, away from my body, smiling in the candlelight. I felt her 
tense and uncomprehending -  then came the moment of exhilaration, 
recognition, joy ... ‘What are you?’ she said. ‘You know,’ I replied. And I 
covered her damp breasts in kisses, all of which she repaid in frill (Duncker, 
1997, p.41).
Here James is not denying his femaleness, although he is not explicitly admitting it 
either. Responding to the question, “what are you?” with “you know” (Duncker, 
1997, p.41) positions the answer as something to be decided by other people.
29‘The Doctor’ is also the title of a chapter in Trumpet which examines a (female) doctor’s 
examination of (and subsequent reaction to) Joss’s body after his death.
30 Olson underlines his claims with the use of a riddle: “A young boy and his father were in a car 
accident. Both were injured and rushed to the hospital... the doctor assigned to the young boy stared 
at him in surprise. 7 can’t operate on him! ’ the doctor exclaimed to the staff, ‘That child is my son! ’
... [the riddle’s] ability to stump intelligent, educated people speaks volumes o f the expectations 
people have for the sex of certain professionals” (Olson, 2005).
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Duncker’s decision not to offer an explicit response to the issue of James’s identity
however, reflects her own difficulties in answering the question satisfactorily: “her
[first] attempt to write a novel based on the character stalled after 100 pages when
she couldn’t resolve the problem of saying ‘him’ or ‘her’ in the narration” (Wroe,
2000).31 Duncker herself recalls the issue differently in a 2002 review of Rachel
Holmes’s biography of James Barry, Scanty Particulars: The Life o f Dr James Barry:
I agree with Holmes that, because Barry chose to live as a man and be known 
as a man, “his choice of identity should be respected”. I chose to tell a version 
of his story in a split narrative: I/he, a private life of indeterminate sexual 
identity and a public life as “a gentleman, a man of honour and an 
Englishman”. (Duncker, 2002b)
Duncker has reinterpreted her pronoun difficulties, choosing to “tell a version”
(Duncker, 2002b) of her writing process that rewrites Duncker’s problems as a
commitment to portraying the ‘truth’ of James’s life.
The complexity of James’s character is such that it is worth considering
Judith Butler’s questions:
[c]an gender complexity and dissonance be accounted for by the 
multiplication and convergence of a variety of culturally dissonant 
identifications? Or is all identification constructed through the exclusion of a 
sexuality that puts those identifications into question?” (Butler, 1999, p.84)
In the short story, although James presents himself as a man, he ultimately chooses
not to exclude those elements of identity (i.e. the body) that undermine his manhood.
Although Butler suggests that successful identities require a degree of exclusion
(which can be expanded to suggest that a masculine identity requires the exclusion of
what are regarded as feminine traits) this is not the case with James in the short story.
After the scene with the unnamed woman, James takes a walk along the beach where
he encounters a group of women: “[o]ne woman, her headscarf superb as an
Egyptian crown, leans slightly towards me. ‘Evenin’, Doctor.’ I bow to the group. I
31 This is an issue I will develop in Chapter 4’s examination of genderless narrators and characters.
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do not speak. ‘Is all right, man. Siddown ... We know what y’are’” (Duncker, 1997, 
p.42). Once again, James’s identity is reduced to the unspoken (you know/we know) 
where having knowledge is more important than revealing it. Diana Fuss argues that 
‘“ [m]an and ‘woman’ are not stable or universal categories, nor do they have the 
explanatory power they are routinely invested with’” (Fuss, 1990, p.3). The claim 
that the women know what James is, stands in opposition to calling him ‘man’, so the 
category ‘man’ is destabilised, calling into question exactly what a man is. 
Nonetheless, James feels “contented” (Duncker, 1997, p.42). The women ‘know’ that 
James is a woman, even though they call him ‘man’: he is “no longer misunderstood” 
(Duncker, 1997, p.42) because of the women’s double identification of him, tacitly 
acknowledging the open secret of his femaleness within the label of ‘man’.
This tacit acknowledgment is less visible in the novel, where James utilises 
hyperbole to be read as a man. When Captain James Loughlin has his marriage 
proposal rejected by Charlotte, he unleashes his jealousy on the man he perceives as 
his rival: the “tiny, dwarf-like, red-haired” (JMB, p.206) James Miranda Barry. 
Loughlin challenges James to a duel, unaware of James’s reputation as “a crack 
marksman [who has] already fought half a dozen duels and killed his man every 
time” (JMB, p.215). Although Loughlin is willing to forgo the duel, James is 
insistent that he will “discharge [his] obligations to the letter” (JMB, p.216). James’s 
over-performance of masculinity relies on props, such as “a brace of engraved silver 
duelling pistols, custom-built by one of London’s finest gunsmiths” (JMB, p.218), 
and he behaves with an air of theatricality, talking “as if he’s repeating lines that 
have already been written” (JMB, p.216). In this performance, James enacts Judith 
Halberstam’s definition of the drag king: “a female ... dressing] up in recognizably 
male costume and performing] theatrically” (Halberstam, 1998, p.232). The strategy
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of employing a hyperbolic performativity to create a sense of ‘normal’ masculinity is
also used by Joss in Trumpet: “[h]e was into the shaving business. He got all
elaborate about i t ... He had to do this big masculine number on [Colman] because
he didn’t have one. He wanted one and he didn’t have one, did he” (7>, p. 122).
Hyperbole is necessary because appropriate maleness requires being ‘more’ than
female, because “[t]he ‘feminine’ is always described in terms of deficiency or
atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds a monopoly in value: the male
sex. Hence the all too well-known ‘penis envy’” (Irigaray, 1985a, p.69). The
exaggeration extends to James’s behaviour during the duel:
[Loughlin] staggered back, his throat and left ear on fire. [James] had neatly 
sliced off one epaulette and a dark curl of hair. The shot had been careful and 
deliberate. Had he wished, [James] could have forged a channel directly into 
[Loughlin’s] heart or laid his brains waste in the wilderness, as he had 
supposedly done to other men on other occasions. (.JMB, p.219)32
James’s legend is more fully realized by Duncker in the short story: “there
was talk, of course. I really did fight a duel on her behalf, killed the man and was
posted elsewhere as a result” (Duncker, 1997, p.41). In contrast, the novel suggests
that James’ actions are embellished:
two stories did the rounds: one about a quarrel in which [James] had sliced 
off his opponent’s finger at the dinner table with a fruit knife ... [Isaac] often 
polished the fruit knives at the residence, and they were barely effective for 
slicing through the flesh of a ripe apricot. (JMB, p.l 87)
Throughout the novel, Duncker makes it increasingly difficult for James to be read as
a man. This is not be a new phenomenon in the Dr James Barry story. June Rose’s
version of the story is subtitled “[t]he remarkable life of Dr James Miranda Barry, the
woman who served as an officer in the British Army from 1813 to 1859”, and
32 The use of ‘supposedly’ suggests that the open secret of the short story has made its way into the 
novel; other characters are not necessarily convinced of James’s masculinity regardless o f how many 
stories he tells: he has already experienced “Cape Town gossip concerning his identity” (JMB, p.203).
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throughout this text, Rose ironises the book’s actual title, The Perfect Gentleman, by
referring to James using female pronouns. Garber says of the title:
since [it is] called The Perfect Gentleman we might suspect some irony in the 
juxtaposition, but Rose -  like Barry’s other biographers -  insists on solving 
the mystery by emphasising Barry’s identification as a woman, suggesting a 
variety of motives for ‘her masquerade’. (Garber, 1992, p.204)
In fact, Rose’s stance on the issue of how to refer to James is made explicit in the
opening comments of the prologue:
[i]t was 1865 -  the year the ‘first’ woman doctor in Great Britain, Elizabeth 
Garrett Anderson, graduated. And yet another woman -  James Barry -  had 
already served with distinction as physician and surgeon for forty-six years in 
the British Army. (Rose, 1977, p. 12)
Rose seems to have a great deal of difficulty in understanding James’s motivation,
commenting that “the ambiguity of her birthdate ... seems curious, almost as if she
chose to be known only by her public persona” (Rose, 1977, p. 17). This ignores the
prime factor of James’ life -  his decision to live as a man -  and that James was only
known by his public persona. For Rose, James’ story raises too many questions that
cannot be comfortably answered: “[w]ho was she? How did she manage to conceal
her sex from the Army for forty-six years? Why did she decide to take on a man’s
role and a man’s work?” (Rose, 1977, p. 16). The only way Rose can reconcile
herself to James’s decision is to look upon it as an “obvious, but incredible solution”
(Rose, 1977, p.21) to the problem of how a woman could fulfil her potential, and she
ends up turning it into a story of one woman’s battle for liberation: “[w]hat makes
Barry so exceptional is that she anticipated female emancipation by nearly a hundred
years. And she did so not as a woman but from within the stiff conventions of an
exclusively male world” (Rose, 1977, p. 153).
Isobel Rae’s earlier account of James Barry, The Strange Story o f Dr James
Barry, also suffers from the author’s insistence upon using female pronouns to refer
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to James (“Dr Barry, having gained her M.D., was not prepared to rest on her 
laurels” [Rae, 1958, p. 15]). The most glaring statement in this text comes at the very 
end, in a discussion of the discovery of Barry’s ‘true’ sex after his death: “[p]oor Dr 
Barry! Her last wishes had been disregarded and the secret of her sex revealed” (Rae, 
1958, p.l 17). Other than the exclamation point, which destroys any sense of true 
regret, Rae disregards Barry’s wishes by constantly referring to him as ‘her’ and 
‘she’. Marjorie Garber remarks that, ‘“ [s]ee Barry is a woman!’ is effectively the 
denouement of the historical biographies as well as the acknowledged 
fictionalizations of James Barry’s life” (Garber, 1992, p.204); this has undoubtedly 
influenced Duncker, leading to the way that the novel treats James. Duncker 
emphasises that James is ‘lacking’ as man by forcing him to be compared with 
Loughlin. They have a complex relationship which is underscored by their shared 
name. At the beginning and end sections of the book, James is referred to as ‘James’, 
but in the middle section, when Loughlin appears, James is referred to as ‘Barry’; 
Loughlin has usurped James’s position -  the ‘real’ man has taken over.
Following their duel, and James’s willingness to spare Loughlin from serious 
injury or death, the two men strike up a friendship. Having heard rumours around the 
colony, Loughlin wonders if James could “be some kind of hermaphrodite, with a 
spectacular intelligence? He was neither man nor woman, but partook of both. He 
had a woman’s delicacy and grace, but the courage and skill of a man” (JMB, p.226). 
James’s ambiguous presentation confounds Loughlin’s understanding of gender as a 
binary that cannot be transgressed. Loughlin finds himself drawn to James: by the 
time they part he “had succumbed to [James’s] magic, and was, knowingly, a little in 
love with this man who had been tempted to kill him” (JMB, p.229). At a loss to 
comprehend both his feelings and James’s identity, Loughlin unconsciously
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reconfigures James as female, so that when he considers James and Charlotte as a 
couple, he dismisses “the perversity of Charlotte’s passion” {JMB, p.229) and “a 
scene of passion that was, indeed, quite beyond the reach of his imagination” {JMB, 
p.229).
Mark Llewellyn argues that “[t]he ‘queemess’ of [The Deadly Space 
Between] and Duncker’s first novel Hallucinating Foucault (1996) is located firmly 
within heterosexuality and male homosexuality” (Llewellyn, 2007, p.92). I would 
argue that this is also in evidence in James Miranda Barry. James’s attraction to, and 
friendship with, Loughlin has homosexual undertones that are queered by the 
reader’s knowledge of James’s female body. This is evidenced as Loughlin starts to 
“[acquire] a peculiar sense of intimacy with and admiration for the doctor” {JMB, 
p.238). Trapped within heterosexual thought patterns, Loughlin treats James like a 
girl, “sending [James] a huge cluster of wild orchids” {JMB, p.239). When a cholera 
outbreak hits the island and Loughlin is ordered to leave the colony, he is unsure of 
how to conduct himself. He admits that he “couldn’t go without saying goodbye ... 
leav[ing] unsaid the very things that were still simmering in the air between them” 
{JMB, p.264). The only acknowledgement that James gives of their relationship is to 
dispense “motherly advice” {JMB, p.264) through his medical expertise: “[t]ake care. 
Boil all your water. Don’t forget that. Don’t do silly things” {JMB, p.264). Although 
Loughlin’s apparent heterosexuality (and by extension, James’s sexuality and 
identity) is challenged, it remains only a challenge because this strand of the novel is 
then discarded until after James dies. The brief crack in James’s identity, wanting to 
be close to Loughlin while simultaneously keeping him at a distance, is a result of
33 It could also be argued that James and Loughlin are enacting a queered heterosexuality.
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not feeling in control of who he is; he cannot exist outside of his male identity 
without disappointing the people who made him, as we shall see.
A Son’s Privilege
As a very young girl, James is marked as different. His mother, Mary Ann, is “very,
^  i
very beautiful” (JMB, p.344), but James does not share her good looks. Mary Ann’s 
attractiveness is rated far more highly than her other attributes: although “[she] was 
clever too. She read widely. She wasn’t shy and she had a sharp wit” (JMB, p.344), 
her success depends upon being attractive to her lover, Francisco: “Francisco always 
loved beautiful women. Would he have gone on being in love with her when she was 
no longer beautiful?” (JMB, p.344). Francisco initially hopes James will “look like 
[his] mother” (JMB, p.3), but later revises his opinion, declaring that “it was more 
important to be clever than to be beautiful” (JMB, p. 19), which suggests his belief in 
the incompatibility of beauty and intelligence.
Francisco exposes James to an exciting male world and gives him access to 
education: “[i]t was Francisco who taught me to read and write. He taught me 
geography, history, philosophy, Latin, Greek, German and Spanish” (JMB, p. 18). 
Francisco’s efforts do not extend to providing James with a female education; he 
excels in the lessons Francisco provides, but “never learned how to draw, press 
flowers into delicate arrangements or execute passable watercolours, and ... didn’t 
have a dancing master” (JMB, p.26). Over time, Francisco abandons “girl” (JMB, 
p.3) and starts calling James “soldier” (JMB, p. 12), referencing the way James is 
starting to copy Francisco’s behaviour (Francisco is an army General), although it 
should be pointed out that at this stage, James shows no preference for either gender, 
so he is awaiting inscription from somebody.
34 For consistency, I will continue to refer to James using male pronouns.
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However, Francisco is not the only man that James learns from. James’s 
uncle, James Barry (who can be read as the true patriarch in this novel), plays a vital 
role in the shaping the man that James becomes. James is “afraid of him” (JMB, 
p. 14) but “tried to remember all his swear words [and] practised them in secret (JMB, 
p. 14). What James first identifies as fear is in fact “fascination” (JMB, p. 14). 
Specifically, James recalls that “[t]here was one particular thing about him which 
held me in thrall. He looked like me” (JMB, p. 14), recalling Lacan’s Mirror Stage: 
“[t]he child, at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the 
chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such 
his own image in a mirror” (Lacan, 2004, p.441). James Barry provides the unity of 
‘self which James is looking for, but both Barry and Francisco represent a 
connection to the masculine world and the possibility of James escaping femininity.
As James delves deeper into education, Francisco and Mary Ann not only 
allow him to take a step back from the female world, but actively encourage his entry 
into the male world, and Mary Ann follows Francisco’s lead, and starts referring to 
James using male pronouns (“[h]e can’t have been more than three years old” [JMB, 
p.27]). In Communicating Gender, Suzanne Romaine writes that “[t]he names we 
give to things are not arbitrary” (Romaine, 1999, p. 121) and this argument can be 
extended to pronouns. Mary Ann and Francisco refer to James as ‘he’ because he 
plays male games and acts in a male manner, and this in turn encourages James 
towards male behaviours: “names [or in this case pronouns] can wrap us up with 
sticky labels that give us a permanent address on the other side” (James Valentine, 
cited in Romaine, 1999, p. 122). When the family spends the summer with the 
Erskines, Lady Erskine is surprised by the way Francisco and Mary Ann are letting 
James live, stating that he has “grown up into someone quite different from what I
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had expected” {JMB, p.39). However, despite Francisco and Mary Ann’s willingness 
to let James grow up unconventionally in their own home, there are still certain rules 
that must be obeyed within society (particularly a society that knows James is 
biologically female): “[w]hen the ladies rose to take coffee in the drawing room 
Francisco pulled back my chair too. ‘Hop it soldier’” {JMB, p.42).
As they get used to James, the Erskines start calling him “chap” {JMB, p.52), 
although they are humouring James rather than accepting him as male. Their staff are 
not gossiping about James’s gender, having decided that he is male, but they are very 
interested in his parentage. When James meets Alice Jones, the kitchen girl, he is 
immediately asked whether he is “Mr Barry’s natural son” {JMB, p.35). James faces 
“embarrassment” {JMB, p.35) as he tries to explain that he is not actually a son at all, 
(the issue of being ‘natural’ being an ironic one in view of James’s gender 
transgressions) because this is the first time he has actually had to defend his gender. 
By saying “I’m not a son” {JMB, p.35), he is denying his manhood, but not actually 
accepting his womanhood. In this moment, James is “in limbo between the safe 
worlds of either sweet ribbons or breeches” {JMB, p.35). Alice tries to help James by 
removing the ambiguity, using a vernacular version of the doctor’s medical-speak to 
suggest that he can be easily defined: “[i]f you’re a boy you’ve got a prick and if 
you’re a girl you’ve got a hole” {JMB, p.35). But this definition flounders with 
James. Appearing masculine, but with female sex organs, James does not fit into 
Alice’s categories. Alice struggles to reconcile the two disparate elements: “[w]ell, 
you’re a sort of girl, I suppose. But definitely not like me. Perhaps you’re a girl 
dressed up as a boy? Or a boy that’s got enough girl for it not to matter too much 
either way” {JMB, p.35). James ends up tearful and “floundering in a pool of 
ambiguity” {JMB, p.35), and it takes Alice’s reassertion of a specific gender to help
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him: “[d]on’t cry. Boys don’t cry” (JMB, p.35). Despite her realisation that James is 
not a ‘normal’ boy, Alice shows belief in James as a boy, going so far as to coach 
him in his male role: “[kjiss. No silly, on the mouth. Cook says boys kiss girls on the 
mouth, not the nose” (JMB, p.3 8). Although James knows he is not traditionally 
male, he is also aware that he is not a typical female, admitting to his femaleness 
only in terms of how it matches Alice’s: “[t]his was all I had in common with Alice 
Jones: forbidden knowledge and powerlessness” (JMB, p.50).
Before the decision is made to allow James to live as a man, he has to follow 
certain rules. Mary Ann realises that James is transgressing too many boundaries 
when he announces that he plans to attend the summer ball with Alice. It is 
acceptable for James to be ‘male’ within the confines of the family and their friends, 
but to act as such at a ball attended by neighbours and villagers is to force the issue 
of his gender ambiguity out into society. Mary Ann and James are both concerned 
with appearing gender appropriate, but they approach the issue of what is appropriate 
from different directions. For Mary Ann, being appropriate is being recognisably 
female: “[y]ou ought to wear a dress for the ball, dear. People do talk” (JMB, p.54). 
James feels that he needs to be male to make his attendance with Alice legitimate: “I 
can’t ask Alice if I don’t wear trousers ...We’d be two girls” (JMB, p.55). James’s 
apparent regard for some of the rules of society is revealed to be no more than a 
desire to promote his ambiguity: “I realised that my ambiguous clothes were what 
had made me special and interesting in the eyes of Alice Jones” (JMB, p.55). This 
entire scene, then, is not a battle to be male, but James “fighting for the right to 
remain interesting” (JMB, p.55). As a girl, James holds no curiosity value and even 
less power, so will not submit to wearing a dress. Louisa Erskine finally decides that 
James can wear “smart blue regimentals, dressed as a soldier. Costume was much
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more acceptable than disguise” {JMB, p.55). Nan uses a similar outfit in Tipping the 
Velvet, when she tries to pass as a man: “my favourite costume -  the guardsman’s 
uniform, with its brass buttons and its piping, its scarlet jacket and its neat little cap” 
{TTV, p.228). The military uniform is like the title ‘doctor’, causing people to 
“reflexively picture a male” (Olson, 2005). This also works in a sexual context: 
Butler argues that “[h]omosexuality ... is simultaneously produced and proscribed by 
military and governmental authorities, which require ‘homosexuality’ in order to 
maintain the cohesion of the straight male community” (Salih, 2002, p.l 10).
Garber believes that “the appeal of cross-dressing is clearly related to its 
status as a sign of the constructedness of gender” (Garber, 1992, p.9) but most people 
find James “charming” {JMB, p.58) in his costume because it is not taken seriously 
as a statement about or against gender: as Judith Butler has pointed out, “parody by 
itself is not subversive” (Butler, 1999, p. 176). The guests view this girl-as-boy with 
amusement and a sense of wonder: “Mrs Emmersley, the vicar’s wife, told my 
mother that she had been quite convinced that I was in fact a mechanical doll, 
perhaps even a musical one, as I was so realistic” {JMB, p.58). Of course, realistic is 
not the same as real, as I have demonstrated in the case of Tipping the Velvet. What 
James is doing in this scene is not only transgressing the boundaries of male and 
female, but also real and not real. For the vicar’s wife, not knowing James’s gender 
causes her to doubt James’s realness. It is impossible for her to conceive of a 
situation where James would be allowed to develop as he has: “grotesque [like] a 
puppet dressed in carnival costume” {JMB, p.l 13).
Alice’s mother recognises the opportunity that James has been presented 
with. Referring to James as “Mrs Bulkeley’s famous tomboy daughter” {JMB, p.53), 
she suggests that his position affords him certain rights: “I hope your stepfather
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intends to continue your own education ... Your mother must insist upon it. You’re
dressed up like his son, not his daughter. You can claim a son’s privilege” (JMB,
p.54). Mary Ann also realises this, telling James to “believe every word [Francisco]
says and to be exactly like him” (JMB, p.23). Mary Ann desperately wants her child
to have a more fulfilling life than is traditionally afforded to women, and tells him,
“[y]ou must never marry! Never! I forbid it” (JMB, p.25). Gayle Rubin draws on
Marxist analysis when she asks,
[w]hat is a domesticated woman? A female of the species. The one 
explanation is as good as the other. A woman is a woman. She only becomes 
a domestic, a wife, a chattel, a playboy bunny, a prostitute, or a human 
dictaphone in certain relations. Tom from relationships, she is no more the 
helpmate of man than gold in itself is money. (Rubin, 2004, p.770)
If women are only oppressed within relationships, James can be protected if he is
removed from the sphere of marriage. As Francisco’s lover, Mary Ann struggles to
maintain her position in society: “she wasn’t a happy woman, not in herself. She was
never married to Francisco, you know. He could have cast her off at any time” (JMB,
p.343). As an almost-wife, Mary Ann is forced to try to survive without the support
of marriage, but does not want her daughter to be a wife. She recognises that the only
true freedom is one that does not rely upon men at all, but rather depends upon the
self for everything. However, this self must also be male, which is what sets Mary
Ann’s plan in motion. James’s uncle tells him that “all societies are based on the
seizure, slaughter and slavery of women, child. You ask your mother” (JMB, p.31).
Similarly, Irigaray remarks that
woman is traditionally a use-value for man, an exchange value among men; 
in other words, a commodity. As such, she remains the guardian of material 
substance, whose price will be established, in terms of the standard of their 
work and of their need/desire, by “subjects”: workers, merchants, consumers. 
Women are marked phallicly by their fathers, husbands, procurers. And this 
branding determines their value in sexual commerce. (Irigaray, 1985a, p.31)
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Francisco, James Barry, and David Erskine decide that they “can’t waste” 
(JMB, p.59) James by letting him grow up as a woman, and after tempting him with 
the offer of a university education, they reveal the cost of such an opportunity: 
“[t]here’s just one thing that you’ll have to remember from now on. You never will 
be a girl” (JMB, p.60). To make James’ transformation complete, he is given a new 
name and position in society: “[y]our uncle and I are giving you our names. And 
David’s volunteered to be your patron and guardian” (JMB, p.60). The patriarchal act 
of naming constructs a masculine ideology that has to be lived up to; that the men 
give James their names also allows them to claim James as a son and reaffirm their 
own masculinity:
[man’s] contribution to gestation -  his function with regard to the origin of 
reproduction -  is hence asserted as less than evident, as open to doubt. An 
indecision to be attenuated both by man’s ‘active’ role in intercourse and by 
the fact that he will mark the product of copulation with his own name ... 
[and] put his trademark upon the finished product. (Irigaray, 1985b, p.23)
This is particularly evident in the case of Francisco. There has always been gossip
surrounding the identity of James’s father; Francisco questions Mary Ann, in the
hope of finding out that James is his: “[s]he could have been mine ... can you swear
to me that she is not my child?” (JMB, p.7). By letting Francisco give James his
name, Mary Ann is staking an indirect claim on Francisco and helping her daughter
to “claim a son’s privilege” (JMB, p.54).
This ‘privilege’ comes at a price: on his deathbed, Barry wants to take full
credit, along with Francisco and Erskine, for the man that James becomes, arguing
that “we made you what you are. David paid for you. Francisco brought you up. I
gave you my name. Without us, you wouldn’t exist. We have some rights over you”
(JMB, p .l33). Barry’s statement can be interpreted as a veiled threat: the men have
ownership of James through his secret; the success of his life as a man is dependent
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on their on-going co-operation. Mary Ann intended for James to be free, but Barry 
believes that he and his co-conspirators own the man James has become. Romaine’s 
assertion that “[njothing is more personal or as closely related to our identity as our 
names” (Romaine, 1999, p. 147) falls apart in relation to James: his name illustrates 
his lack of a personal identity. It is also a constant reminder that “[o]nly men have a 
right to the permanency of their names” (JMB, p. 147); his real (female) name never
ISappears in the text and is lost forever once he becomes ‘James Miranda Barry’.
The men’s version of events -  their championing of their own roles -  is 
actually a privileging of men, for it is revealed that it was Mary Ann’s idea to let 
James live as a man. Francisco is only able to admit this after Mary Ann dies: “[s]he 
sent you to us on that damp midsummer night. She was the source of the plot, 
soldier. It was her idea ... What was she asking of us? To give you the chance to live 
something other than a woman’s life” (JMB, p.277). As a woman, Mary Ann is 
unable to claim credit for her clever plan and has to wait until death to be 
acknowledged; a reminder of her lack of status in the world. She is not just kept 
quiet, but gagged: she is absent when the men tell James what is going to happen, 
either by design or force. It is the men -  presented by Duncker almost like the three 
wise men, bringing enlightenment and hope -  that appear to make the decision. Mary 
Ann is present only as an absence and silence, a ‘good’ -  that is, silent -  woman, like 
the Virgin Mary, in the memory of another ‘woman’ (James): although the men 
ignore Mary Ann’s influence, James recalls how Francisco’s uniform “stank of 
sweat, alcohol and my mother’s musk” (JMB, p.59). Women are further gagged in 
the short story: although James (as a child) declares “I shall never marry” (Duncker, 
1997, p.40), it is a man (a painter who appears to be a version of James Barry) who
35 Mary Ann is also known throughout the text as “Mrs Bulkeley” (JMB, p.9), carrying the name of a 
dead husband and reaffirming her status as male property.
states “[t]hen, child, you must become a man. Learn to live in this world. Earn your 
own money. And stay out of debt” (Duncker, 1997, p.40).
James does not initially realise what it will mean to live as a man. It takes 
Alice’s greater comprehension of the world to “ma[k]e him understand the ways in 
which he had been set free” {JMB, p.91). Nevertheless, James remains trapped in a 
number of ways. Mary Ann realises that a consequence of her plan is that James is 
“alone now. He’ll always be alone. I’ve done that to him” {JMB, p.85). This, 
however, is an inversion of something that Duncker writes in her short story, “I have 
spent my life in exile, ferociously guarding my privacy” (Duncker, 1997, p.40). The 
secrecy of the novel implies that James has no choice but to keep certain facts 
hidden, but the “privacy” (Duncker, 1997, p.40) of the short story suggests a choice -  
although James is still deliberately withholding information about his private life, he 
has the option of revealing it. In the short story, James makes a choice to hide from 
the world (just as he made the decision not to marry), but he is stripped of power in 
the novel, affected by outside sources: the freedom that Alice promised does not 
come. Although James believes himself to be “the real thing” {JMB, p. 135) (that is, a 
man), ties remain to his female identity: “I am like my mother, a woman of secrets” 
{JMB, p. 141). This is in part because James can see parallels between his life and 
that of his mother.
Like James, Mary Ann “made the best of her life by not always telling the 
truth. She propagates an official version of events, in which some things will not, do 
not, cannot, happen” {JMB, p. 143). The similarity between the two is further 
reinforced when James describes his mother as “a woman who is performing a part. 
Her acting is so perfect that she only abandons the stage when she is alone” {JMB, 
p. 143). Mary Ann plays many parts, because
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woman’s ‘body’ has some ‘usefulness,’ represents some ‘value’ only on 
condition that her sex organs are hidden. Since they are something and 
nothing in consumer terms ... To sell herself, woman has to veil as best she 
can how price-less she is in the sexual economy (Irigaray, 1985b, p.l 15).
To sell herself, Mary Ann continually reinvents herself as “[a] rich man’s wife, a
drunkard’s poor widow, another rich man’s mistress. Always a man’s possession”
(JMB, p.276). This comment, which echoes Rubin (“a domestic, a wife, a chattel, a
playboy bunny, a prostitute” [Rubin, 2004, p.770]) is the basis for Mary Ann’s plan:
“I asked you to give my child the life I never had ... My child will have the freedom
I never enjoyed” (JMB, p.276). Unfortunately, Mary Ann’s plan is not as successful
as she had hoped. Following her death, James states that his mother “remains
unforgiven” (JMB, p.297) because “[s]he taught me to believe in fair play,
generosity, openness. Yet she gave me an identity within which I could never be
anything other than an imposter [sic]” (JMB, p.297). He asks himself, “[w]ho is
James Miranda Barry?” (JMB, p.297) and his answer betrays more than he intends:
“No one but her mother knows” (JMB, p.297).
In his analysis of the role played by ideology within society and culture,
Althusser says that “[i]deology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals
to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 2004, p.693). I am particularly
interested in one statement he makes in regard to this:
[t]hese ‘world outlooks’ are largely imaginary, i.e. do not ‘correspond to 
reality.’ However, while admitting that they do not correspond to reality, i.e. 
that they constitute an illusion, we admit that they do make allusion to reality, 
and that they need only be ‘interpreted’ to discover the reality of the world 
behind their imaginary representation of that world. (Althusser, 2004, p.693)
Even though James admits that his ‘outlook’ is largely imaginary, the result of
creating an identity as a man, this identity is necessary to show that manhood is a
requirement of anybody who wishes to be free. The paradox in this case is that
James’s public freedom (to travel the world, study medicine, etc.) comes at the cost
64
of his personal freedom. However, his recognition that his manhood is an 
Althusserian construction does not give him the power to step out of his identity:
“my life can never be disentangled” {JMB, p.297).
A Life in Disguise
Towards the end of his life, James starts to question whether he wants to be a woman
and if it would even be possible. Negotiating his way through confusion, he turns to
Alice Jones to give him the sense of perspective he so badly needs. James’s bond
with Alice remains because she is the “one person in the world who remembers me
when I was a child” {JMB, p.281). Alice represents a link to James’ childhood -  his
girlhood -  that is inaccessible by any other means. James has lived as man for a long
time and outlived everybody who knew the secret, so he is no longer under threat of
discovery, but it is difficult for him to throw off his manhood because it has become
so much of who he ‘is’: “[t]he mask has become the face” {JMB, p.281). When
James tells Alice that he is going to reveal his secret, Alice is aghast: “[a]re you out
of your senses?...They’d probably say you couldn’t possibly have been a real doctor
either -  if you’d been a woman all along” {JMB, p.357). The argument between
Alice and James focuses on the notion of a ‘real’ or ‘true’ identity. In Bodies that
Matter, Butler asks,
[w]hat are we to make of constructions without which we would not be able 
to think, to live, to make sense at all, those which have acquired for us a kind 
of necessity? Are certain constructions of the body constitutive in this sense: 
that we could not operate without them, that without them there would be no 
‘I,’ no ‘we’? (Butler, 1993, p.xi)
Alice cannot accept that there is any ‘I’ behind ‘James Miranda Barry’: “[y]our real
identity? What is your real identity? You’re James Miranda Barry, near relative to
David Steuart Erskine, eleventh Earl of Buchan ... what is genuine? This genuine
inner soul you say you want to discover? Nothing’s absolutely genuine!” {JMB,
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p.3 5 8). In her rage, Alice wonders how James can possibly exist if he admits the 
truth: “[w]hat do you want to do? Go around saying you’re a woman?” {JMB, p.358). 
Alice’s anger masks her fear of what will happen to James if he confesses: “[d]o you 
think that they’ll try to cure you or make you drawings of your anatomy? Or sell you 
to a circus?” {JMB, p.358).
Asking why James “ha[s] doubts at this stage” {JMB, p.359), Alice argues 
that “you can’t suddenly become a woman. It takes years of practice” {JMB, p.368). 
Butler argues that “performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate 
‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse 
produces the effects that it names” (Butler, 1993, p.2). Although Francisco, Barry 
and Erskine believed that they made James a man simply by saying “from now on 
you’re going to be a boy. And then a man” {JMB, p. 160), the process is far more 
complex. It takes the cumulative effect o f ‘reiterative practices’ -  constantly acting 
like a man and speaking like a man -  in order for James to be accepted as a man. 
Alice argues that it will be no easier for James to be a woman just because he has the 
right anatomy; she believes that one has to learn how to be something, that all 
identities are learned. This supports Butler’s belief that “[i]f the inner truth of gender 
is a fabrication and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface 
of bodies, then it seem that genders can be neither true nor false” (Butler, 1999, 
p. 174). Alice also claims that one has to depend on others for one’s identity: “[y]ou 
are who the world says you are” {JMB, p.359). Of course, the world states that James 
is a man because he has spent so much time presenting himself as a man.
One reason that Alice is so against James revealing he is female is because it 
will affect their relationship: “[rjeceived almost everywhere together” {JMB, p.358) 
as a couple, Alice is afraid that she will be labelled as “some sort of Sapphist” {JMB,
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p.358). If James is a man, he and Alice can fit into the heterosexual matrix, but if 
James is a woman, then his and Alice’s reputations will be damaged, and they will be 
denied respectability. This dilemma is also faced by Millie and Joss as will be seen in 
Trumpet
[ojne of the newspaper articles had the headline Living a lie. They found 
people who claimed to be Joss’s friends who said things like, ‘He fooled us 
completely.’ But it didn’t feel like that. I didn’t feel like I was living a 
lie.. .my life is a fiction now, an open book. I am trapped inside the pages of 
it. (Tr, p. 154)
Similarly, this theme also occurs in Tipping the Velvet when Kitty sacrifices her 
relationship with Nan because she “cannot bear also to be -  laughed at; or hated; or 
scorned” (TTV, p. 171). James tries to explain his turmoil, and expresses his fear that 
he is as trapped as any woman: “I’ve spent my life in disguise. I don’t know who else 
I could have been” (JMB, p.359). Alice actually helps James to accept his masculine 
identity by making him acknowledge the success of what he has done: “the most 
subtle performances are never detected, and cannot therefore be admired” (JMB, 
p.361).
Unfortunately for James, his subtle performance is detected after he dies, in 
what Garber refers to in Vested Interests as “post mortem unmasking” (Garber, 1992, 
p.47); that is, the discovery after death that somebody’s biological sex does not 
accord with their public gender performapce. Her argument could be applied to both 
James Miranda Barry and Trumpet. Garber notes that there were “dozens, probably 
hundreds, of such stories of lifelong cross-dressers whose ‘true’ gender identities 
were disclosed only after death” (Garber, 1992, p.67). The use of quotations marks 
indicates Garber’s unhappiness with the way truth is understood. She takes issue not 
just with the way such cases are explained, but that they require explanation at all: 
“whatever gender ... is assigned after the fact, the ‘explanation’ of his (or her)
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transvestism is normalized, by interpreting it in the register of socio-economic 
necessity” (Garber, 1992, p.69). Garber is showing that society is reluctant to believe 
that anybody would cross-dress unless they had specific and important reasons for 
doing so.
In this context, James’s death causes a flurry of reactions as people try to 
understand what James really was. Each different theory can be explained via the 
circumstances in which James Miranda Barry has been received by various factions 
of society. Following the death, George Graham, the Registrar-General, writes a 
letter to McKinnon, the man who completed James’ death certificate: “I take the 
liberty of asking you whether what I have heard is true, and whether you yourself 
ascertained that he was a woman” {JMB, p.363). This is based on the real-life letter 
that Graham wrote to McKinnon, but the linguistic impossibility of the statement 
means that in order to categorise James, Graham enacts Butler’s comment that “it 
will be possible to have a designated ‘female’ body and not to display traits generally 
considered feminine” (Salih, 2002, p.46). Graham’s interest is not a matter of 
science, but a wish to confirm (or deny) some salacious gossip: “[p]erhaps you may 
decline answering these questions: but I ask them not for publication but for my own 
information” {JMB, p.363). In answer, McKinnon replies that he “never had any 
suspicion that Dr Barry was a female” {JMB, p.364). As somebody who was 
“intimately acquainted” {JMB, p.364) with James, McKinnon tries to explain away 
the gossip by suggesting that he was most probably “an imperfectly developed man 
... a hermaphrodite” {JMB, p.364). By defining James in these terms, McKinnon is 
reducing James to a ‘condition’ with the intent to strip James of any blame for his 
actions.
j6 This verdict illustrates that the decisions that doctors reach in ambiguous cases are based on what 
they want the patient to be, rather than what the medical evidence says. This will be elaborated on 
during the Middlesex discussion in Chapter 2.
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Edward Bradford, the Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, describes the rumours
as “too absurd to require serious refutation” {JMB, p.365), and takes refuge in
McKinnon’s science, asserting that
[t]here could not have been any doubt, among people who knew him, on the 
subject of his physical constitution which was really that he was a male in 
whom the development of the organs of sex had been arrested from the sixth 
month of pregnancy {JMB, p.365).
Robert Jobson, James’ medical school friend, believes that the rumours are part of a
vicious smear campaign aimed at discrediting a remarkable man:
[h]is diminutive stature and the fine hands which were so advantageous to his 
work as a surgeon, combined with the above-mentioned professional jealousy 
of many years’ standing, have led to the insulting slanders published in the 
press. {JMB, p.365)
Perhaps the most unexpected defence of James comes from his namesake, James 
Loughlin. Loughlin, regarding reports with “mounting amazement” {JMB, p.366), 
relies not on science, but the idea that gentlemanly behaviour is only possible from a 
man. Loughlin recalls how “[a]n unfortunate misunderstanding led us to confront one 
another with loaded weapons ... the doctor was an expert marksman, and had his 
magnanimous generosity not spared my life I had been a dead man” {JMB, p.366). 
Loughlin reminds the public that James was a brilliant shot (a skill associated with 
men) and also subtly reminds people of what they were fighting over -  a woman. 
Loughlin further reaffirms James’ masculinity by saying that with regard to the duel, 
“[n]o woman would be capable of such a deed” {JMB, p.366). Loughlin’s final act 
towards James is to protect his identity -  to spare James as James spared him. 
However, Loughlin’s amazement does not tally with his earlier suspicions of James’s 
identity. I would suggest that Loughlin defends James because of his love for him: 
to help his friend maintain a lie.
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Alice too rewrites James’s life for her own benefits. In Alice’s version of 
events, she is “the leading lady” {JMB, p.369) and describes their relationship as one 
in which “she had loved in vain” {JMB, p.370). Speaking to a (female) journalist, she 
protects her own image while destroying James’s. In Duncker’s version of James’s 
story, it is Alice who “invented the stretch marks” {JMB, p.370), describing James’s 
body as “not only ... the perfect body of a woman ... but a woman who had borne a 
child. Of this I am quite certain” {JMB, p.370). James becomes more of a fiction in 
death than he was in life, with people clamouring to share their own versions of 
events. The version that closes the novel is Alice’s: “the story of the actress and the 
doctor, the obsession that stretched across decades, continents, the love that never 
died” {JMB, p.3 71). A life spent struggling with gender is transformed into a love 
affair and a scandal, and thus brought firmly back into the heteronormative realm of 
the Romance tale.
James Miranda Barry is given the chance to live as a man, but he struggles to 
be accepted as such in society because of his unconvincing appearance. Unable to 
rely on his looks, James depends on hyperbole, overstating his male behaviour to 
pass as a ‘normal’ man. According to Butler, “[gjenders can be neither true nor false, 
neither real nor apparent, neither original nor derived. As credible bearers of those 
attributes, however, genders can also be rendered thoroughly and radically 
incredible” (Butler, 1999, p. 180, emphasis in original). James reaches the conclusion 
that he has no ‘true’ gender, and that he can be what he wants to be, but to succeed as 
a credible man, James realises that he must, ironically, become incredible. In contrast 
to James, Joss in Trumpet easily succeeds as a credible man, but like James, it is after 
his death that his identity begins to unravel, as people cannot reconcile his female 
body with his identity as a man.
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Trumpet
It is not surprising that Jackie Kay would write a book such as Trumpet because she 
has long been interested in issues of identity: “[w]hen she was 12, she wrote the 80- 
page One Person, Two Names in a school jotter, illustrated by a pal, about a girl 
living in the States who was black but pretended to be white” (Brooks, 2002). In fact, 
this early attempt at writing can be seen as the precursor of Trumpet, which could be 
described as a story about a girl living in England who was female but pretended to 
be a man. Of course, the crucial question is whether Joss ‘pretended’ at all. I find 
myself in agreement with Butler when she says she “opposed those regimes of truth 
that stipulated that certain kinds of gendered expressions were found to be false or 
derivative, and others, true and original” (Butler, 1999, p.viii). Rather than discuss 
Joss (and James) in terms of ‘real’ and ‘false’ gender then, I think it is perhaps more 
accurate to think in terms of biological sex and chosen gender, although in this 
context Butler argues that there are restrictions in choosing a gender (insofar as 
anyone ‘chooses’ their gender), because “one is already one’s gender and one’s 
choice o f ‘gender style’ is limited from the start” (Salih, 2002, p.46, emphasis in 
original). This, in turn, is because “there is no pre-existing performer” (Salih, 2002, 
p.45) -  one is already inextricably linked with one’s gender. Butler’s central question 
can thus be reduced as follows: “[i]f gender is a process or a ‘becoming’ rather than 
an ontological state of being that one simply ‘is’, then what determines what we 
become, as well as the way in which we become it?” (Salih, 2002, p.46).
A large part of Joss’s identity as a man is dependent on his public 
presentation as a heterosexual, married man; his identity extends beyond his own 
performance to include his wife, Millie, so that they represent “‘the’ couple, 
man/woman” (Cixous, 1986, p.64). Within this coupling, both Joss and Millie find
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their identity strengthened by the doubling of ‘normality’ and ‘heterosexuality’ (two
categories which are not treated as separate by other characters in the novel). Before
they establish their roles, discord stems from Joss and Millie assuming sexual roles
that could be considered inappropriate for their gender roles. When they first begin
their relationship, Joss avoids having sex with Millie in order to preserve his secret.
Baffled by his apparent disinterest in sex, Millie tries to search for a rational
explanation, but ends up facing only two possibilities: “[ejither Joss is terribly proper
and old-fashioned or there is something wrong” (Tr, p. 15). In contrast to Joss’s
apparent indifference (“[h]e never tries to touch me ... Three months of kisses on my
left cheek” [Tr, p. 15]), Millie is “madly in love with Joss and terribly frustrated” (Tr,
p. 15). Kay’s decision to place this early in the text serves to place Millie in the
position of defending her relationship with Joss from the very beginning.
The stabilising of the relationship coincides with the revelation of Joss’s
secret. As they walk home from a jazz club, Millie is struck by the hope that
“[tjonight is the night” (Tr, p. 18). And she is right, it is the night that Joss finally
takes control of the situation, starting with a passionate kiss:
[h]e goes to kiss me on the cheek, but changes his mind and kisses me full on 
the mouth. He grabs me up in his arms, sweeping my face towards his. He 
pulls me closer against him till my feet almost rise from the ground. His 
breathing is fast, excited. (Tr, p. 18)
Millie seems detached from the situation, or at least not an active part of the kiss: “I
open my eyes and stare at him whilst he is kissing me” (Tr, p. 19), and this could
again be read as subverting the male gaze, as Millie is projecting her fantasy of
maleness onto the female figure of Joss. Joss is very much in control until they get to
Millie’s bedroom, at which point he fails to meet her expectations: “Joss doesn’t
throw me on my bed like I am expecting” (Tr, p. 19). Instead, he chooses this moment
to reveal that he is biologically female.
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Joss undresses in order to reveal to Millie that he was bom female, but this 
takes place in a scene of confusion. Millie’s first reaction is that Joss is about to 
seduce her, and she is “excited watching this man undress for Pier]” [7>, p.21]), but 
this idea is quickly dismissed when Millie sees the “bandages wrapped round and 
round his chest” (Tr, p.21). As Joss “keeps unwrapping endless rolls of bandages” 
{Tr, p.21), Millie gets her first look at his naked body: “I am still holding out my 
hands when the first of his breasts reveals itself to me. Small, firm” {Tr, p.21). 
Following this revelatory moment, there is a break in the text. By leaving the scene 
here, the suggestion is that physical evidence can be used to determine sex and 
gender, and that the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are interchangeable because they seem 
to match, even though Kay uses the rest of the text to explore the theme of gender 
being unconnected to biological sex. In fact, by giving the reader the opportunity to 
confront what Joss’s body is saying, Kay is undermining Millie’s subsequent 
argument that it was impossible to think of Joss as female.
Although Joss relies on physical cues such as clothes to appear male, the 
ultimate physical cue -  his body -  destabilises Joss’s identity as a man. The 
juxtaposition of seduction and revelation is an important one, because it is at the 
moment when Joss is considered most male (when he is about to commit a sexual 
act, through which he will prove his virility) that he challenges expectations by 
confessing his biological sex. It is also highly significant that Joss expresses his sex 
through a display of what he has (breasts) rather than what he lacks (a penis). By not 
defining his sex on the basis of what is lacking, Joss is defiantly claiming that he is 
not lacking, and that his body does not determine the extent of his maleness. This 
scene can also be read as a subversion of Mulvey’s concept of the male gaze (“[t]he 
determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure” [Mulvey, 1989,
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p. 19]). Millie is placed in the role of active/male, which means that Joss inhabits the 
role of passive/female. It could be argued that Joss has deliberately constructed this 
situation in order to create maximum visual impact, so in this sense, Joss demands to 
be looked at. The break in the text following his revelation illustrates the 
destabilising effect of his actions: not even the narrative is safe, as words fail. Jackie 
Kay exercises careful restraint in her writing, refusing to let Millie discuss Joss’s 
body. The only people that are allowed to describe his body are people who did not 
know him in life -  the doctor and funeral director. Whilst Millie discusses Joss’s 
behaviour and ignores his body, they focus on his body and ignore (or are ignorant 
of) his behaviour.
Millie says that Joss “was always more comfortable once he was dressed. 
More secure somehow” (Tr, p.238). By putting on male clothes, Joss is signalling his 
entry into a male world, with his suit acting as a marker of his preferred gender and 
the beginning of his performance. Although Romaine argues that “unisex fashions 
have made gender boundaries increasingly less rigid” (Romaine, 1999, p.l), I would 
argue that this is only true for women: “the traffic in cross-gender styles was mostly 
one way ... most men have steered clear, even abandoning formerly masculine styles 
once they have been adopted by women” (Steele, 1994, p.552). Therefore, I would 
suggest that it is not male clothing on its own that helps Joss become a man, since it 
is considered acceptable (and indeed ‘normal’) for women to wear ‘male’ clothing. 
Rather, the clothes represent the first step in Joss’s expression of his sense of self as a 
man, and he and Millie develop a ritual to mark the crossing of gender: “[h]e’d say, 
‘How do I look?’ And I’d say, ‘Perfect. You look perfect’” (Tr, p.238). Although 
Joss’s clothes are the primary marker of his gender insofar as the general public is 
concerned, his clothes also add to his sense of otherness because “[h]e’d hardly take
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any of his clothes off on a baking hot day. He wouldn’t take the risk. So I’d laze
around in my variety of swimming costumes ... and Joss would be wrapped up in his
layers” (Tr, p.99). The one thing that Joss uses to draw attention away from himself
actually draws attention to himself.
During the course of the novel, it becomes clear that Joss’s gender is not the
only thing that is under threat: Millie’s heterosexuality is dependent upon Joss’s
categorisation as male. Millie and Joss get married not only to publicly perform their
heterosexuality, but to affirm Joss’s maleness. At the wedding, Millie uses her
wedding dress to make an important point, choosing one that is “pale green” (Tr,
p.26), rather than the traditional white. This is a choice designed to reflect the fact
that she is not a virgin, that Joss is her lover, and that they are in a heterosexual (and
legitimate) relationship. Joss is “proud of himself’ (Tr, p.26) because when Millie
renounces her chaste status, Joss’s maleness is confirmed. However, despite their
apparent defiance, Millie is aware that having such a public celebration of their love
risks their secret, and her thoughts are dominated by the fear that it will be exposed:
[a]t the Registrar’s Office, I kept thinking of that bit in Jane Eyre where the 
minister asks if anyone knows of any reason why Mr Rochester and Jane 
should not marry and the man from the Caribbean suddenly stands up and 
says, Yes. (Tr, p.26)
Jane’s wedding to Mr Rochester (which is famously disrupted by the news 
that Mr Rochester is already married to Bertha Mason) provides an intriguing 
parallel to Millie and Joss’s situation. Bertha is the “daughter of Jonas Mason, 
merchant, and of Antoinetta his wife, a Creole” (Bronte, 1996, p.325). The use of the 
word Creole is a deliberate one, emphasising a confused genetic heritage: “[t]he term 
[Creole] could be applied to a native West Indian of any race ... it is probable that 
[Charlotte Bronte] means something specific by the expression: that Bertha’s mother 
is of racially mixed origins” (Michael Mason, 1996, p.522). Bertha’s English (and by
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implication white) father and racially mixed or West Indian mother are reconfigured 
in Joss’s parents: a (white) Scottish mother and a father who was “a black man 
[from] the West Indies” (Tr, p.250). In this context, Joss is relegated from the 
privileged position of husband to that of Bertha, a “mad-woman” (Bronte, 1996, 
p.339). Joss’s decision to live as a man -  which could be crudely termed his 
‘madness’ -  could be seen as a result of colour. It is the very fact that Joss is a racial 
‘other’ and a gendered ‘other’ that makes the wedding dangerous.
Although the wedding is a success, Millie is afraid of Joss’s past, feeling 
“unsettled [by] the idea that Joss had not always been Joss, that Joss Moody had once 
been Josephine Moore” (Tr, p.93). Alice Walker argues that “Millie is the only 
character in the novel who knew Joss as a cross-dresser throughout his life” (Walker, 
2007, p.39), but it is actually the case that Millie tries to divorce Joss’s actions from 
his identity. Millie’s subsequent realisation that she cannot overlook the evidence of 
her husband’s past life threatens to destabilise their relationship and future together, 
especially when Joss mentions his life as a girl: “[m]y mother called me Josephine 
after her sister” (Tr, p.93). By doing this, he reminds Millie of the constructed 
element of his persona, and, thus, their marriage, and her response is to insist that 
Joss is real while simultaneously denying the validity of Josephine by claiming that, 
“no matter how hard I try, I can’t see him as anything other than him, my Joss, my 
husband” (Tr, p.35). The relationship that Millie hides behind throughout the novel is 
not, as Walker argues, “founded on truth” (Walker, 2007, p.39), but instead based on 
a series of denials -  a rejection of truth.
Like A Man
Millie refuses to consider Joss’s past until she wants a child and finds that it cannot 
be ignored. Judith Butler asks, “[i]s it not purely cultural convention ... that takes
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genitalia to be the definitive ‘sign’ of sex?” (Butler, 1999, p. 140). In her critique of 
Dr David Page’s study of the master gene, she says that it is “interesting to note that 
Page designates the external genitalia, those anatomical parts essential to the 
symbolization of reproductive sexuality, as the unambiguous and a priori 
determinants of sex assignment” (Butler, 1999, 140). She disagrees with this notion, 
and elaborates on her reasons why when she turns her attention to Simone de 
Beauvoir:
[In The Second Sex\ Beauvoir was willing to affirm that one is bom with a 
sex, as a sex, sexed, and that being sexed and being human are coexistive and 
simultaneous; sex is an analytic attribute of the human; there is no human 
who is not sexed; sex qualifies the human as a necessary attribute ... 
Beauvoir’s theory implied seemingly radical consequences, ones that she 
herself did not entertain. For instance, if sex and gender are radically distinct, 
then it does not follow that to be a given sex is to become a given gender; in 
other words, ‘woman’ need not be the cultural construction of the female 
body, and ‘man’ need not interpret male bodies. (Butler, 1999, p. 142)
Butler is here denying the validity of sex as a determiner of gender. However,
returning to Trumpet, Joss’s (masculine) gender is overshadowed by his sex (female),
because his sex makes him unable to father a child. Contrasting with Butler’s ideas,
this part of the novel suggests that sex and gender are not ‘radically distinct’ because
once Joss’s sex is brought to the forefront, his gender is placed under scrutiny and its
construction is questioned: “[w]hy can’t he give me a child? He can do everything
else. Walk like a man, talk like a man, dress like a man, blow his hom like a man.
Why can’t he get me pregnant” (Tr, p.37). The repetition of ‘like a man’ makes
Millie’s claim that she “can’t see him as anything other than him” (Tr, p.35) seem
hollow and unconvincing.
Having a baby is particularly important to Millie because her role as a woman
is being undermined as a result of her proximity to Joss. Her friends expect her life to
follow a specific course: “[m]y old autograph book from school haunts me. Margaret
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Baxter writing that daft ditty: ‘First comes love, then comes marriage, then comes
Millie pushing a baby carriage’” (7>, p.37). Millie finds herself being “jealous of
mothers” (7>, p.37), and the language of deceit surrounds both of them: Millie
describes the way Joss looks at her, “[l]ike I’m playing dirty” (Tr, p.38), then “tell[s]
him he tricked me” (Tr, p.38). The terms of this accusation resonate loudly with a
moment in Jackie Kay’s poem, ‘Fiction’, published in 1998, the same year as
Trumpet. Describing a writer’s attempts to write, it focuses on one character:
She was a martyr -  snivelling, Scottish ...
Fed-up, grief-struck, going on and on and on 
And on: how she was the mug, the sucker,
Taken-for-granted, how I could see her coming. (Kay, 1998, p.37)
As well as feeling like a “mug”, Millie is both “Scottish” and “grief-struck” (Kay,
1998, p.37), and the connection is even more apparent when Kay later writes in the
poem, “[a]s for that man of hers, well he wasn’t a man at all” (Kay, 1998, p.37).
Despite Jackie Kay’s comment that she does not know what Joss is (Nicol, 1998), the
poem suggests that she has given the matter a great deal of thought and attempted to
show two different sides of the issue in two different forms of writing: although she
appears to offer a definitive answer in ‘Fiction’, Trumpet offers a more nuanced look
at the issue and suggests that there are no easy answers to the gender question.
As Joss and Millie continue to argue, Joss admits his awareness of what he
used to be, and his shortcomings as a man:
[i]f he could, he tells me, he would love to get me pregnant. If he could he 
would love to watch a baby grow inside me. If he could, he’d love to get into 
bed at night and stroke my big belly and listen to our baby’s heartbeat. If he 
could, he’d be a good daddy. (7>, p.38)
The repetition of “if he could” illustrates exactly how much Joss cannot give Millie.
But as Joss continues to express his pain, he shifts the blame onto Millie, because in
accepting him as a man she has gone too far and demanded too much: “[mjiracles are
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not possible” {Tr, p.38). Joss feels as though what Millie wants is “not fair” {Tr, 
p.38) because she “never said [he] was expected to perform a fucking miracle” {Tr, 
p.38). Although Butler suggests that “the breakdown of gender binaries ... must be 
held to be definitionally impossible” (Butler, 1999, p.viii), Joss makes the 
‘unthinkable’ real by admitting that he is not a ‘true’ man, but also defiantly 
suggesting that he is male enough, and that Millie wants too much.
Multiple Identities
Joss and Millie are able to settle their differences by adopting a son, Colman, and this 
gives Joss an opportunity to prove himself as a father-figure. Colman’s journey into 
adulthood (and manhood) parallels Joss’s efforts to be accepted as a man. Colman 
struggles with his basic identity because of his adopted status. He tries to address his 
feelings of rootlessness by attempting to share Joss’s past, believing that he and his 
adoptive father can connect through their collective experiences as black men.
Taking comfort in Joss’s belief that they are “related the way it mattered” {Tr, p.58), 
Colman still feels the need to belong somewhere and confesses that “[w]hat I wanted 
when I was a kid was to look like my father” {Tr, p.45). It is possible to see how 
conflicted Colman is when he says “I am the same kind of colour as my father. We 
even look alike. Pure fluke. Or maybe I copied his smile so much I look like his 
carbon copy” {Tr, p.50). Butler describes the “relation between the ‘imitation’ and 
the ‘original’” (Butler, 1999, p. 175) as complicated because of its dependence on 
“[t]he notion of an original or primary gender identity” (Butler, 1999, p. 174). Basing 
her comments on Frederic Jameson’s understanding of imitation as pastiche 
(“without that still latent feeling that there exists something normal compared to 
which what is being imitated is rather comic” [cited in Butler, 1999, p. 176]), Butler 
suggests that
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[t]he loss of the sense o f ‘the normal’ however, can be its own occasion for 
laughter, especially when ‘the normal,’ ‘the original’ is revealed to be a copy, 
and an inevitably failed one, an ideal that no one can embody. In this sense, 
laughter emerges in the realization that all along the original was derived. 
(Butler, 1999, p. 176)
In the case of Trumpet, Colman is the ‘imitation’ of Joss, but Joss (the ‘original’) is
also an ‘imitation’ insofar as he is playing the role of man. However, when Colman
realises that Joss’s identity means he’s lost his own ‘sense of the normal’, the
situation is not an ‘occasion for laughter’, but rather a sobering experience that forces
Colman to examine his identity. The adult Colman tries to come to terms with the
idea that he based his sense of manhood on the manhood projected by Joss, and
although he admits his respect for Joss (“I pretended I didn’t give a flying fuck what
my father thought of me. But I did. I suppose I wanted him to be proud of me as a
man, as a black man. I fucking worshipped him” [Tr, p.44]), he feels that because of
what Joss has done, every relationship needs to be re-evaluated: “I don’t know my
father, my mother or myself. I don’t know any of us anymore. He has made us all
unreal” (Tr, p.60).
According to Irene Rose, “[t]he novel’s greatest destabilization of fixed
identities is achieved through the constant name changes undergone by all but a few
of the characters ... An imposed version of bodily integrity is obviously what Joss
Moody seeks to avoid when he relinquishes the name Josephine Moore and the
perceived female gender position that goes along with it in order to live as the
proprioceptive man he feels he is” (Rose, 2003, p. 144). Another example of this
destabilization can be found in Colman’s difficulty in defining himself, which takes
form in the problems surrounding his name. He struggles to reconcile Colman
Moody with his pre-adoption identity of William Dunsmore:
[i]f Fd stayed William Dunsmore all my life I’d have been a completely 
different man. Definitely. I mean a William Dunsmore’s smile would have
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been different from a Colman Moody’s smile. All my facial expressions 
would have been different. I bet even my walk would have been heavier if I’d 
been William Dunsmore. (Tr, p.56)
This is very similar to the way Jackie Kay describes her own
obsession with identity [that] comes from being adopted. ‘You always ask 
“Would I have been like this, if I had been brought up with my original 
parents?” You ask that of yourself, and then you ask that of people whom you 
see in different situations. What makes them who they are?” (Brooks, 2002)
Furthermore, Kay reiterates these statements in her poem ‘Somebody Else’, from the
Off Colour collection:
If I was not myself, I would be somebody else.
But actually I am somebody else.
I have been somebody else all my life.
It’s no laughing matter going about the place 
all the time being somebody else:
people mistake you; you mistake yourself. (Kay, 1998, p.27)
What Jackie Kay describes at this moment is the difficulty of having more than one 
identity, each at odds with the other, and this is something that can be applied to both 
Colman and Joss. She explores the tension between two identities, especially when 
the identity that brings the most comfort is not the identity a person was bom with. 
Saying that “[i]t’s no laughing matter” (Kay, 1998, p.27), Kay is making the point 
that living like this is extremely difficult because “you mistake yourself’ (Kay, 1998, 
p.27) -  that is, you lose sight of the person you once were and no longer know who 
you are. Indeed, one of Colman’s coping strategies evokes the poem: “[h]e needs to 
bury himself in sleep, to go down and down until he is no longer conscious of 
himself, until he could be somebody else dreaming of himself’ (Tr, p.242, my 
emphasis). When Colman declares towards the end of the novel that “I am Colman 
Moody, the son of Joss Moody, the famous trumpet player. He’ll always be daddy to 
me” (Tr, p.259), Kay is making use of a statement made by Billy Tipton’s adopted 
son: “[h]e’ll always be Dad to me” (cited in Garber, 1992, p.67). Colman realises
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that he can still define himself through Joss, because as long as Joss is still ‘daddy’,
then Colman is still his son. But Colman achieves this by conflating Joss’s
femaleness with ‘Dad’s’ maleness. In a way, Colman is choosing to ignore his
father’s femaleness: “I’m not stopping now just because there’s been a turn-up for
the books” (Tr, p.259), and his inability to cope with this echoes Butler’s notion of
“gender breakdown” being “too frightening” to be think about (Butler, 1999, p.viii).
The idea of one identity depending on another for validation is also visible
with Joss and Millie. They try to make Joss seem as ‘real’ as possible by
concentrating on their respective gender roles. When one of Millie’s friends meets
Joss, she says “I’d watch him. The handsome ones have roving eyes” (7r, p.31). The
reading of Joss as a potentially unfaithful man supports Joss’s role as man by
suggesting that he is subject to strong (possibly uncontrollable and therefore male)
sexual impulses. At the same time, Millie’s knowledge of Joss’s secret gives her a
sense of security that would not be possible if Joss were a ‘normal’ man: “[f]or a
split second, I feel jealous, imagining what it would be like if Joss were ever
unfaithful to me. Then I remember and feel safe. We have our love and we have our
secret” (7>, p.29). Millie aids Joss by submitting to the role of the submissive and
dutiful wife, strengthening Joss’s claimed position as a husband:
I managed to love my husband from the moment I clapped eyes on him till 
the moment he died. I managed to desire him all of our married life. I 
managed to respect and love his music. I managed to always like the way he 
ate his food. I managed to be faithful, to never be interested in another man. I 
managed to be loyal, to keep our private life private where it belonged. To 
not tell a single soul including my own son about our private life. I managed 
all that. (Tr, p.206)
The subconscious message is that for Millie to have achieved all this, Joss must have 
been worth loving; must have been a worthy husband.
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It is essential that Millie and Joss obey traditional behaviour in order to maintain the 
illusion of a traditional heterosexual relationship because assigning ‘male’ and 
‘female’ roles often depends on sexual behaviour as Pat Califia has asserted: “the 
correlation of maleness with masculinity and running the fuck; the correlation of 
femaleness with femininity and getting run over in bed” (Califia, 1997, p.5). The 
suggestion that Joss might be a failure is negated by his overtly sexual behaviour 
throughout the rest of the novel, as though Millie (and Joss) are trying to convince 
other people (and themselves) of Joss’s sexual prowess. Millie reconfigures Joss as 
both a good lover, (“‘the only way I’m going to get to like this place is if we christen 
it right now.’ And we did. I slid down the wall and knocked a few cobwebs off when 
I came” [Tr, p.8]), and a specifically male lover: “[w]e make love on the living room 
floor. He pulls my hair and kisses me all over my face. He pushed himself into me. 
He mutters things in my ear. I am possessed1’ (Tr, p.36, my emphasis). Pat Califia 
suggests that “one of the achievements that someone must demonstrate to be 
recognised as a man is sexual potency, the ability to take or possess a sexual object” 
(Califia, 1997, p.48, my emphasis). On a related note, Vem Bullough remarks that 
“[a] man, fearful of being labeled as exhibiting feminine weaknesses, could 
demonstrate his masculinity by asserting power over his wife” (Bullough, 1993, 
p.l 14). This is not to say that Joss completely rejects ‘feminine things’. Millie 
remembers how “Joss used to comb my hair every night. It was one of the few 
feminine things he did” (Tr, p.8). However, Kay uses this memory to prove that even 
when Joss is doing feminine things, he is doing them in a masculine way. The 
description of Joss brushing Millie’s hair quickly becomes sexually charged: “I loved 
it. Him sitting behind me, pressing against me, combing my thick dark hair in firm 
downward strokes” (Tr, p.8). Walker denies that Joss and Millie’s relationship is a
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parody of heterosexuality because “Joss and Millie’s relationship is not based on
‘gender fucking’ or lesbianism: they are husband and wife, and what could be
straighter than that?” (Walker, 2007, p.41). That Joss is identified as a husband is, if
not ‘gender fucking’, ‘label fucking’, as it marks an inversion of all that ‘husband’ is
ordinarily understood to mean. Jackie Kay herself underlines the difficulty in
defining both Joss and Millie, and their relationship:
Joss is a woman having sex with another woman, which most people would 
define as lesbian behaviour, but Joss thinks of himself as a man and so do the 
people around him. So, you tell me what that makes Millie? I don’t know the 
answer” (Jackie Kay, quoted in Nicol, 1998).
Joss is careful to present himself as heterosexual. When Colman asks if Joss
has ever been unfaithful to Millie, Joss denies it. It is not the denial that is
particularly interesting, but how he phrases it: “I am not interested in anyone besides
your mother. Only she can turn me on” (Tr, p. 168). By talking in these terms, Joss
suggests that he could cheat -  if he so desired -  but that strong sexual attraction stops
him. By using a phrase such as “turns me on”, Kay is emphasising Joss’s sexual
energy, something that is further highlighted in his discussion with Colman:
[d]o you always do it in bed? I ask, knowing that at any minute I will be 
stopped and cursed. He laughs, throwing back his head. Come off it, he says. 
Your mother and I like variety. The spice of life. Any old place will do. A 
dressing room...A dressing room, I shriek. Why not? What else are dressing 
rooms for? (Tr, p. 168)
When Colman reflects on this conversation after finding out Joss’s secret, he thinks
of Joss’s sexual behaviour in heterocentric terms: “he would have rammed it in” (Tr,
p. 168). I do not believe that Colman is expressing his acceptance of his father at this
stage, but that he is trying to affirm his parents’ heterosexuality and therefore his
own identity as their child.
Millie relies upon her heterosexuality once Joss is dead, and seeks refuge in
heterosexual labels such as ‘widow’ to try to normalise things:
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[m]y husband died. I am now a widow. That is what I will tell them if they 
come and ask me. My husband died. I am now a widow. My husband died. I 
am now a widow. Why can they not understand how ordinary that is? Many 
women have become widows. Many women have gone through what I’ve 
gone through. Many women know the shape, the smell, the colour of loss. 
Many women have aged with loss. Grief has changed the face of many 
women. I am not alone. I have to tell myself this. I am not alone. (Tr, p.205)
She apparently struggles to understand the way that the media perceives both her and
Joss: “No doubt they will call me a lesbian. They will find words to put on me.
Words that don’t fit me. Words that don’t fit Joss” (Tr, p. 154). This is because “our
readiness to see ‘reality’ naturally carved into male and female as polar opposites is
culturally and linguistically conditioned” (Romaine, 1999, p.8). I think this could be
taken further -  it is not just a readiness, but a need to preserve a rigid gender binary
that drives the media perception. And this is especially true because, as Hargreaves
asserts, “[i]t is precisely Millie’s ordinariness that is the source of the threat she
poses to dominant sex-gender systems; neither consciously queer, nor camp, nor
femme to Joss’s butch” (Hargreaves, 2003, p.3). The media need to relabel Millie -
to reaffirm her status as a genderfreak -  in order to satisfy themselves that the
male/female binary is still intact. From Millie’s point of view, the biggest problem
with this is that “you end up being defined by what makes you extraordinary” (Nicol,
1998), and yet the definition is so inadequate. Millie looks for the answer in her own
past, and admits that, as much as she despises the labels now being put on her, she
“loved being the wife of Joss Moody” (Tr, p.206), and wants to be known and
remembered as “Joss Moody’s widow” (Tr, p.22).
Irene Rose claims that “Kay represents Joss as a ‘stone butch’, a male-
identified lesbian who is unmistakably masculine in appearance and who feels
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37 •compromised by being made love to as a woman” (Rose, 2003, p. 150). It is my 
view that Rose is wrong: Joss is not a butch, something that becomes clear with a 
brief examination of Stone Butch Blues, a novel about butches that will be discussed 
in more depth in Chapter Two. One of the stone butches in the novel gets “upset 
because some women in the bathroom claimed they thought she was a man” 
(Feinberg, 2003, p. 120). This denial of manhood is reiterated in the way the 
protagonist, Jess, describes her male clothes as “drag” (Feinberg, 2003, p.7) and 
Feinberg’s description of “strong, burly women, wearing ties and suit coats” 
(Feinberg, 2003, p.27). It is evident from these examples that stone butches identify 
with but not as males. This is very different from Joss: “[Millie] asked Mr Sharif if 
[Joss] could be registered as a man. She said, rather enigmatically, it appeared to 
Mohammad, that this would have been important for her husband, to be registered in 
death as he was in life” (7>, p.79).
In defending her husband’s life, Millie asserts that “I don’t think I ever 
thought he was wrong. I don’t think so” (7>, p.35). This is undermined by the 
repetition of markers of uncertainty (“I don’t think” [Tr, p.35]), but also by two other 
lines in the novel. Describing Joss’s initial reluctance to sleep with her, Millie fears 
that “there is something wrong” (Tr, p. 15). Perhaps most damning is Millie’s 
statement on the novel’s opening page that “I haven’t done anything wrong” (Tr, 
p.l). As Walker argues, “[i]f Millie has not ‘done anything wrong’, then the reader 
can only assume that it is Joss who is guilty of some profound transgression” 
(Walker, 2007, p.40). Even so, Millie tries (and fails) to deny the impossibility of 
ignoring Joss’s body. Recalling how she “wrapped two cream bandages around his
37 Rose also argues that “Jackie Kay presents Trumpet as a validation of the often forgotten, and 
sometimes extreme, social costs paid by butch lesbians for transgressing both heteronormative and 
homonormative boundaries” (Rose, 2003, p. 149). I would argue that Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch 
Blues (see Chapter 2) better makes this point, detailing the often violent consequences o f transgressing 
boundaries.
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breasts every morning” (Tr, p.238), part of Millie’s recollection is that the situation 
was awkward: “I didn’t think about anything except doing it w ell... He didn’t care if 
it was uncomfortable. It probably was a little” (Tr, p.238). The reference to 
‘uncomfortable’ is probably as applicable to the situation as to the bandages, a 
situation where they did not and perhaps could not talk: “I don’t remember us saying 
anything whilst I did this” (Tr, p.238). Her further confession that “I don’t remember 
thinking much” (Tr, p.238) implies that Millie blocked the truth out so that she was 
only focusing on the necessity of the act: “I had to help him get dressed so that he 
could enjoy his day and be comfortable” (Tr, p.238). It is my belief that Millie 
helped Joss to dress, not just because it made him comfortable, but because it made it 
easier to assert her own position as his wife: Millie could only be a wife if Joss 
inhabited the role of husband. Or as Brooks puts it, “the relationship between 
Moody and his wife creates and nourishes an identity, allowing him to do the 
impossible -  to live his life as a man” (Brooks, 2002). Although, as I have 
mentioned, Joss uses clothes to outwardly display what he felt himself to be, he also 
needs them to hide what he lacked. Once he put on his boxer shorts, Millie “turned 
away while he stuffed them with a pair of socks” (Tr, p.238). It was important for 
both of them that Millie did not witness the construction of genitals because this is 
arguably the most important part of the ‘costume’. Traditional categorisation of sex 
focuses upon the genitals as a means of establishing identity (“doctors look down at a 
newly-born infant and say ‘It has a penis, it’s a boy.’ Or they say, ‘It doesn’t have a 
penis, it’s a girl’” [Bomstein, 1994, p.22]) so Millie could not witness this part of the 
transformation as it could adversely affect her ability to accept Joss.
38 Hargreaves points out that “in the space between what is publicly acceptable and what is privately 
desirable, [Millie] cannot entirely forget that Joss was a girl or that he continues to have a biologically 
female body, in spite of herself: ‘I don’t want to think about her. Why am I thinking about her?”’ 
(Hargreaves, 2003, p. 10).
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Millie’s fear that Joss’s body could override his performance is realised after
his death. Because Millie refers to Joss as her husband, the (female) doctor has no
cause to doubt that she is dealing with the body of a man. However, in the course of
the physical examination, the doctor discovers Joss’s secret and struggles to define
him within the gender binary that she holds so dear: “[w]hen she first saw the breasts
(and she thought of them again driving home, how strange they looked, how
preserved they looked) she thought that they weren’t real breasts at all. At least not
women’s breasts” (Tr, p.43). The doctor is unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion
regarding Joss’s sex, so feels compelled to take action: “[i]t took her pulling down
the pyjama bottoms for her to be quite certain” (Tr, p.44). It is interesting that the
doctor takes the step that Joss would not in trying to determine sex. Joss went as far
as revealing his breasts, but in the eyes of the doctor, the evidence of the body does
not tally with the evidence of the wife. As far as the doctor is concerned, the genitals
provide absolute and unequivocal proof of sex (and gender), so the next step is to
destroy any traces of ambiguity:
[s]he got her red pen out from her doctor’s bag. What she thought of as her 
emergency red pen. She crossed ‘male’ out and wrote ‘female’ in her rather 
bad doctor’s handwriting. She looked at the word ‘female’ and thought it 
wasn’t quite clear enough. She crossed that out, tutting to herself, and printed 
‘female’ in large childish letters. (Tr, p.44)39
This is a replication of a real-life incident surrounding Eugene C. Perkins, a medical
practitioner from La Jolla, California who died in 1936 (Andrews, 2005): “on the
death certificate ‘male’ was crossed out after examination of the body and ‘female’
written in red ink” (Garber, 1992, p.67). The doctor has an authority that Joss was
denied, as evidenced by the registrar depending on the doctor’s decision when
39 For Jamison Green, “[g]ender and genitals comprise a stronghold of control binding all people to a 
social order that has serious difficulty tolerating diversity or change” (Green, 1999, p. 124). Irene Rose 
reads this moment as the “forcible interpellation of Joss back into the category of female” (Rose,
2003, p. 145).
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issuing a death certificate: “[h]e told the woman that he could not lie on a death 
certificate ... He paused before he ticked ‘female’” (Tr, p.80). It is undoubtedly 
significant that Kay chose a doctor to question (and subsequently disagree with) 
Joss’s gender, because it has been noted that “it’s doctors who dole out the gender 
assignments, which shows you how emphatically gender has been medicalized” 
(Bomstein, 1994, p.22). The presence of the doctor therefore marks an opportunity to 
reassign gender. Although the doctor’s actions could be read as a response to the 
inadequacy of language to adequately express what Joss is, “[t]he ability to impose 
one particular view of reality while suppressing others derives not from language 
itself, but from the power of the dominant group” (Romaine, 1999, p.20). In this 
case, the doctor (and medical representatives in general) represents a refusal to 
engage with the problems that people like Joss present.
The doctor’s need to be certain about Joss’s gender is similar to the reaction 
of Albert Holding, the funeral director. As he prepares the body for embalming, he 
realises that “the man’s legs were not hairy. Then Holding noticed that he had rather 
a lot of pubic hair. A bush. The absence of the penis did not strike him straight away” 
(Tr, p. 109). Like the doctor, Holding needs to be “quite certain” (Tr, p.44) of what 
Joss is, and “[w]hen he did notice after a few moments that there was no visible 
penis, he actually found himself rummaging in the pubic hair just to check that there 
wasn’t a very, very small one hiding somewhere” (Tr, p. 109). So what conclusions 
can be drawn from the way the doctor and funeral director behave? Despite their fear 
that Joss might be female, they are not looking for a vagina. They are desperately 
seeking a penis -  because a penis is irrefutably male, and can override even the 
gender assumptions that come with breasts. As Bomstein puts it, “[i]t has little or 
nothing to do with vaginas. It’s all penises or no penises: gender assignment is both
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phallocentric and genital” (Bomstein, 1994, p.22). Ultimately, then, Joss becomes a 
‘not-male’, rather than a female, for those people gazing at him after death. However, 
Millie and Colman maintain Joss’s manhood: Millie by calling herself his widow, 
and Colman by reinstating the father-son relationship.40
It is the off-stage performance of masculinity (and maleness) that Joss 
sustains throughout his life that is the focus of the text. It is ironic that in a novel 
about performance, Joss’s on-stage performance as a jazz trumpeter is barely touched 
upon. On-stage Joss is actually a lesser version of off-stage Joss, because in playing 
his trumpet, Joss “loses his sex, his race, his memory. He strips himself bare, takes 
everything off, till he’s barely human” (7>, p. 131). When he is playing, his identity is 
reduced to his music, so that although he becomes “something else. Somebody else. 
Her. That girl” {Tr, p. 132), his audience does not notice. Joss’s ability to reconnect 
with his past through his music explains why he otherwise does not need to refer to 
his identity as ‘Josephine’. The music provides an outlet through which Joss can 
briefly ‘be’ Josephine, and this is why his ‘Joss’ identity so rarely falters.
Nan in Tipping the Velvet finds the boundaries between her on- and off-stage
persona blurred. In contrast, Joss finds himself tom between two off-stage identities:
that of Joss, the husband, father and famous trumpeter, and Josephine, the daughter.
Because there is no space in his life for Josephine, Joss has to physically separate her
from his life, so that he ends up living two lives. When Joss and Josephine collide,
Josephine proves powerful enough to threaten Joss, and so Joss has to be careful to
preserve his male identity. In James Miranda Barry, James finds he is not allowed a
separate, private performance. His ‘on-stage’ (public) performance as a doctor is a
hyperbolised version of his ‘off-stage’ (personal) performance: the personal
40 This point is also made by Irene Rose: “[n]ot only does Millie’s grief as a widow support Joss’ 
masculinity, but in Colman’s eventual loving acceptance of Joss as his father, the fact of having or not 
having a penis is rendered obsolete in Joss’ claim to masculinity” (Rose, 2003, p. 151).
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performance is strictly controlled by James in order to prevent anybody from 
realising his secret. Throughout each of the texts, boundaries are blurred and 
identities are confused. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly where one identity ends and 
another begins because constantly enacting performances means that gender starts to 
become unconsciously performed, altering the concept of ‘natural’ and ‘false’ gender 
performances.
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C h a p t e r  T w o : T h e  M e d ic a l is a t io n  o f  G e n d e r
[TJhere are two, and only two, possible destinations -  male and female. 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p. 109)
*
In the essay “How to Build A Man”, Anne Fausto-Sterling has claimed that 
“biological and medical scientists feel quite certain about their world. For them, the 
body tells the truth” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p. 109). However, according to 
postmodernism, ‘truth’ is not a fixed entity, but is discursively contingent upon the 
position of the interpreter -  and in the case of much of the medical establishment, 
this position is affected by the belief that “there are two, and only two, possible 
destinations -  male and female” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p. 109). There are 
increasing challenges to this position: the conflict between identity and medical 
discourse, which was hinted at in Trumpet and James Miranda Barry, is a central 
theme in Middlesex, Stone Butch Blues and Sacred Country, and in this chapter I will 
examine the role of medicine and the medical establishment in defining and 
understanding identity. I argue that the medical establishment’s reliance on the 
male/female binary is a limitation that affects the way that sex and gender and 
understood and inscribed. When ‘male’ and ‘female’ are the only options allowed, 
the validity of the concept of a ‘normal’ gender identity is threatened. As identities 
are re-written and performed, the blurring of boundaries, which was explored in 
Chapter One, becomes more pronounced: the availability of surgery and hormones 
means that the concepts of ‘real’ and ‘natural’ face scrutiny: science has defined the 
categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’, but it has also provided the opportunities for these 
categories to be transgressed.
Bonnie Spanier argues that
[w]hen scientists look to nature, they usually bring with them their socio­
political beliefs about what is natural. This self-reinforcing, internally
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consistent process, then, creates, reflects, and reinscribes often unquestioned 
assumptions about our world. (Spanier, 1991, p.330)
The tension between the medically-defined ‘natural’ and the transsexed or
hermaphroditic body is the product of desperate attempts by the medical world to
preserve the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’, and hide the fact that “[i]deologies of
masculinity and femininity cannot simply be peeled back like a mask to reveal the
‘naked truth’ of the body ... underneath there is quite simply nothing: no central core
of identity or meaning” (McGrath, 1988, p.58). This resonates with Butler’s
understanding of performativity: “acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an
internal core or substance ... Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed,
are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport
to express are fabrications” (Butler, 1999, p. 173, emphasis in original). The fear that
the body can be overridden is overshadowed by the greater fear that previous
methods of gender and sex categorisation are inadequate:
[t]he investigation of gender identity in terms of performance begins by 
diminishing the importance of a few natural objects. The vagina, for instance. 
This organ is no longer capable, all by itself, of turning someone into a 
woman. A lot more is required to do womanhood: specific styles of talking, 
ways of walking, dressing, addressing. A womanly way of screaming, raging, 
smiling, eating, soothing, loving. If gender is not fixed and physical but 
viscous and performed, the body’s sexual organs are not enough to mark it. 
(Mol, 2002, p.38)
Middlesex
Middlesex is the second novel by Jeffrey Eugendes, and the only text I examine that 
features an intersexed character, Callie, who despite being bom “[a] beautiful, 
healthy girl” {Mid, p.216), finds out fourteen years later that her sexual organs have 
been wrongly interpreted: she is “genetic[ally] male” {Mid, p.303). When this 
discovery is made, it is left to the doctors to determine what surgery Callie ‘needs’.
In violation of the common medical belief that “the body tells the truth” (Fausto-
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Sterling, 2000a, p. 109), doctors have to first decide whether Callie fits more easily 
into the category of male or female, and mould her body accordingly. To make this 
decision, the doctors must first “set the standards of normality. They articulate what 
it is to be normal and to behave in a normal way” (Mol, 2002, p.58), and from this 
point determine whether Callie meets the requirements of maleness or femaleness. 
Thus, my focus is on how the medical establishment attempts to reshape and 
reinscribe Callie’s body, and the way in which intersexed bodies challenge the 
viability of the male/female binary.
For the first twelve or so years of her life, the only thing that marks her as 
different is her Greek heritage: “[o]ur religion’s adherence to the Julian calendar has 
once again left us out of sync with the neighbourhood” {Mid, p.15).41 However, as 
she grows older, she realises that she does not fit in with the other girls at school 
because her body has not developed; she has “[n]o breasts. No period either” {Mid, 
p.295). By “January of seventh grade” {Mid, p.303), Callie begins “a growth spurt of 
uncommon proportions and unforeseeable consequences” {Mid, p.303) and her 
“voice began a slow descent” {Mid, p.303). However, “nothing seemed unnatural.
My slight build, my thin waist, the smallness of my head, hands, and feet raised no 
questions in anybody’s mind. Many genetic males raised as girls don’t blend in so 
easily” {Mid, p.303). Callie’s fears for her development are displaced onto her 
identity as one of the school’s “‘Ethnic’ girls” {Mid, p.298), where her strangeness is 
easily identified:
my friends and I had always felt completely American. But now ... upturned 
noses suggested that there was another America to which we could never gain 
admittance. All of a sudden America wasn’t about hamburgers and hot rods 
anymore. It was about the Mayflower and Plymouth Rock. It was about
41 The decision to make Callie Greek has a particular significance. As Feinberg states, “Greek 
mythology was ... filled with references to sex-change, intersexuality, and cross-dressing” (Feinberg, 
1996, p.56).
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something that had happened for two minutes four hundred years ago, instead 
of everything that had happened since. (Mid, p.298)
Callie’s fear that she will never become a ‘real’ American masks her true fear that
she will never become a ‘real’ woman, and raises the question of what it means to be
a ‘real’ woman. For Callie’s mother, Tessie, this state is achieved through
menstruation (“I’m worried about Callie ... She still hasn’t gotten her period ... I
think something’s wrong” [Mid, p.329]). Callie conflates her ethnic identity and
gender identity problems, blaming her undeveloped body on the Greek diet her
mother provides for her: “I had come to a dire conclusion. I had begun to believe that
the Mediterranean Diet that kept my grandmother alive against her will was also
sinisterly retarding my maturity” (Mid, p.288). After a fight where Callie demands
“normal food ... American food” (Mid, p.288), Tessie arranges for her to visit to “a
ladies’ doctor” (Mid, p.340), although this is downplayed as a routine visit to “make
sure everything’s okay” (Mid, p.340). “Filled with dread” (Mid, p.350) at the
prospect of this appointment, Callie fakes the onset of her period, convincing her
mother that she is developing ‘normally’.
In order to appear ‘normal’, Callie must, like other women, subscribe to a
substantial beauty regime: “Sophie Sassoon took care of my facial hair. I went in
about twice a month, adding depilation to an ever-growing list of upkeep
requirements. I started shaving my legs and underarms. I plucked my eyebrows”
(Mid, p.311). Alan Petersen has argued that “[w]omen have become receptive to the
message that the body-commodity is ‘deficient and in need of attention’” (Petersen,
2007, p.67).42 Thus, women who do not “engage in the ‘work of femininity’”
(Jagger, 2000, p. 5 5) are failures, due to the promotion of the idea that “beauty is not
42 Wendy Chapkis suggests that “public acts of femininity, like applying make-up, tend to rely on an 
underlying message of female inadequacy. There is a problem to be corrected, a basic improvement to 
be made” (Chapkis, 1985, p.6).
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naturally given but achievable by all” (Jagger, 2000, p.56): there is therefore no 
excuse for failing to live up to this ideal.
As Callie starts to wonder if something might be wrong with her, she also 
battles with her sexuality. She realises she is different from other girls when she 
becomes obsessed with a fellow pupil at the all-girls school she attends. Questioning 
whether she felt “any inkling of her true biological nature ... [and] that what she was 
feeling was wrong” {Mid, p.327), Callie answers ambiguously: “[y]es and no ... [i]t 
was perfectly acceptable ... to get a crush on a fellow classmate. At a girls’ school a 
certain amount of emotional energy, normally expended on boys, gets redirected into 
friendships” {Mid, p.327). Despite an awareness of the commonality of such feelings 
among the pupils, “the school remained militantly heterosexual” {Mid, p.327). The 
institutional element of gender allocation is important: here, it is the educational 
institution that determines ‘correct’ gender expression (which can only be ‘correctly’ 
performed through adherence to heterosexual behaviour) through a system of 
intimidation and force: “[a]ny girl suspected of being attracted to girls was gossiped 
about, victimized, and shunned” {Mid, p.327). Jeffrey Weeks argues that 
“[hjomosexual desire is socially eliminated from childhood by means of a series of 
family and educational mechanisms. The power of oblivion generated by the social 
mechanisms with respect to the homosexual drive is such to arouse the immediate 
answer: this problem does not concern me” (Weeks, 1998, p.692). In the case of 
Callie, the issue is not that homosexuality “does not concern” her, but that it must not 
be allowed to concern her, because she fears the consequences. Unlike the girls that 
had “envious crushes on other girls” {Mid, p.327), Callie’s feelings are stronger: “[i]t 
felt physical, my crush. It wasn’t a judgment but a tumult in my veins. For that 
reason I kept quiet about it” {Mid, p.328). Later in the novel, the educational
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institution will be replaced by the medical institution, which will place a greater 
reliance on biology over behaviour but engage in similar acts of violent enforcement.
Understanding Normality
In the essay “Trans Studies”, Henry Rubin discusses “the imperative to be 
heterosexual after transition” (Rubin, 1999, p. 183), which is the belief that 
‘heterosexuality’ proves that the transition (from male to female, or vice versa) has 
been realised successfully.43 Callie is in a difficult situation: on the one hand, her 
attraction to girls is the basis for what becomes her heterosexuality when she is 
‘male’, but before she makes this transition, her behaviour is coded as lesbian, and by 
implication, ‘wrong’. In A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory, Nikki Sullivan 
points out that “the 1970 edition of The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ... 
defines ‘heterosexual’ as ‘pertaining to or characterised by the normal relation of the 
sexes’” (Sullivan, 2003, p.l 19). Heterosexuality is always and inevitably ‘the norm’, 
so Callie struggles with her apparently abnormal feelings.
Callie’s relationship to normality takes centre stage once the medical 
establishment becomes aware of Callie’s condition. Following an accident, Callie is 
taken to hospital, where her severe abdominal pain warrants further examination. 
When the doctor and intern see Callie’s genitalia, they react with shock: “[t]he doctor 
bent closer, mumbling to himself. The intern, rather unprofessionally, raised one 
hand to her throat and then pretended to fix her collar” (Mid, p.396). There is 
something ‘wrong’ -  “the way the doctor and nurse reacted made it clear” (Mid, 
p.396) -  and so Dr Luce, the novel’s representation of the medicalisation of gender,
43 This is an element of what Deborah Rudacille terms the “myth of the ‘classic’ male-to-female 
transsexual. A classic transsexual was essentially a traditional woman who happened to have been 
bom in a male body. She was attractive, with feminine mannerisms and a feminine outlook and had 
felt like a girl all o f her life. She was, above all, heterosexual and desired marriage and, when 
possible, children by adoption or step-parenting” (Rudacille, 2005, p. 130).
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steps forward to ‘correct’ Callie. Callie describes him as “the world’s leading 
authority on human hermaphroditism” {Mid, p.409). Luce believes “that parents 
weren’t able to cope with an ambiguous gender assignment. You had to tell them if 
they had a boy or a girl” {Mid, p.413). There is no room in Luce’s world for anybody 
who does not fit into the categories of male or female. Specifically, Callie exists to 
be corrected: as a hermaphrodite she is a “problem which a binary logic attempts to 
erase” (Jones and Stallybrass, 1991, p.80). What is most concerning is the “slide into 
the assumption that gender is a known quantity which is then, at a second stage, 
destabilized” (Jones and Stallybrass, 1991, p.80, emphasis in original).44 Anne 
Fausto-Sterling explains Foucault’s view that “[t]he role of many science 
professionals ... [is] to optomize and standardize the body’s function” (Fausto- 
Sterling, 2000b, p.7). Increasing scientific knowledge has “encouraged physicians to 
attempt to control the very gender of the body” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000b, p. 8), and the 
consequence of this is that “progress in the handling of intersexuality involves 
maintaining the normal. Accordingly, there ought to be only two boxes: male and 
female” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000b, p.8).45 This protection of the ‘normal’ only serves 
to underscore its very ‘unnaturalness’: “[b]ecause anything that is not male or female 
is not a true sex, we pronounce them ‘abnormal,’ fit them legally into male or 
female, and fit them physically into boy or girl by cutting them up at the rate of about 
five every day. Thus are ‘natural’ males and females maintained” (Wilchins, 2002c, 
p.40).
44 As Wilchins argues, “[t]he possibility that intersex infants’ sex might not be immediately available 
to us, that they might not have the sort of binary sex the doctors are so anxious to locate and assign, 
just doesn’t register” (Wilchins, 2004, p.75).
45 Elizabeth Weil points out, “[m]ost people believe, reflexively, that irregular-looking genitals would 
be extremely difficult to live with -  for a child on a sports team, for an adult seeking love and sex -  so 
why not try to make them look more normal?” (Weil, 2006).
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Dr Luce’s role in the novel, enlightening patients about their conditions, is
tempered by his decision to only tell them what he decides they need to know. This
decision is marked by the power of medical knowledge: “[d]octors told the truth ...
or at least they were the only ones able to correct each other in so far as they didn’t”
(Mol, 2002, p.7). With the character of Dr Luce, Eugenides is exploring the way that
the medical world manipulates data in order to deliver ‘easy’ answers that can be
used as the basis for assigning gender. For Luce, the body provides data that he can
use to decide the best course of action: the ‘truth’ of the body can be (and is)
overridden if the doctor believes it appropriate.
When Luce first meets Callie, he is provided with a wealth of information
concerning her genetic make-up. With “the results of the endocrinological tests ...
Luce was able to make an educated guess that [Callie] was a male
pseudohermaphrodite -  genetically male but appearing otherwise” {Mid, p.412).
However, Luce is prepared to accept that being “genetically male ... did not mean
that [Callie] had a male gender identity” {Mid, p.413), because the “sex of rearing
[was] female” {Mid, p.413). However, in his notes, Luce acknowledges that the
situation may not be so clear-cut:
the subject has been raised in the Greek Orthodox tradition, with its strongly 
sex-defined roles. In general, the parents seem assimilationist and very ‘all- 
American’ in their outlook, but the presence of this deeper ethnic identity 
should not be overlooked {Mid, p.436).
Fausto-Sterling refers to John Money’s sexual identity research to illustrate
the way medical researchers think about sexual identity:
[p]otential males take a series of turns in one direction, potential females in 
another. In real time, the road begins at fertilisation and ends during late 
adolescence. If all goes as it should, then there are two, and only two, 
possible destinations -  male and female. (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p.l 10)
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In order to try to understand ‘what’ Callie is, Luce devises a questionnaire that he
hopes will enable him to pinpoint Callie’s gender identity. The questions range from
“[d]o you like any sports?” {Mid, p.416) to “[a]re you sexually attracted to girls?”
{Mid, p.416). The problem with this sort of questioning is the assumptions that lie
behind it, for example, sports are considered a stereotypically ‘male’ pastime, so an
interest in sports could therefore be interpreted as evidence that Callie is male. The
question of whether Callie is sexually attracted to girls throws up greater concerns.
First of all, Luce asks “[i]s there a boy at school you like?” {Mid, p.416), but when
Callie deflects this by pointing out that she attends an all-girls school, he asks the
more explicit question, “[a]re you sexually attracted to girls?” {Mid, p.416). In
contrast to the way Luce quickly drops the issue of Callie’s attraction to boys, he
determinedly pursues the issue of whether Callie has had relationships with girls:
this is all between us, Callie. I’m not going to tell your parents anything that 
you tell me here ... Your mother says you have a close relationship with a 
friend of yours ... Do you feel sexually attracted to her? Or have you had 
sexual relations with her? {Mid, p.416)
Despite Callie’s denials, Luce later shows her a pornographic film, asking
afterwards, “[w]hich one turns you on? The woman or the [pool boy]?” {Mid, p.419).
When Callie reluctantly answers “[t]he boy” {Mid, p.419), Luce pushes her: “I dig
the pizza girl myself. She’s g o t... incredible tits ... You like her tits? Do they turn
you on?” {Mid, p.419). Luce is aggressively focusing on Callie’s relationships with
girls because of his awareness of Callie’s status as a “genetic XY (male)” {Mid,
p.435), and Eugenides uses this scene to emphasis the shortcomings of Luce’s
methods. Firstly, Luce is basing his decision on the answers that Callie gives him -
answers which could be (and are) affected by Callie’s desire to appear ‘normal’.
Secondly, and most importantly, with his focus on sexuality, Luce is trying to define
Callie by using a heteronormative framework: that is, if Callie likes girls, she can be
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made into a heterosexual male, but if she likes boys, she can be made into a 
heterosexual female; Luce’s research is ignoring other possibilities, which are 
equally ‘normal’.
Eventually, Luce comes to the conclusion that Callie “is a girl who has a little too 
much male hormone” {Mid, p.428). Ominously, Luce presents Callie’s condition as 
something that can be easily ‘fixed’: “[w]e’re going to do an operation to finish your 
genitalia. They’re not quite finished yet and we want to finish them” {Mid, p.433). 
Fausto-Sterling points out that “[i]n the genetic male ... the gender of assignment is 
based on the infant’s anatomy, predominantly the size of the phallus” (Fausto- 
Sterling, 2000, p.l 12). She asks, “[h]ow small does a penis have to be before we call 
it a clitoris?” (Fausto-Sterling, 1985, p.85). In his medical notes, Luce refers to Callie 
having “a penis so small as to appear to be a clitoris”, and this undoubtedly 
influences his decision to make her a girl. Eugenides demonstrates that part of Luce’s 
strategy in dealing with Callie’s parents is an avoidance of specific terms. Although 
Luce refers to a penis in his notes, by the time he talks to Callie’s parents the 
threatening term ‘penis’ has been replaced with the more neutral ‘genitals’, so that 
Luce can avoid highlighting Callie’s maleness, and convince her parents to accept his 
diagnosis, which is that “[t]o leave the genitals as they are today would expose 
[Callie] to all manner of humiliation” {Mid, p.437). Alan Sinfield explains that 
“surgeons, coming upon infants whose anatomical sex appears mixed or 
indeterminate, intervene to construct what they regard as more satisfactory gender 
characteristics” (Sinfield, 2000, p. 153). Luce tries to avoid causing panic in parents, 
but it can be viewed in more sinister terms, as a way of controlling the parents’ 
reactions. Luce’s work has taught him that “[y]ou did not tell the parents of a 
newborn, ‘Your baby is a hermaphrodite.’ Instead, you said, ‘Your daughter was
bom with a clitoris that is a little larger than a normal girl’s. We’ll need to do surgery 
to make it the right size’” {Mid, p.413). Implicit in this is a value judgement, as 
mentioned by Fausto-Sterling: the penis must be large, the clitoris must be small. 
Further to this, Feinberg asks “[a]nd what is the criteria for a penis being ‘too small’? 
Too small for successful heterosexual intercourse. Intersexual infants are already 
being tailored for their sexuality, as well as their sex” (Feinberg, 1998, p.8).
Luce emphasises the necessity of genital surgery by suggesting that “sexual 
pleasure is only one factor in a happy life. The ability to marry and to pass as a 
normal woman in society are also important goals” {Mid, p.437). The emphasis is on 
being ‘normal’, so Luce underlines the necessity of surgery by referring to a previous 
patient who is now living what could be considered the heterosexual ideal: ‘“ I just 
got a postcard from a former patient,’ Luce said consolingly. ‘She had a condition 
similar to [Callie’s]. She’s married now. She and her husband adopted two kids and 
they’re as happy as can be’” {Mid, p.429). The judgement of what constitutes 
happiness comes from Luce, highlighting his total control over the information made 
available to Callie’s parents.
In a final attempt to convince Callie’s parents of his diagnosis, Luce confuses 
them with science. Eugenides constructs baffling paragraphs where Luce 
scientifically explains Callie’s situation, then dilutes them into easily-digestible 
sound bites:
[d]ue to her 5-alpha-reductase deficiency, Callie’s body does not produce 
dihydrotestosterone. What this means is that, in utero, she followed a 
primarily female line of development. Especially in terms of the external 
genitalia ... The simplest way to put it is like this: Callie is a girl who has a 
little too much male hormone. {Mid, p.427)
Dr Luce insists that Callie has surgery, claiming that her genitalia “are not quite
finished yet and we want to finish them” {Mid, p.433), to “make Callie look exactly
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like the girl she feels herself to be” (Mid, p.428). Despite Luce’s assurances, Callie
develops her own understanding about both normality, and Luce’s relationship to it:
[n]ormality wasn’t normal. It couldn’t be. If normality were normal, 
everybody could leave it alone. They could sit back and let normality 
manifest itself. But people -  and especially doctors -  had doubts about 
normality. They weren’t sure normality was up to the job. And so they felt 
inclined to give it a boost. (Mid, p.446)
There is a reason that the doctors -  Luce in particular -  are so preoccupied with the
notion of normality. Tiffany Atkinson argues that “the positing of any kind of
embodiment as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ is freighted with political consequences,
demanding as it must an opposing field of the w/matural and deviant” (Atkinson,
2005, p.4). By marking out ‘normality’, the doctors are also creating clear boundaries
for ‘abnormality’ so that people that fall into the latter category can be easily
identified and ‘cured’. In her examination of gender studies, Holly Devor suggests
that “[pjopular conceptions of femininity and masculinity ... revolve around
hierarchical appraisals of the ‘natural’ roles of males and females” (cited in Elam,
2000, p. 175), which prompts Diane Elam to ask “whether the West could ever
understand the un-naturalness of its own assumptions about nature and break away
from gender stereotypes” (Elam, 2000, p. 176). A reliance on gender stereotypes,
however, is an essential part of Luce’s work: “[i]t was impossible to be in Luce’s line
of work without falling back on ... stereotypes. He knew their limitations. But they
were clinically useful” (Mid, p.417). But it is this reliance on stereotypes that causes
‘normality’ to fall short of what is expected, and results in the need for surgery
and/or hormone treatments.
Fearing that Luce is hiding something from her, Callie searches for answers
in “the Reading room of the New York Library” (Mid, p.429). Using the Webster’s
dictionary, Callie follows the synonym trail from “hypospadias” -  a word she has
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heard Luce use in relation to her -  through “eunuch” to “hermaphrodite”, where the
entry suggests examining the “synonyms at m o n ste r” (Mid, p.430). Reading
‘monster’ in the dictionary gives the word power, and Callie recognises that “[t]he
synonym was official, authoritative; it was the verdict that the culture gave on a
person like her. Monster” (Mid, p.430). Collado-Rodriguez explains that
the established notion of monstrosity has ... been ironically undermined by 
the narrator in his/her continuous play with the binary Same/Other and their 
reference to ‘humanity.’ If, in categorical terms, the monster is a being other 
than human, the narrator has progressively stressed that, from the beginning 
of the twentieth century, people have also become other than human. We 
have become postmodern entities. (Collado-Rodriguez, 2006, p.82).
Just as important is the fact that the label of ‘monster’ has a history specific to
intersexuals that Callie is unaware of:
[i]n ancient times anatomical differences between men and women were used 
to ground the social development of individuals based on sex. The intersexual 
confounded such bifurcation. During this time, the intersexual was included 
in the loose classification o f ‘human monster’. These beings were considered 
a double violation of the natural order: half-human and half-animal. (Hird & 
Germon, 2001, p. 165)
At first a threatening term, ‘monster’ is weakened because of
increasing regulation within medicine and psychiatry [that] partially 
disqualified the individual as a legal subject. The intersexual ‘monster’ 
became less powerful; a figure more to be pitied than respected. This 
provided a discourse with which to pastorally regulate the intersexual through 
medicine and psychiatry. (Hird & Germon, 2001, p. 165)
Realising that Luce has been less than honest with her, Callie steals a copy of her
notes from his desk and discovers that she is a “genetic XY (Male) raised as female”
(Mid, p.435). This prompts her to run away, leaving a note to her parents that
describes Luce as “a big liar”, and declares that she is “not a girl. I’m a boy” (Mid,
p.439). Mary in Sacred Country (examined later in this chapter), explains her
situation in the same terms: “I am not a girl. I’m a boy” (SC, p.5). What is interesting
about these assertions is that the declaration of what one is not comes before the
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declaration of what one is. This fits with Diane Elam’s assertion that “we satisfy our 
prescribed gender role more through a knowledge of what we are not rather than 
what we are” (Elam, 2000, p. 169, emphasis in original). In making this declaration, 
Callie has decided that her genitals reveal what she is: the presence of a penis 
(however small) therefore makes her male. As Womack and Mallory-Kani state, 
“Calliope's moment of evolutionary truth occurs when she decides to accept her 
biological reality and establish a new life for herself as [a boy named] Cal” (Womack 
and Mallory-Kani, 2007).
Interspersed with the story of Callie’s past are passages about Cal’s current 
life as a forty-one year old man living in Berlin. These sections of the novel focus 
predominantly on Cal’s burgeoning relationship with Julie Kikuchi, a photographer 
who is unaware of his past. This relationship reveals both Cal’s lingering doubts 
about his masculinity, and his psychological difficulties with being intimate with 
people. Early in the narrative, Cal admits that “despite [his] androgenized brain, 
there’s an innate feminine circularity” (Mid, p.20) to his story, a statement that 
highlights his difficulties in living as male after experiencing the first fourteen years 
of his life as a girl. Although he boasts that he has “lived more than half [his] life as a 
male, and by now everything comes naturally” (Mid, p.41), Cal also acknowledges 
that he is over-reliant on props to aid his identity: “[t]he cigars, the double-breasted 
suits -  they’re a little too much. I’m well aware of that. But I need them. They make 
me feel better. After what I’ve been through, some overcompensation is to be 
expected” (Mid, p.41). The use of the term “naturally” draws attention to the 
unnaturalness of all performances, and illustrates that Cal remains plagued by 
uncertainties regarding his believability as a man. In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler 
argues that,
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gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior 
space through a stylized repetition o f acts ... If the ground of gender identity 
is a stylised repetition of acts through time and not a seemingly seamless 
identity, then the spatial metaphor of a “ground” will be displaced and 
revealed as a stylized configuration ... The abiding gendered self will then be 
shown to be structured by repeated acts that seek to approximate the ideal of 
a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their occasional discontinuity, 
reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this “ground”. (Butler, 
1999, p. 179)
Cal’s need to constantly assert his maleness with the use of clothes and other props
actually undermines his maleness. He protests that he is “not androgynous in the
least” {Mid, p.41), but then admits that there are times when “Calli[e] surfaces ...
like a childhood speech impediment” {Mid, p.41), and that his maleness (“I use the
men’s room” [Mid, p.41]) is diminished by “[n]ever [using] the urinals, always the
stalls” (Mid, p.41).46
Cal’s identity remains incomplete because his family struggles to accept him
as a man: his father, Milton, dies without having a chance to see Cal as a man, which
has the effect of arresting Cal’s development:
I like to think that my father’s love for me was strong enough that he could 
have accepted me. But in some ways it’s better that we never had to work that 
out, he and I. With respect to my father I will always remain a girl. {Mid, 
p.512)
Although Cal’s mother, Tessie, has the opportunity to meet her son, Cal “remain[s] 
in essential ways Tessie’s daughter” because he is “still the one who remembers to 
call her every Sunday ... the one she recounts her growing list of ailments to [and] 
like any good daughter [he]’ll be the one to nurse her in her old age” {Mid, p.520). 
Cal is treated as a daughter not just because he has learned traditionally female 
behaviours, but also partly because Tessie cannot accept Cal as a man, suggesting to 
him that “it would have been easier just to stay the way you were” {Mid, p.520).
46 The ability to use the men’s room is an important test o f the ability to pass; this is developed in 
more detail in my examination of Stone Butch Blues later in this chapter.
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Tessie’s inability to understand, together with Cal’s own worries about his gender,
causes him to feel a great deal of shame, something he is “trying my best to get over
it” {Mid, p. 106). His shame means that he is “closeted at work” {Mid, p. 107), and
struggles with dating:
[t]he tailored suit comes off. The Thomas Pink shirt, too. My dates can’t fail 
to be impressed by my physical condition. (Under the armor of my double- 
breasted suits is another of gym-built muscle.) But the final protection, my 
roomy, my discreet boxer shorts, these I do not remove. Ever. Instead I leave, 
making excuses. {Mid, p. 107)
Cal’s Tack’ of a penis, as alluded to by the roomy boxers, affects his confidence
because he defines his maleness according to his genitals, as does the medical
establishment. Interestingly, Francisco Collado-Rodriguez describes Cal as
“somebody who was bom apparently a girl, was subsequently brought up as such,
but finally underwent a painful process of physical, psychic, and cultural
transformation that turned her/him into what society considers to be a man”
(Collado-Rodriguez, 2006, p.74, my emphasis). The fact is that Cal is a man on the
surface, and goes to great lengths to emphasise his masculinity in order to hide the
fact of his genital Tack’.
Suzanne Kessler explains that in relation to medical construction of gender,
“[t]he formulation ‘good penis equals male; absence of good penis equals female’, is
treated in the literature and by the physicians interviewed as an objective criterion,
operative in all cases” (cited in Elam, 2000, p. 174). Similarly, Anne Fausto-Sterling
points out that
[f]or proper masculine socialisation to occur, the little boy must have a 
sufficiently large penis ... In childhood, all that is required is that he be able 
to pee in a standing position. In adulthood, he must engage in vaginal 
heterosexual intercourse.47 The discourse of sexual pleasure, even for males,
47 Pilcher and Whelehan explain that “heterosexual penetrative intercourse is regarded as the 
determinant of heterosexual sex because it facilitates procreation, seen as governing ‘normal’ sexual 
response (regardless of what sexual practices heterosexuals individually favour)” (Pilcher and 
Whelehan, 2004, p. 155).
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is totally absent from this medical literature ... sexual pleasure clearly takes a 
backseat to ensuring heterosexual conventions. Penetration in the absence of 
pleasure takes precedence over pleasure in the absence of penetration. 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p.l 12).
The doubts in the mind of Cal’s mother, together with what Cal terms his “physical 
predicament” (Mid, p. 107), leave him feeling unable to have sex. At one point, Cal 
admits that he “invited Julie ... to go away for the weekend [but] made a point to 
emphasize that we would have separate rooms” (Mid, p.232). Cal’s failure to 
consummate his relationship with Julie weighs on his mind, and at one point he 
interrupts the narrative to reflect on his lack of progress, saying “before I go on with 
[the] story, I want to update you on developments with Julie Kikuchi. With regard to 
the main point: there have been no developments” (Mid, p.272).
At college, Cal has a sexual relationship with a girl named Olivia -  chosen 
because she is unthreatening: “Olivia had been savagely attacked when she was only 
thirteen, nearly raped ... The ordeal had arrested her development” (Mid, p.319).
This situation appeals to Cal because he too is “emotionally adolescent” (Mid, 
p.319). Describing “the first time we took off our clothes in front of each other”
(Mid, p.319), Cal likens it to “unwinding bandages” (Mid, p.319) illustrating the 
torture of slowly revealing his body to someone. Cal believes himself to be 
‘unfinished’ -  still waiting to be ‘fixed’, but when he sleeps with Olivia, Cal is 
contributing to the diminishment of his maleness by emphasising his under­
developed body, describing himself as “as much of a man as Olivia could bear at that 
point. I was her starter kit” (Mid, p.319).
By the novel’s end, Cal decides to explain himself to Julie, telling her that 
“[t]here’s something you should know about me” (Mid, p.498). Eugenides does not 
let the reader into Cal’s explanation to Julie -  how he explains or defines himself-  
but in the last scene with Julie, she finally knows Cal’s secret and they decide to
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sleep together. Cal takes the dominant role: “I led Julie into the bedroom, where I 
hadn’t led anyone in quite a long time” (Mid, p.513). However, his control soon 
gives way to nervousness: “I was ... taking off my clothes. So was Julie. It was like 
jumping into cold water. You had to do it without thinking too much. We got under 
the covers and held each other, petrified, happy” (Mid, p.514). That Cat’s last 
present-day section of the novel ends with him in bed with Julie Kikuchi could be 
construed as a victory of sorts: despite his ‘difficulties’, Cal is finally a ‘real man’ 
because he is going to have sex with a woman. However, the ‘type’ of sex is left 
unexplained, which subverts this notion. As Zachary Sifiientes notes, “[wjhether in 
biological or performative ways, a hermaphrodite’s sexual practice jeopardizes 
dominant and radical visions of sexuality alike, in which the sustained ambiguity of 
the body unseats the very concept of sexual orientation, regardless if it is based on 
gender, sex, or some complex of the two” (Sifuentes, 2006, p. 145). The fact that Cal 
might not be engaging in heterosexual penetrative intercourse affects his claims to 
maleness: Fausto-Sterling points out that “medical literature insists [that in] 
adulthood, the penis must become large enough for vaginal penetration during sexual 
intercourse” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a, p.l 12). What Cal is actually doing is enacting 
“a very queer sexuality -  one decidedly hetero in outward appearance but evidently 
strange behind the closed door and in the dimmed lights of the bedroom” (Sifuentes, 
2006, p. 146).
This means that on first glance, the ending of Middlesex appears 
unsatisfactory: Cal proves his masculinity by sleeping with a woman. However, the 
complexities of gender -  specifically the lack of opportunities and acceptance for 
anybody who wishes to live outside of the male/female binary -  mean that Eugenides 
is limited in the kind of conclusion he can craft. As a novel of Cal’s journey from
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female to male, it is important that this journey has an end -  a destination of 
‘maleness’ that is diametrically opposed to femaleness -  and it is because of this that 
Eugenides has to instead use Cal’s ethnicity (his previously mentioned struggle 
between his American identity and Greek heritage) to make his point. By the novel’s 
end, Cal finds himself tom between his Greek and American identities (symbolising 
Callie and Cal), but aware of the possibilities that are open to him.
Reinventing the Self
Cal’s past informs his future: the story of his grandparents’ crossing from Turkey to
America reveals how identities can be transformed. In order to get a French passport
that would allow him to flee Turkey, Cal’s grandfather, Lefty, “puckered up his lips
and expelled air, as he’d seen Frenchmen do” {Mid, p.61). This marks the beginning
of Lefty’s realisation that he can transform himself into whatever he wants to be,
simply by changing his behaviour:
Lefty never discouraged any speculation. He seized the opportunity of 
transatlantic travel to reinvent himself. He wrapped a ratty blanket over his 
shoulders like an opera cape. Aware that whatever happened now would 
become the truth, that whatever he seemed to be would become what he was 
-  already an American in other words -  he waited for [his sister] to come up 
on deck. {Mid, p.67)
On arrival at America, Lefty declares that “[wje’re all Amerikanidhes now” {Mid,
p.99): his use of Greek terms underlines the belief that one can choose identities at
will. Judith Butler opposes this notion, asking,
[i]f gender is a construction, must there be an T  or a ‘we’ who enacts or 
performs that construction? How can there be an activity, a constructing, 
without presupposing an agent who precedes and performs that activity? ... it 
takes a certain suspicion toward grammar to reconceive the matter in a 
different light. For if gender is constructed, it is not necessarily constructed 
by an ‘I’ or a ‘we’ who stands before that construction in any spatial or 
temporal sense. (Butler, 1993, p.7)
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The way that Cal starts living as a male suggests that he agrees with Lefty: first 
choosing the identity and then adopting the behaviours. This is especially visible 
when Cal rejects the concept of a unified identity; although he considers himself to 
be very much “an American” (Mid, p.440), Cal later notes that “[w]e’re all made up 
of many parts, other halves. Not just me” (Mid, p.440). When Milton dies, it is Cal 
“who, upholding an old Greek custom no one remembered anymore, stayed behind 
[at the house], blocking the door, so that Milton’s spirit wouldn’t reenter the house. It 
was always a man who did this, and now I qualified” (Mid, p.529). The connection 
that is made between Cal’s Greek and male identities shows that he can adopt 
elements of the cultures and behaviours that are open to him, and use them when 
necessary or desirable. Cal’s fear that “there was another America to which we could 
never gain admittance” (Mid, p.298) exposes his fear that he might not be enough of 
a man, but the adventures of his grandparents prove to him that the most important 
thing is to have conviction in his own chosen male identity.
Stone Butch Blues
In her book, Female Masculinity, Judith Halberstam aims to answer the question, 
“[w]hat is ‘masculinity’?” (Halberstam, 1998, p.l). Despite the inherent difficulty in 
answering the question effectively, Halberstam is adamant that “masculinity must not 
and cannot and should not reduce down to the male body and its effects”
(Halberstam, 1998, p.l). However, she is equally certain that “masculinity and 
maleness are profoundly difficult to pry apart” (Halberstam, 1998, p.2), and 
emphasises the “limitations of a discussion of masculinity that interpreted 
‘masculinity’ as a synonym for men or maleness” (Halberstam, 1998, p. 13). Stone 
Butch Blues, written by Leslie Feinberg, looks at the issue of feeling comfortable in 
one’s body and the way that intersects with cultural constructions of gender. The
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main character, Jess, is a woman who finds it hard to accept the label of ‘woman’.
She embraces her ‘female masculinity’ to the point where she feels it may be safer to
live as a man rather than be visible as a butch. However, in order to do this, Jess
realises that acceptance as a man is dependent on hiding her past as a woman,
leaving her trapped between herself and her body. The body, as far as Jess is
concerned, is a site of conflict, never truly displaying what she feels she is. In part,
this is because of the lack of a viable space in which to live: “[a] 11 kinds of people, all
kinds of identities, in other words, are simply not accounted for in the taxonomies we
live with” (Halberstam, 2004, p.759). As Wilchins argues, “[b]uilding an ‘accurate’
imaginary body, which maps closely to the social reading of my body, is critical to
navigating social space. It’s integral to knowing which clothes to wear, who I can ask
for a date, how to get my hair cut” (Wilchins, 1997, p. 151). The novel, like
Middlesex, rejects the notion that “the body tells the truth” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000a,
p. 109), arguing instead that the body is an experimental space.
In the context of traditional gendering practices, Judith Butler has referred to
“the medical interpellation which...shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to a ‘she’ or a ‘he,’”
and states that “in that naming, the girl is ‘girled,’ brought into the domain of
language and kinship through the interpellation of gender” (Butler, 1993, p.7). Jess’s
birth confirms Butler’s argument, with Jess’s mother’s saying “[p]ut the baby over
there” (SBB, p. 14): Jess is reduced to ‘baby’ and denied a gender, an inversion of
typical birth narratives. In Butlerian terms, Jess has not been ‘girled’. In this context
Butler also claims that
th[e] founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and 
throughout various intervals of time to reenforce [sic] or contest this 
naturalized effect. The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also 
the repeated inculcation of a norm. (Butler, 1993, p.8)
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In the case of Jess, she finds that the otherness is established at birth and constantly
highlighted: “[n]o one ever offered a name for what was wrong with me. That’s what
made me afraid it was really bad. I only came to recognize its melody through this
constant refrain: ‘Is that a boy or a girl?’” (SBB, p. 13). Jess’s situation is summed up
by Halberstam’s comment that “gender assignations rely so heavily on the visual”
(Halberstam, 2005, p. 104). By failing to be clearly distinguishable as either a man or
a woman, Jess attracts anger and a lack of understanding.
Jess’s confusion as a young adult is eased when she discovers lesbian bars,
and in particular, butch lesbians with whom she can identify. Encouraged by what
she sees, Jess starts to create and live her own butch identity; one that is not reliant
on the “normative constraints” (Butler, 1993, p.x) that Butler deems necessary for
“heterosexual hegemony” (Butler, 1993, p.xii). Having been worn down by society’s
prejudice, and feeling “self-conscious about being so butch” (SBB, p.78) in the
outside world, Jess draws some strength from a butch who has chosen the route of
hormones and surgery:
[s]tanding in the doorway was a mountain of a woman. She wore a black 
leather jacket unzipped. Her chest was flat, and it was clear she wasn’t 
wearing a binder. Her jeans were low slung, unbelted. She carried her riding 
gloves and her helmet in one hand. Rocco. Her legend preceded her. (SBB, 
p.95)
Jess is impressed because Rocco “worked as a man on a building site” (SBB, p.95), 
but she does not seriously consider Rocco to be a man, as evidenced by her use of 
female pronouns when discussing Rocco. This can also be seen when Jess and her 
friends discuss another butch who has chosen surgery: “‘You know Ginni? She got 
on a sex-change program, now she calls herself Jimmy.’ Edwin glared at Grant. ‘He 
asked us to call him he -  remember? We ought to do it’” (SBB, p. 144). As far as Jess 
and her friends are concerned, surgery and hormones will not make these butches
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men, but rather provide a cover under which they can hide themselves, and remain 
safe.
Rocco therefore represents a departure from Foucault’s notion of the body as 
“caught up in a system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions” 
(Foucault, 1977, p.l 1), insofar as she represents a new understanding of the body as 
a site of personal gender expression, and her story makes Jess question which 
direction she is heading in: “[n]o matter how painful it was to be a he-she, I 
wondered what kind of courage was required to leave the sex you’d always known, 
or to live so alone” (SBB, p.95). The emphasis on Jess’s sex as something she had 
“always known” makes it clear that her subsequent thoughts about surgery are not 
prompted by a specific desire to be male. This contrasts with Alan Sinfield’s claim 
that “[i]n Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues ... whether [stone butches] should be 
considered as lesbian or as somehow male is an issue ... Some of the butches seek to 
ratify their maleness through hormone treatment and surgery” (Sinfield, 2000, 
p. 152).
The Limitation of Binaries
At the same time that Jess is thinking about hormones and sex changes, her femme 
girlfriend, Theresa, starts to become more politicised, developing an interest in the 
women’s liberation movement. Theresa’s argument is that “Butches need women’s 
liberation ... Anything that’s good for women is good for butches” (SBB, p. 138), but 
this comment only serves to illustrate that butches are considered separate from 
women. Jess regards her identity as ‘woman’ as secondary to her ‘butch’ identity, 
and actually thinks that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are too simplistic for her needs, saying to 
Theresa,
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I just had this really amazing dream.. .1 had a beard and my chest was flat. It 
made me so happy.. .it wasn’t about being gay. It was about being a man or a 
woman. Do you know what I mean? I always feel I have to prove I’m like 
other women, but in the dream I didn’t feel that way. I’m not even sure I felt 
like a woman. (SBB, p. 143)
Stating that she “didn’t feel like a woman or a man” (SBB, p. 143), Jess admits she
liked being different, suggesting the limitations of binaries to define and contain
what Jess is. Giving some more thought to Rocco, Jess feels that she may be “safe”
(SBB, p. 144) if she takes hormones because she’ll be able to hide from people, and it
will take her into the Butlerian ‘safe’ zone of gender binaries. When she finds out
that her friend Ed has started taking hormones, Jess asks, “What happens? Does it
just last for a little while? I mean can you go back to being a butch later, when it’s
safe to come out?” (SBB, p. 145), indicating that she does not consider taking
hormones to mark a permanent change. In fact, Jess tells Theresa that she is thinking
of starting on hormones “to pass as a guy” (SBB, p. 146). Jess does not want to be
male, and she does not consider it possible -  by taking hormones, Jess believes she
will look like a man, and be able to convince other people that she is a man, but not
that she will be a man.
Theresa does not really understand why Jess wants to take hormones, and
cannot accept it:
‘[yjou’re a woman!’ Theresa shouted at breakfast...
‘No I’m not,’ I yelled back at her. ‘I’m a he-she. That’s different.’
Theresa slapped the table in anger. ‘That’s a terrible word. They call you that 
to hurt you’. (SBB, p.147)48
Here the issue of pronouns and their role in fixing gender identity raises its head
again. In this context, Suzanne Romaine argues that “pronouns are used to represent
not just anatomy, but a complex and varying concept of oneself as a gendered
48 Feinberg reclaims the term ‘he-she’ in Transgender Warriors: “‘[s]he’ and ‘he’ are customarily 
used to describe both the birth sex and the gender expression of an individual. But ‘he-she’ and ‘she- 
male’ describe the person’s gender expression with the first pronoun and the birth sex with the 
second” (Feinberg, 1996, p.97).
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person” (Romaine, 1999, p.47), and by adopting the compound ‘he-she’, Jess is 
revealing the inadequacy of either ‘she’ or ‘he’ to define her. Jess embraces the 
category of ‘he-she’ -  normally a term of abuse -  as a means of self-definition and 
this is the closest that language gets in the novel to an accurate description of what 
Jess is because it corresponds with her feeling of not comfortably fitting in to either 
gender category, but possessing elements of both.
Riki Wilchins points out that “there is not a single word for people who don’t 
fit gender norms that is positive, affirming, and complimentary. There is not even a 
word that is neutral... Language works against you. It is meant to, because the 
language of gender is highly political” (Wilchins, 2004, p.3 8). Jess is trying to 
reclaim language, to make the power of language work for, rather than against, her. 
Nonetheless, Theresa feels that she cannot accept Jess as a man because it calls into 
question her own category as a lesbian and a femme, saying she doesn’t want to be 
“some man’s wife, even if that man’s a woman” (SBB, p. 148). The viability of 
‘lesbian’ as a distinct category is further eroded by Halberstam’s assertion that 
“[s]ome queer identities have appeared recently in lesbian zines and elsewhere: guys 
with pussies, dykes with dicks, queer butches, aggressive femmes, F2Ms, lesbians 
who like men, daddy boys, gender queens, drag kings, porno afro homos, 
bulldaggers, women who fuck boys, women who fuck like boys, dyke mommies, 
transsexual lesbians, male lesbians. As the list suggests, gay/lesbian/straight simply 
cannot account for the range of sexual experience available” (Halberstam, 2004, 
p.760). Similarly, Joan Nestle explains that “[w]hat I have come to understand is that 
there are pluralistic gender histories, pluralistic challenges to the male/female, 
woman/man, lesbian, butch/femme construction and identities as I had come to know 
them” (Nestle, 2002, p.9).
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Jess knows she “can’t go on much longer without something changing” (SBB,
p. 151), but Theresa reiterates that she does not want to be with a man. As a femme,
Theresa faces a different set of problems from Jess. Although, according to Nikki
Sullivan, butches are “‘masculine’ women who made explicit the existence of
lesbianism” (Sullivan, 2003, p.27), the problem is that femmes are often visibly
indistinguishable from heterosexual women. Femmes, then, are suffering an
alternative discrimination, where they are either not derided for being lesbians,
because they are wrongly assumed to be heterosexual, or become “largely invisible
or passed over as ‘pseudo lesbians’” (Waterhouse, 1993, p.106). Riki Wilchins
argues that “[i]n a culture where masculinity is defined by having sex with women
and femininity by having sex with men, all gay people are genderqueer” (Wilchins,
2002a, p. 12). However, Theresa’s problem is that she is not read as queer enough.49
Therefore, she cannot accept Jess’s decision because of the implications it will have
for her own queer identity, which is confirmed by Jess’s female masculinity:
I put on lipstick and high heels and walk down the street arm in arm with 
you, Jess. This is my life, and I’m damn brave to love who I love...If I’m not 
with a butch everyone just assumes I’m straight. It’s like I’m passing too, 
against my will. I’m sick of the world thinking I’m straight. I’ve worked hard 
to be discriminated against as a lesbian. (SBB, p. 151)50
While Jess is fleeing discrimination, Theresa actively seeks it. Jess has to constantly
“defend who [she is]” (SBB, p. 148) because she cannot avoid being identified as a
butch, but Theresa has the opposite problem: as a femme, her lesbianism is either not
taken seriously, or “everyone assumes [she is] straight” (SBB, p. 151), and so she
49 Defining ‘genderqueer’, Wilchins argues that “[w]ords work well for things we can repeat, that we 
hold in common. What is unique or private is lost to language. But gender is a system of meanings 
that shapes our experience of bodies. Genderqueemess is by definition unique, private, and profoundly 
different. That’s what makes it ‘queer’” (Wilchins, 2002c, p.46). From this definition, it is clear that 
Theresa is not different enough (at least, not visually) to be understood as queer.
50 Sonya Bolus makes the same point in “Loving Outside Simple Lines”, a narrative detailing her 
reaction to her butch lover’s decision to have chest reconstruction, and begin living as a transgender 
man: “[m]y greatest fear is of how this might affect my own sense o f self. ‘Just don’t ask me to be 
straight,’ I tell you. ‘It took me too much pain, and time and struggle to come out queer, lesbian, and 
femme-proud. I can’t go back’” (Bolus, 2002, p.l 16).
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needs to be with a butch to validate her identity as a lesbian. Theresa’s position is 
echoed by Maltz in “Fading to Pink”. Maltz has coined the term “[f]emme 
invisibility” (Maltz, 2002, p. 161) to describe the way in which femmes “are misread 
as heterosexual” (Maltz, 2002, p. 161). For Maltz, being a femme is in itself 
characterised by the struggle to be recognised as queer: “GLBT pride means being 
visible queer, and being visibly queer means compromising my femmeness” (Maltz, 
2002, p. 161). Just as butches fight against the assumption that masculinity is 
synonymous with maleness, so do femmes battle “against the assumption that 
femininity in a female means [they are] heterosexual” (Maltz, 2002, p.161). To 
return to Halberstam’s words, the problem femmes face is not being “readable at a 
glance” (Halberstam, 1998, p.23). Maltz admits that it is difficult to read her as queer 
because her queemess is only read through her declaration of queemess, or her 
proximity to other (more visible) queers, and queer situations: “I am persistently 
outing myself... I am also marked as queer through my affiliations with queer 
organizations, my friendships, my writing, and the presence of my partner, a stone 
butch” (Maltz, 2002, p. 162). Irene Rose’s simplistic assertion that “butch/femme 
lesbian couples ... liv[e] their lives perceptually as heterosexuals” (Rose, 2003, 
p. 149), is challenged by Feinberg’s depiction of the complex relationship between 
Theresa and Jess. Like Maltz, both Theresa and Jess are haunted by how others 
perceive them and their bodies. Although Jess wants to try and pass as a man, 
Theresa cannot bear the thought of being perceived as heterosexual, and so their 
irreconcilable positions ultimately force them apart.
The ‘Bathroom Problem’
Jess is haunted by her body because it stops her interacting with the world, and 
marks her as different. As she says on a number of occasions, “I just don’t want to be
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different any more” (SBB, p. 159). With her first hormone shot, Jess hopes she can,
as she says, “finally be pier] self’ (SBB, p. 164). Choosing to have surgery is a more
notable decision than taking hormones because it is not easily reversed, and it must
be contrasted with her initial wish to take hormones as a temporary measure. Tiffany
Atkinson suggests in the context of bodily dissection that “[w]ith the opening of the
cadaver to the scientific gaze, anatomists effectively became ‘the first modem
persons to distinguish man from his body’” (Atkinson, 2005, p.6). Jess’s decision to
have surgery will not distinguish her from her body because she will be appearing as
male and passing as male, but, in the sense that Jess actually considers herself to be
female, she is being distinguished from her newly acquired ‘male’ body.
So it would seem that the hormones and surgery are only worthwhile as long
as they help Jess to consolidate a ‘performance’ of masculinity which will pass as
male, and so she must test her appearance to ensure that she is a convincing ‘man’.
Jess goes to a barbershop and when the barber responds warmly to Jess and calls her
“sir” (SBB, p. 172), she feels “excitement” at “entering men’s turf” (SBB, p. 172), but
I would argue that her pleasure comes not just from being perceived as a man, but
from not being rejected. The next self-imposed test will serve to confirm this
success: Jess decides it is “time for the most important test of all: the men’s room”
(SBB, p. 172). Halberstam devotes an entire section of her book Female Masculinity
to what she calls “The Bathroom Problem”:
in public bathrooms for women, various bathroom users tend to fail to 
measure up to expectations of femininity, and those of us who present in 
some ambiguous way are routinely questioned and challenged about our 
presence in the ‘wrong’ bathroom. (Halberstam, 1998, p.20)
Halberstam uses a scene in Stone Butch Blues where Jess is mocked for using the
women’s bathroom as an illustration of what she terms the ‘bathroom problem’ but
she ignores Jess’s test in the men’s ^athroom, even though Jpssrps-man is the “self
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that masquerades as another kind of self and does so successfully” (Halberstam,
1998, p.21). Despite overlooking this, Halberstam does admit that “for the FTM, the 
men’s room represents the most severe test of his ability to pass” (Halberstam, 1998, 
p.25).
Maijorie Garber also focuses attention on ‘the bathroom problem’, looking at 
Lacan’s discussion of “Urinary Segregation” (Garber, 1992, p. 13). The important 
issue for Garber is that “[t]he signs on the doors do not contain pictures of sex 
organs; they satisfy a desire for cultural binarism rather than for biological certainty” 
(Garber, 1992, p. 13). Garber points out that “the words ‘men’ and ‘women’ or 
‘ladies’ and ‘gentlemen’ have been replaced by signs showing a figure dressed in 
male clothes -  trousers -  and a figure dressed in female clothes -  a skirt or a dress” 
(Garber, 1992, p. 14). She adds a curious afterthought to this: “[y]et no one (except 
perhaps transvestites and transsexuals) interprets these signs literally or mimetically” 
(Garber, 1992, p. 14). I would say that no one including transvestites and 
transsexuals, interprets the signs literally. If transvestites or transsexuals were to go 
into the ‘wrong’ bathroom (and here we enter the problem of what the ‘right’ 
bathroom is), they do so perhaps because they wish to pass, or perhaps because they 
are dissatisfied with the gender they were assigned at birth, not because they have 
misread the signs.51 In this sense, using a public bathroom, for everyone, becomes a
51 Diane Elam makes a similar point: “the pictures which accompany or replace the written 
designations on Western toilet facilities do not necessarily bear a strict resemblance to those 
individuals who are hailed by them. Women will not necessarily wear the familiar skirt which 
inevitably adorns the women’s room, and men in kilts and djellebas will not particularly resemble 
their trousered counterparts” (Elam, 2000, p. 171). However, Elam adds, “there must, underneath it all, 
be a moment of visual accountability. Women who fail to resemble sufficiently stereotypic women 
will be likely to find themselves accosted by law enforcement officials and asked to prove why they 
should be using the women’s not the men’s room -  presence of the wrong set o f genitals indicates the 
presence of a pervert” (Elam, 2000, p. 171).
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statement: this is what I wish to be (today).52 For Jess, using a public bathroom is an 
opportunity to show how she wants to be perceived.
Now that she does not have to hide, Jess thinks life will be easier, but when 
Jess starts living as a man, she finds that she has placed herself under constraints, 
stating that
passing didn’t just mean slipping below the surface, it meant being buried 
alive. I was still me on the inside, trapped in there with all my wounds and 
fears. But I was no longer me on the outside. (SBB, p. 173)
Jean Bobby Noble contrasts Jess’s situation with that of Mary in Sacred Country:
“[o]ne of the strategies of survival that Jess chooses -  a strategy that eventually
works both with and against the conditions of (un)intelligibility mandated by the
sex/gender system -  is that of passing. Where Martin emerges to enable Mary’s
becoming more himself, especially once Mary leaves Swaithey for London, Jess’s
passing enables self-alienation and almost virtual erasure” (Noble, 2003, p. 109). Jess
does not ‘become more herself because being male is not her ultimate aim. As she
finds it easier and easier to pass as male, Jess is getting further away from her butch
identity. In part, this is because Jess is afraid of bumping into someone who knew her
as a woman, and who could therefore ‘out’ her, a sentiment echoed by the American
journalist Norah Vincent, who undertook an experiment in 2004 to live as a man:
“[y]ou are always afraid that someone knows you are not who you say you are, or
will know immediately if you make even the slightest false step” (Vincent, 2006,
p.269). Although strangers are ‘fooled’ by Jess’s appearance, Jess realises that
forming relationships means keeping quiet about her past. A potential employer
explains that he is interested in hiring Jess because “[y]ou look like a clean-cut
52 A male-to-female transsexual who felt she was “too read[ily] encourage[d] to have a sex change 
operation” (Batty, 2006) told a General Medical Council disciplinary hearing that she “feels unable to 
live as either a man or a woman” (Batty, 2006), specifically finding it difficult to choose which 
bathroom to use: “I get very confused when it comes to even simple things such as choosing which 
conveniences to use. It is very hard” (Batty, 2006).
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young man”, although Jess knows that “[o]nly a short time before I had been a 
monster” (SBB, p. 174). Therefore, this new-found acceptance, which is based on a 
falsehood, is essentially worthless: “[a]ll my life I’d been told everything about me 
was really twisted and sick. But if I was a man, I was ‘cute’. Acceptance of me as a 
he felt like an ongoing indictment of me as a he-she” (SBB, p. 178). Gender is here 
portrayed as inter-relational, constructed through social discourse, and Feinberg is 
questioning whether gender can exist in solitude and/or isolation.
Woman or Man?
In spite of the fact that Foucault claims that “[s]olitude was necessary to both body 
and soul” (Foucault, 1977, p. 143), Jess finds constant solitude overwhelming 
because it does not present her with the opportunity to validate her identity. She took 
hormones to hide her difference and blend into society, and has gone to a lot of effort 
to change the way people see her, but now nobody is looking because she looks 
‘normal’. Butler acknowledges that “I may feel that without some recognizability I 
cannot live. But I may also feel that the terms by which I am recognized make life 
unlivable [sic]” (Butler, 2004, p.4). What this means is that Jess is grappling with a 
similar problem to Theresa. Theresa needed people to see her with a butch to know 
that she was a lesbian. If she had stayed with Jess after surgery, people wouldn’t 
have seen her as a femme because they would not have been looking. Solitude 
therefore poses a problem for Jess because of her lack of confidence in her male 
identity, experiencing “the constant terror of discovery” (SBB, p. 173). Her fractured 
identity is therefore difficult to maintain.
Dissatisfied with the direction her life has taken, Jess finds herself drawn 
back towards the butch/femme world, not least because there she finds someone who
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will accept her identity.53 Edna is a femme that Jess has long been attracted to, and 
Jess feels accepted because Edna “smiled, as though she liked what she saw” (SBB, 
p.211). When Feinberg writes this, she is not trying to say that Edna recognizes Jess 
as male, but that Edna approves of Jess as a butch, regardless of her body. Edna 
reaches out to Jess not just emotionally, but physically, causing Jess to have regrets 
about her transformation: “Edna ran her fingertips across the beard stubble on my 
cheek. I wished I had shaved before I’d gone to the gym” (SBB, p.212). Edna offers 
an interesting perspective on the success of Jess’s transformation, saying that, “[i]n a 
way I don’t know how anyone in the world could think you’re a man, especially if 
they looked into your eyes” (SBB, p.212). Edna is able to see the beauty that Jess 
represents as an individual, even as she stumbles over the vocabulary to describe it: 
‘“ [y]ou are so beautiful,’ she whispered. ‘Handsome, I should have said you are so 
handsome’” (SBB, p.216).
Romaine claims that “Language is fundamental to understanding gendered 
selves” (Romaine, 1999, p.xi), and that it “reflects existing social identities rather 
than constructs them” (Romaine, 1999, p.xiii). Edna is confused, using the word 
‘beautiful’, because it is a word often applied to women, but switching to ‘handsome’ 
as it seems more appropriate for Jess’s masculine appearance. This, as Romaine 
argues, reflects Jess’s current identity as masculine, but also reveals the inadequacy 
of language: “languages ... like the surgeon’s scalpel, impose a dichotomy into male 
(he) and female (she), compelling us to choose one or the other in referring to
53 Jess also finds herself drawn back to her past by the realisation that “[t]here is no ‘other’ side, no 
‘opposite’ sex, no natural divide to be spanned by surgery, by disguise, by passing” (Halberstam, 
2004, p.761). The very thing that begins Jess’s gender journey -  the lack of a perfect identity -  is also 
what ends up bringing her back to her butch roots. Jess failed to live up to society’s conceptions of the 
‘perfect woman’ because of her masculinity, and she subsequently realises that gender is not a system 
of opposites, but rather a spectrum of identities. There is no ‘other’ side for her to reach, so instead of 
gaining her freedom, Jess is in the same position she was always in -  unable to tell the ‘truth’ about 
her identity and fearful of people discovering who she is.
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people” (Romaine, 1999, p.45). The compulsion to choose one or the other leads 
Edna to attempt to avoid the issue while seeming to give support to Jess’s masculine 
identity. Because Edna appears to understand this issue of Jess’s gender, she is asked 
to provide Jess with an answer to the question that has plagued her for so long: “Do 
you think I’m a woman?” (SBB, p.217).
In asking this, Jess is looking to somebody else to explain what she is, just as 
she has relied on other people to identify her as masculine. Not having anybody she 
can turn to stops Jess from reaching any definite conclusions, and limits her 
response: “[tjhere’s never been many other women in the world I could identify with. 
But I sure as hell don’t feel like a guy, either. I don’t know what I am” (SBB, p.217). 
Edna’s answer to this problem takes into consideration all the struggles that Jess has 
faced to try and fit in: “[yjou’re not alone in the feeling that you’re not a man or a 
woman ... You’re more than just neither, honey. There’s other ways to be than 
either-or. It’s not so simple. Otherwise there wouldn’t be so many people who don’t 
fit” (SBB, p.218). Although this grey area is the area occupied by people in general, 
Jess finds that by appearing to ‘fit’, she is further alienated from herself. Jess wishes 
that “everything could go back to the way it was” (SBB, p.218) and starts to 
understand that passing is not the answer. The problem for Jess is, as Jason 
Cromwell points out, “passing means blending in and becoming unnoticeable and 
unremarkable as either a man or a woman” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39). However Jess 
reconfigures her body, she cannot escape its implications. By blending in, she has 
shut the door on her old life as a butch, but as a man she is excluded from the lesbian 
world. She asks herself,
who was I now -  woman or man? I fought long and hard to be included as
woman among women, but I always felt so excluded by my differences. I
hadn’t just believed that passing would hide me. I hoped that it would allow
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me to express the part of myself that didn’t seem to be a woman. (SBB,
p .222)54
This references Jess’s earlier identification as a he-she. In trying to prove herself as a
‘he-she’, Jess tries to emphasise her masculine side, but it ends up overshadowing
her female identity, to the point where she didn’t get to explore being a he-she, she
“simply became a he -  a man without a past” (SBB, p.222).
Following Edna’s suggestion that either-or is not the only way, Jess decides
to try and go back to being a he-she, saying “[w]hat i f  the real me could emerge,
changed by the journey. Who would I be? Suddenly, I needed to know” (SBB,
p.222). Jess believes that once the hormones wear off, she’ll discover she’s gone
“full circle” (SBB, p.222), and this does seem to be the case when she describes her
anxious wait for her body to change back, which parallels the initial impatience she
felt when she first started hormones:
[njothing happened when I stopped taking hormones. For months I got up 
every morning and raced to the mirror, breathless with anticipation. Nothing 
changed. It was sort of anti-climactic. It took many hours of electrolysis 
before I began to feel the softness of my cheeks again. One morning I got up 
and found menstrual blood on my BVD’s. (SBB, p.224)
Feinberg presents Jess as having no regrets about passing. She is not trying to correct
a mistake because she “wouldn’t have survived much longer without passing” (SBB,
p.224), and she does not regret her changed body either, stating that “surgery was a
gift to myself, a coming home to my body” (SBB, p.224). In the midst of her change,
Jess reverts back to the unknown:
[m]y beard grew wispy and fine from electrolysis. My face looked softer. 
Once my voice was hormone-lowered, however, it stayed there. And my 
chest was still flat. My body was blending gender characteristics ... Woman
54 According to Sullivan, “the process of naming inevitably involves (re)constructing oneself in and 
through humanist identity categories -  often imposed by others -  and moreover, bracketing off or 
veiling over all the aspects of oneself that do not seem to fit neatly with such a designation” (Sullivan, 
2003, p.53). By identifying as a ‘man’, Jess has to cut herself off from anything that could draw 
attention to her past as a butch.
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or man: they are outraged that I confuse them. The punishment will follow. 
The only recognition I can find in their eyes is that I am ‘other’. (SBB, p.224)
Jay Prosser reads Stone Butch Blues as “the story of a transsexual who turned
back; or, rather, of a subject who, like Feinberg hirself [sic], halts her transition
through surgery and hormones to found an embodied transgendered subjectivity”
(Prosser, 1998, p. 178). To Prosser,
the narrative suggests that Jess’s move away from femaleness is emphatically 
not a case of a ‘lesbian’s’ or a ‘woman’s’ going under cover as a man to 
escape stigmatization but part of one stone butch’s attempt to embody her 
transgender. Passing for Jess (in spite of how the plot turns out) is 
emphatically not a woman’s or a lesbian’s passing phase. (Prosser, 1998, 
p.183)55
Referencing this reading, Halberstam asserts that “when the main character, Jess 
Goldberg, chooses to halt his transition from female to male, we see the necessary 
insufficiency of binary gender rather than the solidity of transsexual identification” 
(Halberstam, 1998, p. 148). Prosser’s claims, and Halberstam’s use o f ‘him’ to 
describe Jess, contrast with my own reading of the novel, which argues that Jess’s 
transition is not halted, simple because being a man is not her intended destination. 
Rather, Jess wishes to conceal her femaleness until such a time as she can openly live 
as a butch. Jess herself makes this clear when she asks “can you go back to being a 
butch later, when it’s safe to come out?” (SBB, p. 145). I disagree with Halberstam’s
55 Jason Cromwell explains that “[w]ithin transsexual discourses, passing means blending in and 
becoming unnoticeable and unremarkable as either a man or a woman. Blending in as normal means 
that one has succeeded and become a ‘real’ man or woman. With ‘realness,’ an individual is no longer 
a member of the stigmatized group of transsexuals; she or he has completed ‘transition’ and is now 
‘just a woman’ or ‘just a man’. To do otherwise is to fail” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39). This differs from 
the way passing is understood within mainstream discourse “when female-bodied people who have 
lived as or who do live as men are discovered” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39). In this situation, such success 
is read as “disguise, masquerade, and pretense. The assumption is that a reader knows the meaning 
behind the behaviour and actions and that these involve intentional artifice; the person is something 
other than what he or she says or does” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39). This provides a way to understand the 
reactions of characters to both Joss (Trumpet) and James (James Miranda Barry) after their deaths. 
However, what Cromwell does not articulate is that these differing views can also be explained in 
terms of discovery (pre- or post-death). The reading of passing as “disguise, masquerade and 
pretense” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39) obviously does not apply if the individual is never discovered to be 
passing. In such a case, passing would mean, as in transsexual discourse, “blending in and becoming 
unnoticeable” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39).
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assertion that Jess is, or was, ever in transit from female to male. Although 
Halberstam refers to the ‘insufficiency of binary gender’, she ironically depends on 
this binary too much, implying with her reading that Jess can only be either male or 
female. Feinberg takes great pains to show that Jess does not want to be a man, 
revealing her hope that she will be able to go back to being a butch when the political 
situation changes, as well as including many instances where Jess rejects the label of 
‘male’ and ‘man’. Because of this, I am also troubled by Halberstam’s use of the 
male pronoun (his) to describe Jess. Although Jess does want strangers to respond to 
her as a man, it is important to draw a distinction between this and her lack of 
identity as a man when she is alone. The identification as a man is only necessary to 
reduce the risk of attack from prejudicial sources -  the very reason that prompted her 
initial decision to start hormones.
Reconnecting with the Body
Once the transformation is underway, Jess decides that it would be safer if she moves 
away to New York, where nobody knows her, but even there she is subject to 
questions from people who do not know how to categorise her, asking “are you a guy 
or what?” (SBB, p.230). Jess is not completely sure of the answer herself, but a 
vaginal infection forces her to reconsider her identity as ‘woman’. In spite of her 
efforts to control it, Jess’s ‘haunted’ body provides the catalyst that saves her, even 
though her attempt to get help at the women’s health clinic is met with ridicule:
‘ [t]his clinic is for women,’ the receptionist smiled.
I nodded. ‘I know. I have a vaginal infection,’ I whispered.
‘A what?’ she asked ... ‘Are you kidding?’
I shook my head ...
‘Have a seat sir’. (SBB, p.234)
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Jess is fortunate to be treated by a doctor who, although not completely willing to
believe her, is willing to give her the benefit of the doubt: “[y]ou might be a man.
But if you are a woman, I don’t want to send you away. It doesn’t cost me anything
to write you out a prescription” (SBB, p.236). This semi-acceptance of her as a
woman prompts Jess to consult a bookstore in a bid to understand what the term
‘woman’ actually means. In the bookstore, Jess describes how
the Women’s Studies section tempted me. By leafing through the books I 
could eavesdrop on the discussions going on between women without being 
seen. It turned out to be true that I couldn’t understand a lot of the theory. But 
I felt as though I was rushing into a burning building to rescue the ideas I 
needed in my own life. (SBB, p.239)
Jess initially fails to see any connection between herself and what she is reading,
until she considers herself through somebody else’s eyes:
[a]t first I skimmed past all the words and pages about reproductive rights. I 
had no relationship to my own uterus. But I remembered how upset Theresa 
had been after I got busted in Rochester because she couldn’t remember when 
she had her last period. I never kept track of my menstrual cycle. But Theresa 
always knew when my period was in relation to hers. It suddenly made sense 
to me: she was afraid I might have gotten pregnant. The idea had never 
occurred to me. What would I have done if I’d gotten pregnant after a rape? 
(SBB, p.239)
This is a troubling part of the narrative: by rethinking her relationship to her body, 
Jess starts to accept that she is a woman. In other words, Feinberg is suggesting that 
Jess’s body equals Jess’s identity. Along with the menstrual blood in her BVDs and 
her vaginal infection, the possibility that Jess could fall pregnant is presented as 
evidence of the apparent immutability of her female identity. And yet, this must be 
contrasted with Jess’s success in crossing from female and male (achieved by 
changing her body with the aid of surgery and hormones) and her identity as a he-
Once Jess starts accepting her own gender status, she “stop[s] skipping over 
the sections in books about women controlling their own bodies. Maybe all of these
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things that were so important to other women would prove to have meaning for me, 
too” (SBB, p.240). Jess (re)constructs her female identity book by book, idea by idea. 
Her body is a vessel through which she can start to understand what is expected of 
her -  and what she cannot avoid in terms of the development and possibilities of her 
body. The concept of woman remains too narrow for her, so having re-embraced her 
identity as a woman in the only way she can -  through her butchness -  Jess comes to 
the realisation that Theresa was correct, and that some of the words she used to 
define herself were just an expression of her own self-hatred: “I’m a butch. A he-she. 
I don’t know if the people that hate our guts call us that anymore. But that single 
epithet shaped my teenage years” (SBB, p.296). Revealing her feelings at a gay rally, 
Jess is rewarded when people respond positively to her: “[w]hen I handed the mike 
to the woman who was chairing, she put her arm around me. ‘Good for you, sister,’ 
she whispered in my ear. No one had ever called me that before” (SBB, p.296). 
Referencing Jess’s earlier hopes, she says “I felt my whole life coming full circle. 
Growing up so different, coming out as a butch, passing as a man, and then back to 
the same question that had shaped my life: woman or man?” (SBB, p.301)
At the novel’s end, Jess has reached a sense of peace regarding her identity. 
She feels comfortable in her surgery-scarred body, and no longer haunted by it, 
because it represents the male and female elements of who she is, but also because it 
reflects the hard journey she has been through: from confused child to butch woman, 
surgically-altered woman to passing man, and nonperson to butch. At times, the body 
reflects how Jess feels, but at other times the distance between the body and Jess’s 
sense of ‘essence’ is intolerable. Jess is haunted by what she ‘is’, as if her being is 
essence, which runs counter to what Butler states:
[t]hat the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological
status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality ... if that reality
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is fabricated as an interior essence, that very interiority is an effect and 
function of a decidedly public and social discourse, the public regulation of 
fantasy through the surface politics of the body, the gender border control that 
differentiates inner from outer, and so institutes the ‘integrity’ of the subject. 
(Butler, 1999, p. 173)
Halberstam’s statement that “[mjasculinity and maleness are profoundly difficult to
pry apart” is proven when Jess’s surgery-scarred body fails to resolve her problems,
but the acknowledgement that her female physiology of vagina, womb and ovaries
can exist within the labels of ‘he-she’ and ‘butch’ is the major break-through and it
releases Jess to her body from the demons which have haunted her all her life. Jess
makes a conscious decision to live as a man for a short period of time, with the intent
of one day re-identifying as a butch when the political climate has changed
sufficiently to make such an identity ‘safe’ to adopt, which it is at the novel’s
culmination. As a result, the process of having surgery and following a drug regime
does not cut Jess off from herself. On the contrary, reconfiguring her body allows it
to more accurately reflect the mix of masculinity and femininity that constitutes her
identity.
Sacred Country
In Masculinities Without Men? Jean Bobby Noble draws parallels between Stone 
Butch Blues and Sacred Country, another of my chosen texts, particularly in the way 
that the protagonists of both novels equate masculinity with suffering, and attempt to 
improve their lives by passing as male.56 However, my own findings cause me to 
disagree with Noble’s view. Stone Butch Blues and Sacred Country are two very 
different books, dealing with extremely different gender crises. Whereas Stone Butch 
Blues temporarily passes as a member of the opposite sex, the protagonist of Sacred
56 According to Noble, “both Mary Martin and Jess seek out medical interventions in order to alter 
their bodies ...they both retreat from this process and choose to reside permanently in No Man’s 
Land, neither one gender nor the other but both” (Noble, 2003, p. 100).
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Country is committed to sex reassignment surgery and a permanent transition from 
female to male, only to eventually refuse the final stage of the transformation (genital 
surgery). In Emma Parker’s “The Real Thing: Transsexuality and Manhood in Rose 
Tremain's Sacred Country”, the most recent writing on Sacred Country, Parker 
argues that “a penis is superfluous to Martin’s identity as a man” (Parker, 2007, 
p.307). Unconvinced by this reading, I argue instead that Martin actually achieves 
peace in his Butlerian designation of “not-woman”, thus rendering the final act of 
surgery unnecessary.
Although Mary is convinced from the age of six that a “mistake” (SC, p.5) 
has been made, and that she is “not a girl” (SC, p.5), her subsequent attempts to 
realise her male identity expose the failings of this identity, and raise questions about 
what it means to ‘be’ male or female.
Mary is first conscious of being ‘different’ during a silence to mark the death 
of King George VI. In Jason Cromwell’s study of female to male transsexuals, it is 
stated that “[s]ome individuals may believe or come to believe that they are in the 
wrong body or at least use language that imparts the same meaning” (Cromwell, 
1999, p. 104). Mary makes it clear that “I am not a girl. I’m a boy” (SC, p.5), and 
spends the rest of the narrative attempting to (re)write and control her body narrative. 
Alan Sinfield suggests that “every identity is an exclusion as well as an inclusion” 
(Sinfield, 2000, p. 150), while Jay Prosser reads identity as “inarguably violent work. 
As Judith Butler and other theorists of identity working out of psychoanalysis so 
cogently show, identification, whether with an ideal or with an embodied subject, is 
inextricably entangled with disidentification. To claim an identity for myself is by 
implication to disclaim others” (Prosser, 1999, p.88). Mary’s subsequent choice to 
identify as ‘Martin’ is as much as a rejection of her ‘Mary’ identity as it is an
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acceptance of her ‘Martin’ identity. In the case of Trumpet, Joss’s male identity
results in an explicit rejection of his ‘Josephine’ identity, but this is a rejection that
Millie shares in; a direct result of her investment in Joss’s identity. This process
starts with the understanding that she will not be able to fulfil the conditions for
womanhood that have been set down by her family:
she had never been able to imagine herself growing up to be like Grandma 
Livia. She knew she would not become beautiful or join the Women’s 
League, whatever a Women’s League might be. And after the day of the two- 
minute silence, she knew she would not even be a woman. {SC, p.6)
Mary fixates on her “coming life as a boy” {SC, p. 13), and constructs elaborate
stories to explain how she will one day become male:
[tjhere was a swing at the farm. It was tied to the limb of a Scots pine. Sonny 
had made it for Tim from a tractor tyre and a length of rope ... There was a 
gap between the low limb of the pine and its higher branches. When Mary 
stood in the tyre, it was this gap she was aiming for. The gap was a tes t... If 
she could make the tyre go up into the gap with such speed and power that 
she and it flew vertically above the pine limb and down again on the other 
side, completing a circle, well, then anything she prayed for would certainly 
happen. In particular, becoming a boy would happen. {SC, p.26)
By setting herself impossible tasks, Mary ensures that her failure is built into her
narratives, although in a partially concealed way that ensures that she does not have
to confront the truth. When her attempt ends in failure (“the tyre wouldn’t go high
enough to reach the gap. It wouldn’t even get to the vertical point where Mary was
upside-down” [SC, p.27]), she can accept the defeat by convincing herself that “more
practice” {SC, p.27) is all that stands between her and her dream. By thinking in
these terms, Mary is able to retain hope for the future. When she finally does
confront the impossibility of the task she has set herself, and subsequently harbours
real fears that she might not succeed, Mary formulates a test that she has hopes of
passing: “if I suffer a lot, I will grow a man’s skin. If I suffer and refuse to cry, a
penis will grow out of all that is locked away inside. It needs only time” {SC, p.29).
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This belief stems from Mary’s attempts to cope with her difficult life by believing 
she will be rewarded for her pain, and her interpretation (formed by watching her 
depressed father) of the male experience. Mary is so certain of her beliefs that as she 
practises withholding emotions, she believes she is experiencing “the feel of [her] 
body, trying to grow its man’s skin” (SC, p.32).
Names
Mary’s male identity is boosted following a stay at her grandfather’s house. Shown a 
theatre programme with a picture of the actress Mary Martin on it, Mary decides that 
“Mary Martin was a good name ... I would call myself that from now on” (SC, 
p.47).57 A few days after deciding to be called ‘Mary Martin’, Mary dispenses with 
her first name, using the name’s length to draw attention away from her desire to 
have a male name: “[m]uch as I like Mary Martin as a name, it is rather long,
Grandpa Cord. So I think you can just call me Martin” (SC, p.47). In spite of Cord 
agreeing to this, the issue of Mary’s name continues to dominate the narrative.
Known as ‘Martin’ by Cord (as well as in her own mind), Mary is still referred to as 
‘Mary’ by others (who do not know of her wish to be male). In addition, the sections 
of novel that Mary narrates continue to be labelled ‘Mary’ long after Mary has a 
mastectomy, starts taking hormones, and begins passing as Martin. This suggests that 
Tremain is making the point that Mary does not become Martin through surgery 
(which partially explains why Martin later rejects the suggestion of “reconstructive 
surgery” [SC, p.311 ]). Mary phrases her thinking in terms of “[w]hen I’m a boy”
(SC, p. 14): Tremain is actually showing that this ‘when’ will never definitively 
come, and her use of ‘Mary’ and, much later, ‘Martin’, actually marks Mary’s own
57 The actress Mary Martin is arguably most famous for her role in the TV movie Peter Pan (1960), 
playing the eponymous boy who never grew up (and thus never became a man -  an ironic inversion of 
Mary’s dreams).
beliefs in her identity. Although Mary believes she is a boy, and easily adopts the 
name ‘Martin’ it takes a long time for her to accept that she has actually attained 
‘ maleness
Changing her name proves to be less useful than Mary hoped, as shown
during a conversation with Cord. Mary tells Cord that she does not understand what
the phrase “moving inwards” means:
‘[w]ell, no, I don’t expect you to, Martin, not at your age, but later when 
you’re in your proper life, you will’.
I said: ‘Do you mean, when I’m Martin Ward?’
‘You are Martin Ward,’ said Cord. (SC, p.48)
Cord believes that Mary is Martin, simply because she calls herself Martin; Mary’s
comment suggests that she will not be Martin until she can physically embody
maleness. Therefore, there is a fracture in Mary’s self-narrative: on the one hand
calling herself Martin, but on the other, admitting that she has not yet attained the
necessary qualities for that identity.
This fracture comes to the fore when Mary writes a letter to her
institutionalized mother: “I hope you are getting better. I want you to get better now,
this moment, and not be there when we arrive, love from Mary” (SC, p.50). Through
the act of writing this letter, Mary is trying to rewrite her life, to create a healthy
mother, and to deny her own identity confusion. The use of ‘Mary’ is an attempt to
erase the spectre of Martin, because Mary knows her mother will not be able to
comprehend or accept him. Mary defends her actions by pointing out that she visited
her mother while wearing “my Martin clothes, my aertex shirt and my grey shorts
and my plimsolls, Blanco’d white” (SC, p.50).
Clothes have a strong effect on the way Mary reads herself, and when she
begins attending Grammar school, she uses the uniform (“the tie which was red and
white and like a man’s tie” [SC, p.73]) to bolster her identity as Martin. This is
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particularly important because her surroundings -  a girl’s school -  challenge her 
claims to maleriess. Calling herself “the only boy” (SC, p.72) and separating herself 
from the girls as “ninety-seven girls and me” (SC, p.72) works insofar as she keeps 
these thoughts to herself, and remains unchallenged. When the girls are asked if they 
have any nicknames, Mary sees this as an opportunity to cast off her female name, 
and rewrites her past to claim that “I’ve never been Mary, I have always been Martin, 
and I would like to be called Martin, please” (SC, p.73). In requesting the use of a 
nickname, Mary is secretly acknowledging her identity crisis by stating that she has 
“never been Mary” (SC, p.73), but her efforts are unrewarded: the teacher ‘mishears’ 
(or perhaps is unwilling to tolerate such a transgression in naming) and so Mary 
becomes “Marty” (SC, p.73).
As “Marty”, Mary becomes infatuated with one of her fellow pupils, Lindsey 
Stevens, declaring “I will get Lindsey Stevens to be my friend, or I will die” (SC, 
p.74). In order to achieve this, Mary relies on her constructed past. Seeking an 
explanation for her perception that she is not a girl, Mary discovers the notion of 
previous lives (specifically, the thought that she “could have been a man” (SC, p.67) 
in a previous incarnation). Using this as a starting-point, Mary begins to “construct 
her previous life. She had been a magician, known as ‘The Great Camillo.’ His hair 
had been black and shiny. He had been clever and good-looking” (SC, p.68). The 
figure of the magician is chosen following something Mary reads in a book: “]h]e 
who learns to be a magician makes himself master of the seemingly impossible. In 
his world, the laws of nature appear to be defied. He puts before one’s very eyes that 
which one never dreamed to behold” (SC, p.74). In casting herself as the magician, 
Mary is appropriating the ‘he’ of the text, and hoping that she can harness the power 
to fight “the laws of nature” (SC, p.74) and so become a man.
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Reconfiguring the Body
In spite of Mary’s hopes, nature proves a too-powerful opponent. As she goes
through puberty, Mary’s body ‘rebels’ (that is, it follows the expected path for a
woman), and takes on a shape that Mary cannot accept: “[s]he was fifteen and she
could feel and see damage all around. It had begun in her. Her flesh had refused to
harden as she believed it would. It had disobeyed her mind. In her mind, she was
Martin Ward, a lean boy” (SC, p.97). To try and reverse this metamorphosis, Mary
starts a training regime: “[s]omeone had told her you could grow by stretching
yourself. In the school gym, she hung by her hands from the wall bars. At home, she
swung from door lintels” (SC, p.82).
When this fails, Mary can do nothing to halt her body’s progress: her breasts
are reconfigured in her body narrative as “parasites” (SC, p.97), and further
understood in terms of illness: “[s]he always touched them when she woke, hoping
vainly to find them shrunk or burst or sliced away” (SC, p.97). This reaction is,
according to Jason Cromwell, common for female to male transsexuals:
it is the rare FTM or transman who does not know from an early age what his 
gender identity is. What many experience, however, is body-part dysphoria, 
which focuses on elements such as breasts and menstruation that are 
quintessentially female. Those who do talk about having breasts do so with 
feelings that range from revulsion and denial to matter-of-fact acceptance. 
(Cromwell, 1999, p. 105)
Mary’s inability to accept her body can be attributed to the fact that “breasts are the
primary sign of female women and, by implication, femininity” (Cromwell, 1999,
p. 105); her body is signalling an identity that she refuses to accept. Unable to rid
herself of her breasts, Mary hides them: “she wound a crepe bandage round and
round them seven times and fastened it with a safety pin. She was Martin in her mind
and
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she hoped that, with the bandages on, it would be her mind that showed” (SC, 
p.98).58
Unfortunately, what is shown (or what is read) is Mary’s failure as a woman: 
her father, Sonny, brands her “an abomination” (SC, p. 102), something Mary agrees 
with, but for different reasons. Sonny regards Mary as an abomination because she 
rejects her femininity, but to Mary, it is her body’s failure to be male that makes her 
repulsive. To punish Mary for deviating from ‘normal’ behaviour, Sonny forces her 
to look at her body. This is “a thing she never wanted to do and never wanted him to 
see as long as she lived ... the worst moment of [her] life” (SC, p. 102). Faced with 
the dissonance of her body and mind, Mary bursts into tears, abandoning her hope 
that “[i]f I suffer and refuse to cry, a penis will grow out of all that is locked away 
inside” (SC, p.29). Noble argues that “[o]ne of the things Mary Martin shares with ... 
Jess Goldberg is the belief that masculinity is somehow coterminous or metonymic 
with suffering ... both Jess and Mary learn that to ‘be a man’ means to suffer silently 
and bravely within impossible contradictions” (Noble, 2003, pp. 117,119).
With her dreams in tatters, Mary looks towards medicine to help her become 
a man. Despite expecting that the doctor “won’t believe what I’m going to say” (SC, 
p.l 31), Mary hopes the doctor’s medical knowledge will help her, because she is “ill 
... It’s something internal” (SC, p. 131). Describing herself in these terms, Mary is 
suggesting that she can be ‘cured’. She tells the doctor that, “although in some 
respects I’ve got a girl’s body, I have never felt, I mean not for one hour or one day 
or one minute, that I was a proper girl or that I’d grow up to be a woman. I have 
always felt male” (SC, p. 132). Annemarie Mol argues that doctors “set the standards
58 Mary’s denial (“[the bandages] could have been secretly washed and hung to dry out of Mary’s 
window, but part of her refused to believe that she would keep on needing them” [SC, p. 101]) must be 
compared with Joss’s use of bandages in Trumpet: at least to the extent that he lets Millie help him 
with his bandage-disguise, Joss silently acknowledges it as a daily necessity for the world’s 
acceptance of him as male.
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of normality ... They may also actively intervene so as to bring about normal states”
(SC, p.57). In order to protect against a transgression of the gender binary, the doctor
uses medical knowledge to reframe Mary’s issue as a ‘woman’s problem’:
‘You have breasts?’
‘Yes.’
‘Presumably you menstruate?’
‘No.’
‘You know what menstruation is?’
‘Yes’...
‘You have no menstrual cycle?’
‘No.’
‘And because of this, you’ve come to believe you’re not a girl?... Your 
delusion is probably allied to hormone deficiency. Once your cycle is 
established, I’m sure it will disappear.’ (SC, p. 132)
The doctor’s response fails in two ways: first, he ignores the facts that Mary has
presented, and second, Mary does not want her problem explained', instead she wants
to know how she can become male. Mary argues that “it’s explained to prisoners
how they came to be locked up in a cell with an iron bed and a grey blanket and a
bucket. This isn’t enough to make them enjoy prison” (SC, p. 148). Jonathan Sawday
has described how, in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the body was
considered to be “the close prison which perpetually sought to constrain the
expansionary desire of the soul” (Sawday, 1999, p. 12). This inverts Foucault’s
assertion that “[t]he soul is the prison of the body” (Foucault, 1977, p.30). Referring
to Foucault, Butler says:
[t]he figure of the interior soul understood as ‘within’ the body is signified 
through its inscription on the body, even though its primary mode of 
signification is through its very absence, its potent invisibility ... The soul is 
precisely what the body lacks; hence, the body presents itself as a signifying 
lack. That lack which is the body signifies the soul as that which cannot 
show. (Butler, 1999, p.172)59
59 It is my belief that an incompatibility of body and soul leads to a feeling of being imprisoned. Jess 
feels trapped because her body initially fails to correspond with her essence (or vice versa).
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Mary believes that the soul ‘cannot show’ -  not because the body is lacking, but
because the body actively imprisons it as it continues to develop along female lines.
Mary decides she has to leave her village for the sake of her body: “I had to
transmigrate. Not my soul, which I knew would probably stay behind, hiding in the
Suffolk lanes or in a ditch like my old tennis ball, but my body. I had to move it, or it
would die right here” (SC, p. 151). The desire to move away is also experienced by
Jess in Stone Butch Blues and Cal in Middlesex. All three characters realise it is
impossible to remain in their hometowns because people know them as girls or
women: Cal is worried that “[ejveryone ... will talk” (Mid, p.439), while Jess finds
that New York’s “anonymity ... attracted me” (SBB, p.225). This can be explained in
terms of Sandy Stone’s argument that
[t]he highest purpose of the transsexual is to erase him/herself, to fade into 
the ‘normal’ population as soon as possible. Part of this process is known as 
constructing a plausible history -  learning to lie effectively about one’s past. 
What is gained is acceptability in society. (Stone, 1991, p.295, emphasis in 
original)
Any history that Cal, Jess and Mary write risks being challenged -  especially when 
they are surrounded by people who knew them as girls. Moving away marks a split 
in the original narrative, the construction of a new narrative, and the denial of the 
past: “[t]he most critical thing a transsexual can do, the thing that constitutes success, 
is to “pass”. Passing means to live successfully in the gender of choice, to be 
accepted as a “natural” member of that gender. Passing means the denial of mixture” 
(Stone, 1991, p.296). Moving away becomes both a rebirth, and a test of the new 
identity: a chance to see whether the new life has a chance of success.
Gender Conservatism
Mary’s rebirth begins with a wardrobe change: she “hurled all the skirts she owned 
out of her window” (SC, p. 156), a symbolic act that marks her first stage in casting
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off the constraints of femaleness. Told by an agony aunt that “[ojthers have suffered
as you are suffering and have been helped by counselling and, in some cases, by
surgery” (SC, p. 176), Mary feels less alone. The agony aunt suggests that Mary tries
once more to get help from the medical world:
see your GP and ask him to refer you to a psychiatrist specialising in sex 
counselling. Only he will be able to ascertain what path is the right one for 
you. Only he will be able to discover whether you could adapt to life as a 
member of the opposite sex. (SC, p. 176)
The duplication of “only he” emphasises both the absolute power of the psychiatrist
in determining Mary’s treatment, and the masculine world of medicine; this echoes
the portrayal of Dr Luce in Middlesex. Dr Beales, Mary’s psychiatrist, is more
understanding than her first doctor, but his initial observation on meeting Mary is
that she will struggle to be a convincing man: “[yjou’re very small. There aren’t
many men of your height” (SC, p. 177). The idea that men need to be tall is a value
judgement designed to protect the concept of maleness, because “cases of female to
male gender reclassification ... are perhaps best looked at in terms of social
promotion to a superior status” (Shapiro, 1991, p.270). This is particularly significant
in light of the fact that medicine is an overwhelmingly male field. Thus, men are in
control of who is allowed to become a man, and in this way also control the images
of men in society.
In order to ascertain whether Mary should begin treatment to become a man, 
Dr Beales asks a series of questions, based on stereotypes of male and female 
behaviour:
[h]e asked me whether I could mend an electric fuse and whether I knew the 
rules of pricket. He said: ‘Do you enjoy or repudiate domestic tasks, such as 
hoovering?’ He said: ‘Are you jealous of men’s superior strength?’ He said: 
‘Have you ever been train spotting? (SC, p. 177)
140
Dr Luce uses the same technique, asking Callie “[d]o you like any sports? ... Are
you sexually attracted to girls?” {Mid, p.416). Unfortunately, this technique is also
used by real-life psychiatrists: after Dr Russell Reid was censured by the General
Medical Council for “improperly authorising sex changes” (Bindel, 2007), one of his
male-to-female patients revealed that “during the 45-minute consultation, Reid asked
her how she was earning her living; how long she had been taking hormones; and
whether she had played with dolls as a child’ (Bindel, 2007, my emphasis). Mary’s
conversation with Dr Beales is very much like a job interview, with Mary applying
for a ‘promotion’ -  the job of being male. In order for Mary to be successful, she has
to represent her ‘condition’ in a way that the psychiatrist deems acceptable.
Annemarie Mol has drawn a link between disease and performance that provides a
useful framework for discussing this:
[wjhen a disease is being done, we say that it is performed in a specific way. 
The word “performance” has various connotations. There may (but need not 
be) a script available for doing a disease ... If there is no script, actors 
improvise. The stage props are as important as the people, because, after all, 
they set the stage. (Mol, 2002, p.32)
Mary is judged by the way she performs her claim to a male body, as well as the way
in which she dresses (prop usage): “I imagined he was describing me to himself -  the
open-neck shirt I wore, my jeans and my jeans jacket, my heavy-frame glasses, my
brown hair cut in a Beatles style” {SC, p. 177). Judith Shapiro sees this circularity as a
means o f ‘protecting’ the designations ‘male’ and ‘female’:
gender conservatism of transsexuals is encouraged and reinforced by the 
medical establishment on which they are dependent for therapy. The 
conservatism of the doctors is in turn reinforced by their need to feel justified 
in undertaking as momentous a procedure as sex change surgery. (Shapiro, 
1991, p.254)
The binary categories are further protected by Dr Beales’s assertion that even 
with “hormone treatment and eventually surgery” {SC, p. 179), Mary’s eventual
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‘male’ body will be no more than an imitation: “you will never be a man. Not a true
biological male” (SC, p. 178). Jay Prosser explains that
in science sex is no longer located monolithically in the genitals but 
disseminated through the inscrutable parts of the body: the gonads, the 
chromosomes, even the brain -  parts of the body that cannot be exchanged in 
sex reassignment... the transsexual can alter sex only partially and 
superficially (Prosser, 1998, p.63).
Dr Beales’s use of the word ‘true’ is important, demonstrating his belief that Mary
will only ever be able to pass. Shapiro argues that
[t]he relationship of the transsexed body to the “naturally” sexed body calls 
attention to notions of nature as being associated, on the one hand, with 
“reality” and, on the other, as something to be manipulated and controlled by 
science. (Shapiro, 1991, p.261)
Dr Beales recognises his ability to control science to create a new body, but believes
that such a body can only be marked as ‘unnatural’, placing Mary outside of both
male and female: “you will not be a man. Nor will you any longer be a woman” (SC,
p. 179). In Gender Trouble, Judith questions “how ... non-normative sexual practices
call into question the stability of gender as a category of analysis” (Butler, 1999,
p.xi). Dr Beales is grappling with the way that medical practices challenge ‘sex’ as a
stable category. A dependence upon biology to determine sex means that when
surgery enters the equation and alters the biology of the body, the existing language
is inadequate to describe what Mary will be, and brings into question what it actually
means to ‘be’ male or female. Mary requests clarification from Dr Beales, who
explains that
[yjou will be a partially constructed male. The world will take you for a man 
and you will look like a man -  to yourself. And so your internal conviction of 
your essential maleness will receive confirmation when you look in the 
mirror -  and your anguish will cease, or so it is hoped. (SC, p. 179)
Dr Beales’s insistence that Mary will only be a “partially constructed male” (SC,
p. 179) reveals his belief in an essence of maleness than cannot be attained through
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surgery. In Middlesex, Dr Luce wants to perform genital surgery on Callie, to “make 
Callie look exactly like the girl she feels herself to be” (Mid, p.428), acknowledging 
that all he can do is help to bring Callie’s body in line with her apparent female 
essence. Likewise, Jess in Stone Butch Blues believes that surgery and hormones will 
not make her a man; instead they will allow her to alter her body into a personal 
expression of her identity. The protagonists of the three novels I am examining in 
this chapter have in common a belief in an essence of identity, whether male or 
female, that, although it can be boosted by surgery/hormones, is not necessarily 
reliant upon it.
Lies and Delusions
It is by no means certain that Mary will quality for surgery: there is a fear that
Mary’s idea of maleness “could be a delusion or [she] could be lying” (SC, p. 179).
The word ‘delusion’ is used by Mary’s previous doctor, to describe her situation:
Tremain is illustrating the problems that Mary faces in getting people to listen to and
believe her; when Mary likens her situation to that of a patient at her mother’s
institution, it throws into question her own mental state:
I was thought to be suffering from a delusion. My mother told me she had a 
friend at Mountview who thought she was a chicken. And this is why this 
person was locked up there. No one examined her for feathers. No one 
offered her a worm. (SC, p. 133)
Although Mary appears to be suggesting that the two beliefs are comparably
ridiculous, she is actually critiquing her situation. The first doctor never took Mary’s
claims seriously, or offered her any treatment that could actually help her.
When Dr Beales shows that there may be a way forward, Mary has difficulty
believing this:
all my life I had thought this would happen one day, I had believed in it 
without knowing of any means by which it could happen. And now that I
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knew the means, I had trouble believing it. I think this happens to the human 
mind: it sometimes finds it easier to believe in the dream of something than in 
the something itself. (SC, p. 180)
To try and convince Dr Beales to refer her for treatment, Mary constructs a new past
for herself, claiming her parents are dead:
I won’t tell him about my life as it’s been, but as it might have been. I’ll tell 
him a story. I said: ‘I was six years old when they died. They died in a plane 
going from Southampton to Cherbourg. The airline was called Silver City. 
You could put cars into those planes and fly them to France. My parents’ car 
was a Humber Super Snipe and it died in the plane also. (SC, p. 178)
Mary’s revised history eliminates all mention of her brother, Timmy, because of her
deep-seated jealousy of him, for effortlessly attaining the male body she is so
desperate for. Mary’s lies mean that her future is temporarily taken away from her:
“I conclude that you have therefore invented all or part of every single thing you’ve
told me. This invalidates every session we’ve had ... You must find someone else to
take your case -  if you can. I have no more time for you” (SC, p.205).
Mary finds a new doctor, Dr Stems, but is uneasy in his company because
“[h]is name was Martin -  a coincidence I didn’t like” (SC, p.213). Stems is Mary’s
double; a ‘natural’ Martin who challenges her claims to masculinity. Nevertheless, he
agrees to start Mary on “a monitored metamorphosis” (SC, p.214). At this point,
Mary will also be able to have surgery, but she starts having her first serious doubts
about becoming a man: “[w]ill Mary be gone utterly? Do I want her gone utterly, or
only parts of her? Is there anything about Mary I should remember to save?” (SC,
p. 180). The wish to keep parts of her female identity is not compatible with being a
man, especially because “[t]he gender conservatism of transsexuals is encouraged
and reinforced by the medical establishment on which they are dependent for
therapy” (SC, p.254). Mary’s uncertainty parallels Jess’s fears regarding hormones in
Stone Butch Blues: “[w]hat happens? Does it just last for a little while? I mean can
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you go back to being a butch later, when it’s safe to come out?” (SBB, p. 145). Mary 
knows that if she has surgery, she can never ‘go back’, and she rationalises this by 
stating that “[njothing is wrong with being a woman. It’s only that I’m not one. I 
never have been” (SC, p.213).
As the hormones start to transform Mary’s body, she finds that she appears 
to be going through a second puberty; her body is assisting in the rewriting of her 
body narrative:
[c]hange didn’t age Mary. It seemed to take her back in time. This was the 
first thing she noticed -  that she looked younger. Her body lost bulk. Small as 
she was, she began to look lanky, like a youth of thirteen and fourteen. And 
the hair that grew on her upper lip and in a little line around her jaw was like 
the hair of puberty, a faint brown fuzz. (SC, p.227)
When a stranger calls her “lad” (SC, p.228), Mary finds that it “stabbed me with
pleasure” (SC, p.228). To duplicate this sensation, Mary buys a new suit, and finds it
becomes “much easier to behave like a man” (SC, p.232).60 Emma Parker states that
“clothes enable others to see Mary as she sees herself, that is, as Martin” (Parker,
2007, p.305), but this implies a sense of confidence in her identity. Instead, I believe
that, like Cal, Mary uses clothes to project the image of what she would like to be,
and to make up for any failings in her performance:
if gender is instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous, then 
the appearance o f substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a 
performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including 
the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief. 
(Butler, 1999, p.179)
Mary’s relationship to her clothes is different from that of Nan and Kitty’s in Tipping 
the Velvet: they use clothes to project an image of manhood on stage, in this case to 
contrast with the deliberate failings in their performances.61
60 In Middlesex, Cal explains that “double-breasted suits ... make me feel better” (Mid, p.41).
61 As I have previously stated, the aim of Nan and Kitty’s act is not to ‘be’ men, but to parody them.
145
\
The discontinuity between Mary’s beliefs and reality is made explicit when 
she explains how women “expected to come home with me, but this wasn’t possible 
except in my mind. My body had to stay inside its suit, hidden from view” (SC, 
p.232). As well as the literal suit she is wearing, Mary’s body performance is a 
metaphorical suit that she takes on (and off) as necessary, which recalls Butler’s 
comment: “if I were to argue that genders are performative, that could mean that I 
thought that one woke in the morning, perused the closet or some more open space 
for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day, and then restored the 
garment to its place at night” (Butler, 1993, p.x).
Reality and Fantasy
Surgery is expected to close the gap between Mary’s reality and fantasy; indeed, 
when it takes place, Mary is able to describe what happens to her in dispassionate, 
factual terms:
[tjwenty years and six months after the two-minute silence I went into 
hospital. Three incisions, like a triangle, were made near to my nipples and 
through these wounds all the breast tissue that remained in me was taken out. 
The operation was called a bilateral mastectomy. (SC, p.254)
Asked “[i]s it better without tits?” (SC, p.254), Mary responds, “it will be” (SC,
p.254); a hint that the results of surgery have not been as powerful as Mary had
hoped. It will take more than just surgery to create ‘Martin’, and Mary briefly
wonders whether she has done the right thing:
I had a thought that I hardly ever allow myself to think: why couldn’t it have 
been simple? Why couldn’t I have just accepted being Mary Ward? The 
answers are: because it wasn’t. Because I couldn’t. Because I am not Mary 
Ward. And no one ... can explain it better that that. (SC, p.258)
This moment marks not just a failure of language, but the failure of the body to
define Mary: surgery has not provided her with the relief she expected. Stems tries to
ease Mary’s worries, but confirms that she will not be a ‘normal’ man: “soon, your
two selves will be better integrated but your status in the world will still be a special 
status because you will have seen the world from two different perspectives” (SC, 
p.228). Regardless of the treatment that Mary receives, she will always be ‘special’: 
that is, ‘different’. To cope with this disappointment, Mary -  now Martin -  rewrites 
his past to incorporate an attraction to his childhood friend, Pearl.
Roz Kaveney states, with reference to transsexuals, “[i]t is less important to
pass than to be accepted” (Kaveney, 1999, p. 148). Martin cannot pass with Pearl
because “[w]ithin transsexual discourses, passing means blending in and becoming
unnoticeable and unremarkable as either a man or a woman” (Cromwell, 1999, p.39),
but Pearl knows of Martin’s past as a woman. Martin’s hope that Pearl can overlook
his past and fall in love with him is a form of self-sabotage: it gives him outside
confirmation that he cannot pass, and gives him the excuse he is looking for to halt
his transformation. It also enables him to occupy a suitable position in between the
binaries where he is comfortable -  like Jess. Martin claims “[i]n the future that I’d
imagined she was going to be there. As Martin I was going to love her properly and
protect her from other men. And she would love me back. That’s what I’d always
planned” (SC, p.212). Because Pearl has fallen in love with somebody else, Martin’s
maleness is threatened and found wanting, and his life feels as if it is over: “[t]here is
no now” (SC, p.212).62 Noble reads Pearl as “an idealized white feminine subject
who functions to reflect and to refract Martin. Recalling that there are no literal
mirror scenes in SC, one is able to see that Pearl functions as Martin’s metaphorical
mirror, without which he fails to exist” (Noble, 2003 p. 130). I disagree with this
reading. Martin articulates his belief in his male identity long before he knows Pearl,
and tries to ‘become’ male largely without her help or knowledge. Although the loss
62 It is particularly significant that Pearl falls in love with Martin’s brother, Timmy. Timmy is 
everything that Martin wants to be -  a so-called ‘real man’ -  and represents the man that Martin could 
have been if he had been given the ‘correct’ body at birth.
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of Pearl marks the loss of his idealised vision of male life, Martin continues to live as
a man, and is able to construct a new male life without Pearl.
Cutting himself off from his past, Martin moves to America, where he can
pass as a man, but remains aware of his ‘failings’: “[my landlords] believe I’m an
ordinary man, not an imaginary one” (SC, p.298). As an Englishman in America,
Martin is already marked as different, but this is a difference that is acceptable and
controlled, distracting attention away from his sex/gender identity. Martin is insecure
about his ‘lack’ of a penis, wearing “a silk scarf, folded into a pad, inside my blue Y-
fronts” (SC, p.298), but refuses to have further surgery even though “[Stems] thinks I
am one of the few female-to-male transsexuals for whom the creation of a penis is of
critical importance” (SC, p.311).63 Sara Salih believes that
[t]o theorize sex in terms of interpellation as [Judith] Butler does is to imply 
that one’s body parts (particularly penis and vagina) are not simply and 
naturally ‘there’ from birth onwards, but that one’s sex is performatively 
constituted when one’s body is categorized as either ‘male’ or ‘female’.
(Salih, 2002, p.79)
Emma Parker claims that “a penis is superfluous to Martin’s identity as a man” 
(Parker, 2007, p.307), but I would argue that Martin does not need a penis because he 
no longer needs to be ‘male’: he undergoes treatment because of his hatred for his 
female body, and when he has a mastectomy, his sex becomes ‘performatively 
constituted’ because his body has been categorised as ‘not-female’. Kate Bomstein 
believes that “a transsexual cannot be described by the noun of ‘woman’ or ‘man,’ 
but must be approached through active verbs that attest to the constant 
transformation which ‘is’ the new identity” (cited in Butler, 1999, p.xi). Satisfied to
63 Stems’s insistence that Martin needs to complete his surgery is an example of “[t]he rhetoric of 
cosmetic surgery [which] reveals that identity is nowhere more obviously bound to gender and 
sexuality than in the case of transsexual surgery. And gender and sexuality are nowhere more 
obviously hemmed in by binary options” (Halberstam, 2004, p.764). If Martin remains as he is, in 
between genders, he offers a challenge to the medical establishment’s assertions that ‘male’ and 
‘female’ are the only possibilities.
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no longer ‘be’ female, Martin ends the novel located in between male and female, an
ironic echo of his condition at the start of the book, when he is tom between his
female body and belief of his maleness.
Middlesex, Stone Butch Blues and Sacred Country all grapple with what it
means to ‘be’ male or female, and the way that surgery can help (or hinder) this
categorisation. Mol argues that
genitals are heroically resculptured. Vagina is turned into penis or vice versa. 
Without those physical interventions, transsexuals, or so they say, have 
trouble performing the other gender. They need a body with the “right” sex to 
be able to have a coherent identity. Bodies thus do not oppose social 
performances, but are a part of them. (Mol, 2002, p.40)
The concepts of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ are used by doctors to control access to
hormones and surgery: when Dr Luce decides that Callie exhibits ‘normal’ female
behaviour, he wants to perform surgery to “make [her ‘clitoris’] the right size’” (Mid,
p.413, my emphasis); Jess is nearly refused treatment at the women’s clinic because
she does not look like a woman ‘should’; Mary needs to meet various requirements
in order to be given approval to proceed with surgery and hormones.
Echoing the doctors’ attempts to rewrite the ‘abnormal’, Cal, Jess, and Mary
are involved in continuous attempts to rewrite their own narratives. In the midst of
writing his life story, Cal rewrites himself as a man, engaging in a process of duality:
ignoring his past while also giving voice to it. Jess first rewrites herself as a man, but
then erases this narrative and, with the help of other stories (notably found in “the
Women’s Studies section” (SBB, p.239) of the bookstore), starts to reclaim her own
(female) life story. On the other hand, Mary rejects her own story to live in a world
of fantasy that, inevitably, disappoints her. Convincing herself that she will become a
man, the realisation that she will need surgery and the subsequent comprehension
that she can never be the man of her narratives causes her to rewrite the ending of her
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story, so that she finds comfort in being ‘not-female’. Cal, Jess, and Mary, while 
engaged in the process of rewriting, are also ‘re-righting’ themselves: taking control 
of their stories and casting off the label of ‘abnormal’ so that they too can be read as 
‘right’.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e : A P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  W o m a n h o o d
[D]oes a change in the coloration of the rind alter the taste of a fruit?
(Carter, 2006, p.68)
*
All of the texts I have examined so far are concerned with the ‘female to male’ 
journey, from passing to having surgery and taking hormones. In this chapter I will 
concentrate on two texts, Angela Carter’s The Passion o f New Eve and Wesley 
Stace’s Misfortune, which focus on characters who move from ‘male to female’.
Both texts have been inspired by Virginia Woolfs writings on gender. Through an 
examination of The Passion o f New Eve I demonstrate not only that Carter 
anticipates Judith Butler’s understanding of essence as an illusion created by 
performance, but also the ways in which Carter’s work differs from Butler. With 
Misfortune, I demonstrate its shortcomings as a text focused on gender issues, 
showing how gender can be misunderstood. In The Passion o f New Eve, Evelyn is 
forcibly castrated and made to live as Eve, while in Misfortune, Rose is brought up as 
a girl, her male identity hidden from her. In both novels, neither character has a 
choice; a female identity is forced upon them. This highlights the perceived 
superiority of maleness and masculinity over femaleness and femininity within 
society: “[wjoman is valuable in so far as she permits man to fulfil his being as man. 
But man is valuable in and o f himself' (Leclerc, 1981, p.79).64 This is not the novels’ 
only link: both The Passion o f New Eve and Misfortune are inspired by Virginia 
Woolfs Orlando; The Passion o f New Eve is the more successful of the two texts in 
discussing gender, with Carter’s work offering valuable insight into identity politics. 
However, that is not to say that Misfortune is not worthy of examination. Although it 
is possible to see where Stace has struggled in his attempts to grapple with the
64 Cixous points out that “woman is always associated with passivity ... Either woman is passive or 
she does not exist” (Cixous, 2004, p.349). It is man that represents the (positive) active role.
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relationship between gender and the body, this actually serves to highlight Woolf s 
success (in both Orlando and ^ 4 Room o f One’s Own) in unravelling society’s 
influence on the way gender identities are allowed to be presented. In addition, I will 
demonstrate how The Passion o f New Eve also deviates from some of Butler’s 
arguments surrounding gender in key ways.
The Passion of New Eve
At around the same time as she was writing The Passion o f New Eve, Angela Carter
was working on another, equally daring project:
[t]he idea for an operatic version of Virginia Woolfs novel Orlando (1928) 
was conceived in 1976 by John Cox, then Director of Productions at 
Glyndeboume. In 1979 Michael Berkley agreed to compose the music and 
suggested Carter as librettist. She wrote a rough outline, followed by two 
drafts. (Bell, 1996, p.505)
Carter’s effort, Orlando: or, The Enigma o f the Sexes, “went no further than the
second draft of the libretto” (Bell, 1996, p.506), but even at this early stage, “she had
really begun to engage with Woolfs material” (John Cox, cited in Bell, 1996,
p.506).65 1 consider it no coincidence that The Passion o f New Eve and Enigma were
produced side-by-side. On a basic level, the similarities between the protagonists,
Evelyn and Orlando, are obvious: “[l]ike Orlando, the hero of Carter’s novel is a
modern-day Tiresias, a hero who becomes a heroine” (Suleiman, 1985, p.60).
However, Suleiman also notes a more important difference between the texts:
“Evelyn’s story ... unlike Orlando’s, is narrated retrospectively in the first person,
thus immediately raising the quintessentially modem question: who speaks?”
(Suleiman, 1985, p.61). According to Sarah Gamble,
Carter cultivates an extraordinary fluidity in which nothing is 
incontrovertible, nothing is set -  the boundaries between story and history,
65 From this point on Orlando: or, The Enigma o f the Sexes will be referred to as Enigma to avoid 
confusion with Orlando (Woolfs novel) and Orlando (the character).
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male and female, logic and irrationality all dissolve into the surreal narrative 
anarchy which is the hallmark of Carter’s fiction of this decade. (Gamble, 
1997, p. 103)
Of course, the appearance of “narrative anarchy” (Gamble, 1997, p. 103) hides a 
careful structure and fits in perfectly with a work in which nothing is necessarily as it 
seems. And neither New Eve nor Enigma are Carter’s first opportunities to play with 
narrative: in the short story ‘Flesh and the Mirror’, she uses a first-person narrative to 
“deliberately destabilis[e] the narrative voice to such an extent that it cannot be fixed 
to a clearly defined subject position” (Gamble, 2006, p. 112) as she includes 
“moments of slippage between the first and the third person, who is both ‘I’ and 
‘she’” (Gamble, 2006, p.l 12). This method is also in evidence in The Passion o f New 
Eve, where Evelyn slips between male and female identities, and also makes this slip 
later in the text while referring to Tristessa (“I crept up to him and kissed her pitiful, 
bare feet” [Eve, p. 128]).
Who Speaks?
The Passion o f New Eve utilises a narrative form that echoes the complexity of 
gendered identities. At first glance, the narrator is Evelyn (male), but as the narrative 
unfolds, it is clear that he is telling this story through the prism/prison of his new 
body: Evelyn has ‘become’ Eve (female). But what is the nature of this female 
identity? Evelyn is physically transformed into Eve against his will, the victim of 
Mother’s experiments, but remains mentally a man. Even as his female body offers 
him a new view of the world, as it reflects the world’s reaction to women, his 
experiences are filtered through his male brain, albeit a brain that has been subjected 
to “psycho-surgery” {Eve, p.72), a programming technique designed to “restructure 
the essence” {Eve, p.68).
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Carter reveals details about Evelyn, littering the text with clues. He “took 
some girl” (Eve, p.5) to the cinema, and “paid ... a little tribute of spermatozoa”
(Eve, p.5) to the apparently female star of the film, Tristessa -  someone whom 
Evelyn has been in love with since he “was a little boy” (Eve, p.6). It is only when 
his “forgotten” (Eve, p.9) companion murmurs his name that we discover it is 
“Evelyn” (Eve, p.9). Lindsey Tucker describes this as a “sexually ambiguous name” 
(Tucker, 1998, p.l 1), although Nicoletta Vallorani sees things differently, describing 
Evelyn as “a man given a woman’s name” (Vallorani, 1998, p. 179). If ‘Evelyn’ is 
read as a sexually ambiguous name, it can be viewed as a fitting tribute to the 
ambiguities of Evelyn’s identity when he is forcibly given a female body, but 
Vallorani’s reading suggests the identity issue is more clear-cut. Evelyn struggles to 
define himself throughout the novel, and this uncertainty is echoed by critics when 
they stumble over how to refer to the character: “Evelyn/Eve” (Palmer, 1997, p.30), 
“Eve(lyn)” (Sceats, 1997 p. 102) and “Eve/lyn” (Jordan, 1997 p.218), to give a few 
examples. The difficulty is in determining where (if anywhere) Evelyn ends and Eve 
begins -  the ‘who speaks?’ that Suleiman finds so interesting.
To try to make sense of the narrative voice, it is necessary to examine the 
moment(s) of transformation. After abandoning Leilah, a woman who fulfils the dual 
role of “whore” (Eve, p.20) and “child” (Eve, p.30) -  a mixture of knowledge and 
innocence, and one of many instances of ‘doubling’ in the novel -  Evelyn embarks 
on a road trip which leads him to the desert, where he is abducted by a group of 
women. The leader of the women is “Mother” (Eve, p.49) and her followers are 
labelled “her daughters” (Eve, p.49). Although she has constructed a matriarchal 
position for herself, it is a grotesque hyperbole of motherhood: “[s]he was breasted 
like a sow -  she possessed two tiers of nipples, the result... of a strenuous
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programme of grafting, so that, in theory, she could suckle four babies at one time” 
{Eve, p.59). Through this transformation, Mother has actually distanced herself from 
the realm of womanhood and literally marked herself as a deity, as well as a parody 
of herself: “she had made herself. Yes, made herself She was her own mythological 
artefact; she had reconstructed her flesh painfully, with knives and with needles, into 
a transcendental form as an emblem, as an example” {Eve, p.60).
Evelyn is shown a Mother who also embraces the roles of “the Great 
Parracide ... Castratix of the Phallocentric Universe ... Mama” {Eve, p.67). Simply 
being in the presence of this “concrete essence of woman” {Eve, p. 60) is enough to 
make Evelyn reconsider the power of his male identity: “[b]efore this overwhelming 
woman, the instrument that dangled from my belly was useless. It was nothing but a 
decorative appendage” {Eve, p.60). So useless is this “appendage” {Eve, p.60) that it 
is not even worthy of being named. In Mother’s role as “The Grand Emasculator” 
{Eve, p.49), she subjects Evelyn first to a psychological castration (“there was no 
way in which I could show her my virility that would astonish her ... Since I had no 
notion how to approach her with [my instrument], she rendered it insignificant” [Eve, 
p.60]) and then to a literal castration -  an operation which is undermined by the 
comedic way it is treated by Carter in the text: “[r]aising her knife, she brought it 
down. She cut off all my genital appendages with a single blow, caught them in her 
other hand and tossed them to Sophia, who slipped them into the pocket of her 
shorts” {Eve, p.70).
Mother’s plan is ‘simple’: “[s]he’s going to castrate you, Evelyn, and then 
excavate what we call the ‘fructifying female space’ inside you and make you a 
perfect specimen of womanhood” {Eve, p.68). Following this, she plans to 
impregnate Evelyn with his own sperm and, thus, “bring forth the Messiah of the
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Antithesis” (Eve, p.67). Evelyn is quite calm during his castration, noting with bitter
humour “the dreadful symbolism of that knife! To be castrated with a phallic
symbol!” (Eve, p.70). His biggest worry is the viability of Mother’s plan to make him
“a complete woman” (Eve, p.68). It is worth noting at this stage that
while The Passion o f New Eve may employ, whether knowingly or not, many 
of the tropes and conventions of transsexual autobiography, it does not, 
ultimately, sustain them. ... Carter’s novel is crucially different, in that it is 
based around a character who makes the transaction from male to female 
unwillingly ... Carter’s [narrative] evokes a subject who in the wake of 
surgery is left struggling with the very sense of bodily estrangement the 
transsexual has left behind. (Gamble, 2002, p.51)
Evelyn’s opposition to surgery leads him to question what it is that makes him a
man, and whether he can actually be transformed into a woman. One of Mother’s
followers explains the lengths Mother is prepared to go to, to transform Evelyn: “[a]
complete woman, yes, Sophia assured me; tits, clit, ovaries, labia major, labia
minor...” (Eve, p.68). However, Evelyn is not concerned with Mother’s ability to
perform surgery -  her own “fringe of breasts” (Eve, p.60) is testament to her skill at
“reconstructing] flesh” (Eve, p.60) -  but whether this surgery will actually make
him the “complete woman” (Eve, p.68) that has been suggested: the whole notion of
‘essence’ is brought into question.
The Illusion of Essence
In a sense, Evelyn will be a “complete woman” (Eve, p.68): the ‘lack’ brought about 
by his castration will be countered by the fact that to become a woman requires 
additional parts: “we see an Evelyn that has been reconstructed, since her surgery — a 
combination of cosmetic reconstruction and organ transplant -  has added to his body 
some previously missing parts -  breasts, a clitoris, a uterus” (Tucker, 1998, p.l 1). In 
this sense, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ have been inverted: it is man who is burdened with a 
body of lack, and it is woman (in the form of both Eve’s new body, and the knife-
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wielding Mother) who can make him ‘complete’. Nonetheless, Evelyn’s concerns are 
valid: “does a change in the coloration of the rind alter the taste of a fruit?” (Eve, 
p.68). Sophia dismisses this by claiming that “[a] change in the appearance will 
reconstruct the essence” (Eve, p.68), but this is contradicted by the admission that 
Evelyn will have to undergo “[p]sycho-surgery” (Eve, p.68), a form of 
“programming” (Eve, p.71) designed to ease Evelyn’s passage into womanhood.66 As 
I have already argued in the preceding chapters, Butler regards essence as an illusion 
created by performance; Carter is anticipating not just Butler’s theories here, but also 
a constructionist/poststructural stance, as well as the fluidity of gender.
Evelyn’s castration -  the literal surgery that necessitates the use of psycho­
surgery to create “the effect of an internal core” (Butler, 1999, p. 173) -  is a crucial 
moment in the text, not because it turns Evelyn into a woman (if it even succeeds), 
but because of the way it destabilizes the preceding narrative. If The Passion o f New 
Eve is compared to Misfortune and Orlando then this becomes clear. In Misfortune, 
Geoffroy Loveall first refers to the baby using female pronouns (“[s]he was a tiny 
red ball” [MF, p.23]”, and then announces ‘her’ arrival to his mother: “meet your 
granddaughter” (ME, p.40). Through all this, Geoffroy’s servant, Hood, attempts to 
convey that Geoffroy has made a mistake: “[a] doubt had arisen in Hood’s mind, 
which he tried to convey with a widening of his eyes” (MF, p.40). Eventually, Hood 
is forced to tell Geoffroy the facts: “[t]he baby you have found is a boy” (MF, p.42). 
Although the baby -  Rose -  is not told of the facts surrounding her birth, and is 
raised as a girl, the narrative is straightforward. Told by Rose in retrospect, the 
narrative falls into two parts: the first half of the novel, where Rose believes she is a 
girl, and the second half when she finds out she was bom a boy and tries to take on a
66 The notion of essence is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
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male role. Although Rose lives as both a woman and a man, Wesley Stace’s novel
suggests that Rose was male all along: “BOY. I had kept myself from knowing it. I
had been waiting for someone to tell me, when I had only to tell myself, to let myself
listen to what my body shouted. It had known all along. I had known” (MF, p.224).
By contrast, the narrator in Orlando simply recounts Orlando’s
metamorphosis: “[h]e stood upright in complete nakedness before us, and while the
trumpets pealed Truth! Truth! Truth! we have no choice left but confess -  he was a
woman” (Woolf, 2006, p. 123, my emphasis). The concept of truth is undermined by
the last sentence, which gender semantics render an impossible statement. However,
Woolfs narrative technique creates a sense of detachment between the narrator and
Orlando, allowing the narrator to scrutinise Orlando and come to the conclusion that
[he] had become a woman -  there is no denying it. But in every other respect, 
Orlando remained precisely as he had been. The change of sex, though it 
altered their future, did nothing whatever to alter their identity. (Woolf, 2006, 
p. 124)
Orlando’s change is just a physical one: mentally, she remains the same person she 
always was, with the same thoughts and feelings: “as all Orlando’s loves had been 
women, now, through the culpable laggardry of the human frame to adapt itself to 
convention, though she herself was a woman, it was still a woman she loved”
(Woolf, 2006, p. 144).
Where Misfortune and Orlando clearly explain the gender situations their 
protagonists find themselves in, The Passion o f New Eve is altogether more complex. 
Evelyn’s castration, together with the “massive injections of female hormones” (Eve, 
p.73) he is forced to receive, obviously changes him: physically, he has become a 
new person -  Eve. Returning to the earlier part of Evelyn’s narrative -  insofar as any 
of the novel can be said to be Evelyn’s narrative -  it is clear that the speaker’s 
position needs to be reconsidered: as Suleiman has asked, “who speaks?” (Suleiman,
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1985, p.61). Gamble points out that The Passion o f New Eve is “related not only with 
all the benefit of hindsight, but also all the possibility for deception that hindsight 
allows” (Gamble, 2006, p. 146). All the clues that Carter has left on those opening 
pages -  Evelyn’s allusions to his boyhood, his “tribute of spermatozoa” {Eve, p.5), 
his apparently heterosexual behaviour -  have been designed to trip up the reader.
In Enigma, Carter uses a similar strategy with the character of the 
Archduchess Harriet. Initially called by this name in the directions, Carter describes 
her as an “ambiguous figure” (Carter, 1996, p. 163), noting that “I rather feel we 
should first be introduced to him as a man” (Carter, 1996, p. 163) and in the next 
sentence referring to him as “the Archduke” and having him enter “with a titter of 
whores” (Carter, 1996, p. 163). Harriet, like Evelyn, is introduced as a man, only to 
become a woman later in the text (unlike Evelyn, Harriet then reveals that she was 
male all along, but both texts construct labyrinthine journeys through gender).
Evelyn makes a brief mention of his transformation in the opening pages of The 
Passion o f New Eve, describing himself in relation to the woman he spent his last 
night in London with: “[s]he kept a hieroglyph of plastic in the neck of her womb, to 
prevent conception; the black lady never advised me on those techniques when she 
fitted me up with a uterus of my own” {Eve, p.9). This statement reveals while 
obscuring further: it explains (briefly) Evelyn’s metamorphosis while confusing the 
issue of who exactly is speaking. If it is Eve, then what effect has she had on 
Evelyn’s memories? More importantly: can it be Eve?
The End of Evelyn
When Evelyn is castrated, he considers it “the end of Evelyn” {Eve, p.71), as though 
his identity as a man is totally dependent on his genitals. Likewise, Susan Rubin 
Suleiman describes how Mother “perform[s] the operation that converts Evelyn into
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Eve” (Suleiman, 1985, p.62), suggesting that the moment of castration and the
moment of identity change are one and the same, and further equating castration with
the creation of a female body. Thus, for Suleiman, the penis is the ultimate marker of
maleness. This contrasts with Halberstam’s belief that “penises as well as
masculinity become artificial and constructible when we challenge the naturalness of
gender” (Halberstam, 2004, p.762). The label of Evelyn does not need to be
abandoned: it is after all, “a woman’s name” (Vallorani, 1998, p.179), and even
Evelyn is able to recognise the irony of his name and situation: “[p]erhaps, I thought,
they had utilised my tender body because they couldn’t resist the horrid pun of my
name, with all its teasing connotations. Evelyn. Why had my parents chosen to call
me Evelyn, of all the names in the world?” (Eve, p.73). Evelyn briefly turns to the
name ‘Eve’ in order to express the shortcomings of his own identity, feeling he’s
been turned “into [his] own diminutive. Eve, the shortened form of Evelyn, this
artificial changeling” (Eve, p.71). However, Evelyn finds he cannot easily accept
what has happened to him: “I would moan, in a voice that grew softer and, against
my will, musical with each day that passed” (Eve, p.73).
The disjunction between Evelyn’s mind and body is illustrated when Evelyn
is finally allowed to look at himself in the mirror: he admits that he “saw Eve” (Eve,
p.74) but counters this with the assertion that “I did not see myself. I saw a young
woman who, though she was I, I could in no way acknowledge as myself’ (Eve,
p.74). As far as he is concerned, “[t]he psycho-programming has not been entirely
successful” (Eve, p.75), because he regards his reflection -  his body -  as,
only a lyrical abstraction of femininity to me, a tinted arrangement of curved 
lines. I touched the breasts and the mound that were not mine; I saw white 
hands in the mirror move, it was as though they were white gloves I had put 
on to conduct the unfamiliar orchestra of myself. (Eve, p.74)
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Despite his denials, Evelyn recognises that ‘Eve’ bears “a strong family resemblance
to myself’ (p.74), and his narcissism leads him to the realisation that Mother has
made him into “the object of all the unfocused desires that had ever existed in my
own head. I had become my own masturbatory fantasy” {Eve, p.75). Through this
thought, Evelyn is able to access his Evelyn-identity and persuade himself that he
remains in many ways the same person: “the cock in my head, still, twitched at the
sight of myself’ {Eve, p.75). Although he can locate himself in his psychological
processes, he cannot recognise the physical landscape Mother has sculpted, and
admits “I don’t find myself at all” {Eve, p.75).
In a Lacanian sense, Evelyn needs to relearn the ‘Mirror Stage’, so that he
can “recognize as such his own image in a mirror” (Lacan, 1977, p.l) by reading the
fragments as a whole. Similarly, Jan Campbell points out that
[i]n [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty’s view the image in the mirror is other. The 
child knows that what he sees is not where he experiences himself 
introceptively ... the child must ‘displace the mirror image, bringing it from 
the apparent and virtual place it occupies in the depth of the mirror back to 
himself, whom he identifies at a distance with his introceptive body.’ 
(Campbell, 2005, p. 12)
Evelyn struggles to comprehend his new body; this is a struggle shared by the reader,
who is left to try to make sense of the multitude of gender fragments pervading both
the novel and the individual characters. As previously mentioned, Laura Mulvey
argues that “[t]he determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the male figure”
(Mulvey, 1989, p. 19); drawing from this in an Irigarayan sense, Evelyn-in-the-mirror
has a dual role, as an active male forcing his gaze onto his own fantasy-female body
which results in a split that means that he is simultaneously Same and Other in one
body. Evelyn is fragmented; anticipating and embodying Irigaray’s notion of woman:
“[t]he rejection, the exclusion of a female imaginary certainly puts woman in the
position of experiencing herself only ffagmentarily ... as waste, or excess, what is
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left of a mirror invested by the (masculine) “subject” to reflect himself’ (Irigaray, 
1985a, p.30).
Mirroring
After coming to terms with his appearance, Evelyn must, like Rose in Misfortune, 
Joss in Trumpet and Jess in Stone Butch Blues, learn how to exist in his new gender 
role:
Sophia taught me how to make water in the way a woman does and the right 
way to perform one or two other biologically determined acts, how to comb 
my hair and plait it, to wash between my legs and under my arms and so forth 
{Eve, p.80).
Although Evelyn is taught to change his behaviours so he can pass as a woman, 
certain behaviours have to be adapted to make allowances for his changed body. This 
all serves to illustrate that being a woman does not come naturally: that is, having the 
anatomical attributes of the female does not make one a woman. Behaviours have to 
be learned -  artificial behaviours which are ironically termed the ‘natural’ way to 
behave: “what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a 
sustained set o f acts, positioned through the gendered stylization of the body”
(Butler, 1999, p.xv, my emphasis).
Evelyn’s biggest test comes with the prospect of getting pregnant and giving 
birth; something that fills him with “despair at my biological helplessness” {Eve, 
p.77). The fear manifests itself when Evelyn faces the “one test menstruation” {Eve, 
p.77) that Mother permits. Insisting that he is “not ready for motherhood” {Eve, p.77) 
proves that Evelyn is not afraid of “biological helplessness” {Eve, p.77), but rather 
biological power -  the power to conceive and become pregnant. The reality of 
menstruating makes Evelyn realise that “change was absolute and I must climb 
inside the skin of the girl willy nilly, whether I liked it or not, and learn, somehow, to
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live there” (Eve, p.80). At this point in the narrative, Evelyn starts becoming more
open to the prospect of living as Eve, if only because he knows that he cannot go
back to the Evelyn he used to be. As Evelyn tries to accept what is happening, Carter
uses the narrative itself to illustrate his dilemma:
I was literally in two minds; my transformation was both perfect and 
imperfect. All of New Eve’s experience came through two channels of 
sensation, her own fleshly one and his mental ones. But at length the sense of 
having been Evelyn began, in spite of himself, to fade, although Eve was a 
creature without memory. (Eve, p.77)
Evelyn is discussing himself in abstract, detached terms, which demonstrates the
chasm that exists between his body and mind, and marks de Beauvoir’s notion of
‘becoming’ a woman as an ongoing performative process. For de Beauvoir, “[n]o
biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human
female presents in society” (de Beauvoir, 1997, p.296). Instead one learns, and
relearns, what it means to ‘become’ a woman. His refusal to be more inclusive of his
‘Eve’ identity also reveals that he has not reached a point where he can confidently
state that he is Eve. In fact, Evelyn is so frightened of his future that he makes his
escape from the women, ready to take his chances in the outside world.
The escape is short-lived: Evelyn is captured by Zero, a poet, and forced to
become one of his many wives. Believing Evelyn to be a woman (Eve), Zero initiates
him into wifehood by raping him. Evelyn describes Zero as “the first man I met
when I became a woman” (Eve, p.86), and it is highly significant that this man
should also initiate Evelyn into the (female) role of victim. This reverses Evelyn’s
previous experiences of sex, where he is the ‘attacker’:
I always managed to have [Leilah] somehow, at the last minute, even if it was 
up against the wall, while her lips stretched back to show her dark gums in an 
agony of affront and she gasped: ‘No!’ and her purple fingernails scored my 
back more out of indignation than passion. (Eve, p.31)
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As a man, Evelyn downplays his actions, suggesting that any displeasure shown by
Leilah is a result of her not wanting him to “smudge her lipstick or otherwise untidy
her” (Eve, p.31) rather than a conscious refusal to engage sexually. As a woman,
Evelyn complains that his virginity “had been no less real because it was synthetic”
(Eve, p.86), and that he “was in no way prepared for the pain; [Zero’s] body was an
anonymous instrument of torture” (Eve, p.86). By claiming to be unprepared, Evelyn
is indirectly laying the blame for his suffering on Mother: as she reconstructed his
body, she also left him open to abuse at the hands of men.
Carter ensures that Evelyn’s sexual encounters with Zero have another
dimension, in keeping with Evelyn’s fractured identity: always aggressive, the
encounters are “[e]ach time, a renewed defloration, as if his violence perpetually
refreshed my virginity” (Eve, p. 101), and yet Evelyn gains something from the rapes:
the ability to identify with Zero:
when he mounted me ... I felt myself to be, not myself but he; and the 
experience of this crucial lack of self, which always brought with it a shock 
on introspection, forced me to know myself as a former violator at the 
moment of my own violation. (Eve, p. 101)
I agree with David Punter, who claims that mirroring is “the symbolic heart of [The]
Passion o f New Eve” (Punter, 1998, p.52). During the sexual act, Evelyn sees himself
as if through a hall of mirrors, each one reflecting back another aspect of his identity
just as in his earlier failure to recognise himself in a moment of Lacanian panic:
“[w]hen he entered me, the act seemed to me one of seppuku, a ritual
disembowelment I committed upon myself, although I was only watching him and
only felt my pain and unpleasure in his joy at my pain and pleasure at my distress”
(Eve, p. 102). Evelyn is both perpetrator and victim of violence, “literally in two
minds” (Eve, p.77). Although the male-Evelyn may have faded, Evelyn is able to
retain a male identity by appropriating the phallus; he channels his thoughts through
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the perspective of Zero. Lacan points out that “[t]he fact that the phallus is a signifier 
means that it is in the place of the Other that the subject has access to it” (Lacan,
1977, p.288). This echoes an experience earlier in the novel when Evelyn is pursuing 
Leilah through the streets of New York. Wanting to be in control, but fearing 
otherwise, Evelyn reinstates a sense of equilibrium by reflecting back Leilah’s 
position: “I dropped down on her like, I suppose, a bird of prey, although my prey, 
throughout the pursuit, had played the hunter” (Eve, p.25).67 Vallorani argues that the 
context of Evelyn’s change is the reason that he cannot bridge the gap between male 
and female:
[t]he surgical operation has been compulsory and therefore no new awareness 
is implied in it. A female body has been simply added to a male identity. The 
two genders exhibit a contiguity which does not -  and could never -  become 
continuity. No integration is possible. Eve/lyn’s body and mind diverge but, 
paradoxically, the resulting chaotic disposition triggers the process of 
comprehension. (Vallorani, 1998, p. 179)
Through his mirrored perspective, Evelyn can at least understand some of what it
means to be a woman -  something that is aided by his interactions with Zero’s seven
other wives.
Zero and his Wives
The wives are Zero’s victims and slaves: “they loved him and did not think they were 
fit to pick up the crumbs from his table, at which he always ate in solitary splendour” 
(Eve, p.85). Zero believes that “women were fashioned of a different soul substance 
from men, a more primitive, animal stuff’ (Eve, p.87), and treats his wives badly, 
subjecting them to beatings and forcing them to live according to his rules. One of 
these rules is that they must not speak -  “[a] rule they interpreted as a perpetual
67 Here, the focus must return to the narrative itself: Evelyn is recalling this event from the later 
perspective of knowing that that Leilah occupied a prime position in Mother’s group, even though at 
the time he had no idea of her power -  his description of Leilah as both prey and hunter owes a great 
deal to his later reinterpretation of her role.
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whispering; if Zero did not hear them, it was as if they had not spoken” {Eve, p.87).
There is only speech if Zero says there is speech: Zero is the absolute authority to
which the wives submit, and they, for their part, “all loved him blindly” {Eve, p.87).
Annie Leclerc points out that “the master is one who commands. Fine. But as you
only command those who obey, it was first necessary to win obedience of those who
might seek to act and speak for themselves” (Leclerc, 1981, p.81), something Evelyn
echoes when he describes Zero as “powerful yet impotent, since his power depended
on his dependants” {Eve, p. 102). In the absence of children of his own, the wives
fulfil the dual role of wife and child (especially given their ages: “the eldest,
Marijane, was no more than twenty while the youngest, Betty Louella, was only a
child, perhaps twelve, perhaps less” [Eve, p.87]). According to Andrea Dworkin,
[w]omen who were molested as children also experience confusion as to what 
they really wanted when the adult male exercised his sexual will on them, but 
must, as a condition of forced femininity, accept the male as constant 
aggressor and forced sex as normative. (Dworkin, 1981, p.58)
Zero’s young brides readily accept his sex-schedule, “decid[ing] to believe that
sexual intercourse with him guaranteed their continuing health and strength” {Eve,
p.88). This inverts a question asked by Irigaray: “[h]ow could material substance
enjoy her/itself without provoking the consumer’s anxiety over the disappearance of
his nurturing ground?” (Irigaray, 1985a, p.32). Zero is not afraid of losing his
‘nurturing ground’, but provokes in his wives the fear that they might miss out on the
“sacred fluid imparted by [his] member ... the elixium vitae distilled by [his]
immaculate testicles” {Eve, p.92). When Zero “demanded absolute subservience
from his women ... they gave in to him freely, as though they knew they must be
wicked and so deserve to be inflicted with such pain” {Eve, p.95). They take their
subservience further, so desiring to belong to Zero that they will hurt anyone who
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threatens this. Afraid that Evelyn’s beauty will lead to him replacing one of them in
Zero’s affections, the women attack:
[Marijane] said: T guess she won’t be pretty at all any more after -  ’ and, 
leaving the threat hanging on the air, she seized the plate from which I’d just 
eaten, broke it in half and advanced on me in a menacing fashion, armed with 
the two, sharp, splintered surfaces. The other girls all squealed in unison, 
leaped up from the mattresses on which they sat and broke upon me like a 
wave equipped with teeth and claws. {Eve, p.89)
Evelyn remarks that they were “fighting for their lives” {Eve, p.89), because they
believe that they are nothing without Zero: “these poor girls had indeed dedicated
themselves, body, heart and soul, to the Church of Zero” {Eve, p.99). Discussing the
concept of women as merchandise, Luce Irigaray asks “[h]ow can this object of
transaction claim a right to pleasure without removing her/itself from the established
commerce? With respect to other merchandise in the marketplace, how could this
commodity maintain a relationship other than one of aggressive jealousy?” (Irigaray,
1985a, p.32). This jealousy manifests itself in the novel: Evelyn notices that the girls
“were always betraying one another to a beating ... they fretfully competed amongst
themselves all the time for more than their fair share of his attentions” {Eve, p.99).
Unable to escape from Zero, Evelyn has no choice but to accept the role of
Eve/wife. Afraid of Zero finding out about his past as a woman, Evelyn struggles to
keep it a secret, but finds it difficult to be a convincing woman because his female
mask keeps slipping, and male behaviours come to the surface: “in spite of Sophia’s
training ... I would often make a gesture with my hands that was out of Eve’s
character or exclaim with a subtly male inflection that made [the wives] raise their
eyebrows” {Eve, p. 100). Using the wives as subjects for his “intensive study of
feminine manners” {Eve, p. 101) leaves Evelyn “tense and preoccupied; although I
was a woman, I was now also passing for a woman, but, then, many women bom
spend their whole lives in such imitations” {Eve, p. 101). Again, this anticipates
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Butler’s argument that “gender is a kind o f imitation for which there is no original;
in fact it is a kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the original as an
effect and consequence of the imitation itself’ (Butler, 2001, p.723). Punter suggests
that “the structure of doubleness becomes too complex for narrative; we are not
seriously invited, for instance, to explore the cohabitation of Eve’s masculine and
feminine selves within a female body” (Eve, p.53) but I believe that Carter
competently handles Evelyn’s situation to make some important points.
Firstly, ‘being’ a woman (i.e. having the anatomical attributes of a female) is
not necessarily coupled with feminine behaviour. Passing as a woman means
bringing feminine behaviour to the forefront, so in order to appear to be a ‘natural’
woman, Evelyn has to create a hyperbolic performance of femininity which bridges
the gap between gender performance and drag:
[w]hat is “performed” in drag is, of course, the sign of gender, a sign that is 
not the same as the body that it figures, but that cannot be read without i t ... 
As an allegory that works through the hyperbolic, drag brings into relief what 
is, after all, determined only in relation to the hyperbolic: the understated, 
taken-for-granted quality of heterosexual performativity. (Butler, 1993, 
p.237)
Carter’s comment about such behaviour being common to “women bom” (Eve, 
p. 101), which is a nod in the direction of de Beauvoir (“one is not bom, but rather 
becomes, a woman” [de Beauvoir, 1997, p.295]), illustrates the unnaturalness of 
assigning any behaviour to a particular gender. Ironically, Evelyn’s efforts arouse 
Zero’s suspicions because he makes himself “too emphatically feminine ... too much 
like a woman” (Eve, p. 101). Zero is also afraid that ‘Eve’ “might be too much of a 
woman for him” (Eve, p. 101). He reaches this conclusion partly because Evelyn is 
“the oldest [wife]” (Eve, p.93), and so not as naive as the others, but also because of 
Evelyn’s “perfection of physical beauty” (Eve, p. 107). Zero also has his doubts about 
Evelyn’s sexuality: “[h]is hatred of female homosexuality was inflexible; it was
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obsessional” (Eve, p. 101). This hatred is borne of fear: Zero already feels a failure as 
a man because he cannot father children. If his wives start turning to one another for 
sexual satisfaction, then he will be stripped of his power. Irigaray says, “[h]ow can 
female homosexuality be diminished? By reducing it to ‘acting like a man’” 
(Irigaray, 1981, p. 109). However, it is this fear that the women can replace Zero in 
the male role that motivates his intolerance of female homosexuality; an intolerance 
that is expressed most forcefully in Zero’s hatred of Tristessa.
Tristessa
Like the Evelyn of the novel’s beginning, Zero is obsessed with the Hollywood 
actress Tristessa, but unlike Evelyn, this is an obsession borne out of revulsion, 
dubbing her “public enemy number one” (Eve, p.91). The main charge Zero levels 
against her is the belief that she has somehow used her “dyke” (Eve, p.91) powers to 
render him infertile:
[t]his is the lousiest woman in the world ... She eats souls. She’s magicked
the genius out of my jissom, that evil bitch! And it won’t come back until I
stick my merciless finger into this ultimate dyke, like the little Dutch boy.
Dyke; she’s a dyke, a sluice of nothingness. (Eve, p.91)
He interprets her imagined disinterest in men as a personal attack on his maleness, 
and is obviously afraid of the idea of a woman who does not need a man; a woman 
that he cannot control by manipulating ‘her’ desire. Tristessa is Zero’s prey and he 
devotes many hours to searching for her. As the focus of Zero’s war against women, 
Tristessa has a mythical status that has only been aided by her retreat from the world 
(“she retired to, I read somewhere, a hermit-like seclusion in Southern California” 
[Eve, p.8]). When Zero eventually tracks her down, he and his wives break into her 
home, with the intention of getting revenge: “I am the avenging phallic fire ... I’ve
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come to fecundate your sterility, you dyke of dykes, you jamjar of infertility” (Eve, 
p.127).
Beating and stripping her, Zero stumbles upon Tristessa’s secret: “[o]ut of the
vestigial garment sprang the rude, red-purple insignia of maleness, the secret core of
Tristessa’s sorrow, the source of her enigma, of her shame” (Eve, p. 128). Tristessa is
anatomically male, and Paulina Palmer describes her as “the most interesting
example of gender as performance in the novel” (Palmer, 1997, p.30), because “in
achieving a sex change, she employs neither surgery nor psychological conditioning.
Her willed performance of femininity, combined with her audience’s belief that she
is a woman, are sufficient, Carter suggests, to make her one” (Palmer, 197, p.30). A
comparable situation arose during an experiment carried out by the American
journalist Norah Vincent in 2003. Vincent spent time living as a man, and initially
felt that the disguise -  male clothing, fake beard, etc. -  was most important, but as
she gained more confidence in ‘being’ a man in the guise of Ned, she found that she
did not need such reliance on props:
I wasn’t wearing my beard anymore. I hadn’t been wearing it for several 
days. To me it should have seemed obvious that something wasn’t quite right. 
But this was the test of perception that continually arose with Ned. People 
saw in him what I had conditioned them to see. When I removed the beard, 
they saw nothing but a shaved boy. (Vincent, 2006, p. 173)
In a Butlerian way (albeit before Butler articulated her ideas), performance and
essence are rendered the same thing when Tristessa explains how he transformed
himself:
I used to conceal my genitals in my anus. I would fix them in position with 
Scotch tape, so that my mound was smooth as a young girl’s. But when the 
years passed and my disguise became my nature, I no longer troubled myself 
with these subterfuges. Once the essence was achieved, the appearance could 
take care of itself. (Eve, p. 141)
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Palmer reads Carter as saying that the “audience’s belief’ (Palmer, 1997, p.30) plays 
an active role in making Tristessa seem like a convincing woman, but as Vincent and 
Carter show, it is the convincingness of the act that makes the audience believe in the 
‘reality’ of the performance. Palmer’s reading of Carter’s intentions is a troubling 
one, also suggesting that Carter is “poking fun at the gullibility of the general public” 
(Palmer, 1997, p.30). I agree that Carter is “highlight[ing] the connections between 
gender and fantasy, gender and illusion” (Palmer, 1997, p.30) but this needs to be 
taken further: Carter is illustrating what Heather L. Johnson calls the “fictive nature 
of gender” (cited in Gamble, 2001, p. 100) rather than mocking. Carter has already 
shown this when Evelyn learns how to be a woman by copying Zero’s wives, 
themselves operating a mirroring effect illustrative of their own copying of one 
another:
[t]he earnest air they shared made them look like sisters and they were 
dressed alike ... [t]hey wore their hair cut very short and slashed in a straight 
fringe across their foreheads; each one had a wide gold wedding ring on the 
fourth finger of her left hand. (Eve, p.88)
Evelyn’s performance has also been informed by Tristessa, whose films were shown
as part of Evelyn’s psycho-programming: “Tristessa, your solitude, your melancholy
-  Our Lady of the Sorrows, Tristessa; you came to me in seven veils of celluloid and
demonstrated, in your comparable tears, every kitch [sic] excess of the mode of
femininity” (Eve, p.71). Drag is here being portrayed as producing a more womanly
figure than woman/women because it captures an ‘essence’ which does not exist
outside of performance. Butler argues, “[t]hat the gendered body is performative
suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute
its reality” (Butler, 1999, p. 173). The doubled performance of drag (the
unconsciously performative and the consciously hyperbolic performance) brings into
focus and undermines the ‘Very notions of an essential sex and a true or abiding
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masculinity or femininity” (Butler, 1999, p. 180). The revelation of Tristessa’s 
anatomy offers a new perspective on why she was chosen as the face of femininity in 
Mother’s programming. In addition to being a fantasy woman, Tristessa can teach 
Evelyn (and other soon-to-be-women) how to project ‘femininity’ without falling 
into the trap of being “too emphatically feminine” (Eve, p. 101) and arousing negative 
attention.
The Riddle of Gender
Like Evelyn, Tristessa has great difficulty in reconciling her mind and body: “the
heraldic regalia of his sex appalled him, I thought that Mother would say he had
become a woman because he had abhorred his most female part -  that is, his
instrument of mediation between himself and the other” (Eve, p. 128). Although
Evelyn can accept Tristessa’s revelation, he faces “confusion” (Eve, p. 128) and
stumbles over pronouns when describing Tristessa: “I crept up to him and kissed her
pitiful, bare feet” (Eve, p. 128). These pronouns give way to the dehumanising ‘it’ as
Evelyn struggles to make sense of the scene before him: “the proud, solitary heroine
who now underwent the unimaginable ordeal of a confrontation with the essential
aspect of its being it had so grandly abandoned” (Eve, p. 128, my emphasis). Gamble
states that Evelyn and Tristessa have in common
the retention, to a certain degree at least, of a masculine viewpoint. Eve has 
been forced to assume a gender s/he never identified with him/herself... 
while Tristessa, for all her feminine glamour, cannot relinquish ‘the awful 
ineradicable quality of his maleness.’ (Gamble, 2006, p. 149)
Zero appears to recognise the unspoken bond between Evelyn and Tristessa, and
decides to punish them both by forcing them into a ‘marriage’. Heather Johnson
claims that Zero and his wives torture Tristessa “because of her dual nature”
(Johnson, 2000, p. 129), but it would be more accurate to say that Zero hates women,
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and his wives view the world through his eyes, so they cannot understand a man who 
chooses to live as a woman.
Evelyn is forced to put on a suit and play groom in the mock-marriage. 
Surrounded by mirrors, Evelyn sees Zero “step back and I saw his reflection in the 
mirror step back and the reflection of that reflection in another mirror stepped back” 
(Eve, p. 132). This mirroring has the additional effect of echoing the disintegration of 
Evelyn’s identity:
it seemed, at first glance, I had become my old self again in the inverted 
world of the mirrors. But this masquerade was more than skin deep. Under 
the mask of maleness I wore another mask of femaleness but a mask that now 
I never would be able to remove, no matter how hard I tried, although I was a 
boy disguised as a girl and now disguised as a boy again. (Eve, p. 132)
The mirroring is made even more explicit following the ceremony: “[Zero] made us
man and wife although it was a double wedding -  both were the bride, both the
groom in this ceremony” (Eve, p. 135). This is a situation that Trevenna reads as
highlighting the differences between Carter’s and Butler’s understanding of drag:
Butler insists that drag reveals the performative nature of both gender and sex 
since she denies that the two can be separated. While drag, in Carter’s hands, 
certainly foregrounds the constructedness of gender, it is also shown to hide a 
pre-existing subject position, conditionally linked to original sexual biology, 
prior to the exaggerated performance of the ‘other’ gender. This is 
particularly evident during the mock wedding of Tristessa and Eve.
(Trevenna, 2002, p.272)
As I have already noted, Evelyn finds it extremely difficult to recognise himself as
Eve, and retains a masculine viewpoint as he recounts his adventures, realising that
“his/her ‘womanliness’ is still limited to physicality” (Trevenna, 2002, p.271).
Sarah Gamble regards the wedding as important for different reasons:
[t]he union of the woman who was once a man and the man who has made 
himself into the perfect woman has profound implications, for in this action 
not only gendered language but gender itself has been cut adrift from the 
body, completely reducing sexual identity to a matter of performance. 
(Gamble, 2001,p.l25)
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Carter then expands her games, to the point where Zero forces Tristessa to have sex 
with Evelyn: a double rape that will cause its own doubling: “[m]y bride will become 
my child’s father” (Eve, p. 136). The semantic impossibility of this sentence, entering 
into the realm of metaphor, represents the ‘riddle’ of gender; a complexity that 
Wesley Stace underestimates in Misfortune, as I shall demonstrate. The rape causes 
Tristessa significant mental anguish, inverting her onscreen role as “the spectacle of 
female suffering” (Gamble, 2001, p. 126, my emphasis): Tristessa looks at “his own 
maleness as if he had never seen it before. He seemed numbed by the rediscovery of 
his virility; it was incomprehensible to him” (Eve, p. 141). Driven “quite mad” (Eve, 
p. 143) by his suffering, it is inevitable that Tristessa will die, unwilling and unable to 
accept what has happened to him. His last act is to “chang[e] into his female aspect. 
He reverted entirely to the sinuous principle of his notion of femininity” (Eve, 
p. 156). He returns to his signature role, that of the “glamorously suffering woman” 
(Jordan, 1994, p.212) before being murdered.
By the novel’s end, Evelyn may or may not be pregnant with Tristessa’s 
child, and the circulatory nature of the novel makes itself visible again: “[w]e start 
from our conclusions” (Eve, p. 191). Evelyn feels able to “leave behind me” (Eve, 
p. 191), ready to be taken to the “place of birth” (Eve, p. 191). As the novel draws to a 
close, one of Mother’s disciples finds Evelyn and offers him something: “[i]t was a 
miniature portable refrigerator. Inside, on a bed of dry ice, lay the set of genitals 
which had once belonged to Evelyn” (Eve, p. 187). When the woman says that 
Evelyn “can have them back, if [he] still want[s] them” (Eve, p. 187), Evelyn 
responds by laughing and shaking his head; a refusal motivated by his realisation that 
the genitals are no longer of any relevance to him. Sarah Gamble argues that ‘Eve’ 
“cannot undo what has been done to her and become Evelyn again” (Gamble, 1997,
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p. 124), but throughout the course of the text, Evelyn has been very much alive 
(“his/her femininity is fleshly while his/her masculinity remains cerebral” [Armitt, 
cited in Gamble, 2001 p. 104]), affecting the narrative as it is filtered through his 
once-male sensibility. Evelyn no longer wants to undo the castration -  partly because 
he knows that, after all he has been through, undoing the castration will not be 
enough to undo everything he has learned about his identity, but also because he has 
started to accept parts of his female identity. Evelyn could return to ‘being’ Evelyn 
because Tristessa has taught him about the fluidity of gender and unimportance of 
anatomy, but the novel ends on a note of rebirth because Evelyn is ready to start 
‘being’ Eve and taking on the responsibility of motherhood.
Misfortune
Reproduction can, of course, be read in terms of mirroring; the possible baby is a
reflection of Evelyn’s female role, drawing together his fragmented parts to form a
cohesive identity for him as ‘mother’. The protagonist of Misfortune, Rose, is the
embodiment of this type of mirroring. After being found as a baby boy on a rubbish
heap, Rose is taken in by Lord Geoffroy Loveall, who decides to raise the baby as a
replacement for his dead sister, Dolores. The reconfiguration of the baby’s name to
Rose Old (an anagram of Dolores) marks the child as a fragmented mirror-image of
the dead woman. This sense of fragmentation is also visible in the text itself. The
beginning of the novel is written in the third person, but when Stace starts writing
about the life of Rose, the main protagonist, he switches to the first person. Stace (or
‘Rose’) offers an explanation for this:
I should apologise for not revealing myself in the first volume, which I chose 
not to tell in my own voice. “Why,” you may ask, “when you are so very first 
person now?” The answer is simple.. .there wasn’t enough of an I with which 
to speak, or see. I didn’t think my own voice would be persuasive enough, so
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I opted for the old-fashioned narrator, the All-Seeing One -  or let’s call him
God. (MF, p.77)
Stace effects this switch just before ‘the baby’ becomes Rose: before it becomes 
necessary to dispense with the genderless term ‘the baby’ and resort to pronouns: 
“shift[ing] an infant from an ‘it’ to a ‘she’ or a ‘he’” (Butler, 1993, p.7). It has been 
established that Rose is biologically male, but is going to be raised as a female, 
which raises the problem of which pronoun to use. In the context of writing, Judith 
Butler notes that “the styles that become available to you are not entirely a matter of 
choice. Moreover, neither grammar nor style are politically neutral” (Butler, 1999, 
p.xviii). Stace is aware that describing Rose as either ‘she’ or ‘he’ is to make a 
political statement about the character’s sex and gender, and seeks to avoid this with 
the useful gender ambiguity of the first-person pronoun, ‘I’. At this point, it would be 
useful to consider two of Butler’s questions regarding lucidity and truth: “[w]hat 
travels under the sign of ‘clarity’? ... What does ‘transparency’ keep obscure?” 
(Butler, 1999, p.xix). Stace goes to great lengths to reassure the reader who might be 
uncomfortable with the change in perspective, introducing Rose’s voice by having 
her claim that “[y]ou know who I am” (MF, p.75), and “I deal only in the truth” (MF, 
p.77). To answer Butler’s questions, Stace is depending on the apparent clarity of ‘I’ 
to hide his difficulty in choosing a gender signifier for his protagonist, and the 
‘transparency’ with which he uses ‘I’ disguises the limitations of Stace’s narrative.
Wesley Stace is not the only author to struggle with the ‘pronoun problem’: 
as I have previously explained, Patricia Duncker’s “[first] attempt to write a novel 
based on the character [of James Barry] ... stalled after 100 pages when she couldn't 
resolve the problem of saying ‘him’ or ‘her’ in the narration” (Wroe, 2000). Brigid 
Brophy’s novel In Transit revolves around a narrator of uncertain gender, causing 
Brophy to write, “I ... could hardly (could I?) commit myself to a main character at
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whose every appearance in my narrative I would be obliged to write he/she, his/her, 
etc. For which reason I have dear Sir/Madam, to remain your I” (Brophy, 2002, 
p.71). In reference to this novel, Christine Brooke-Rose makes a statement that could 
easily be applied to Stace and Misfortune: “the ‘I’ is not just a fictional character but 
also an I-narrator quite aware of using ‘I’ because it is genderless” (Brooke-Rose, 
2002, p.iii, my emphasis). Anna Livia suggests that Brophy “uses the first person 
pronoun in order to avoid the clumsy neologism he/she” (Livia, 2001, p.70), but in 
Stace’s case, it is a way to avoid using either he or she, in the hope that he can leave 
this dilemma to the judgement of the reader.68
Anonyma’s Theories
To ensure that Rose is accepted as a ‘she’, Geoffroy realises that she must first be 
accepted as his daughter; for this to work, Geoffroy needs a wife and so he enlists the 
help of the librarian, Anonyma Wood, in fulfilling this role. It is almost certain that 
she will accept Geoffroy’s proposal because of her “age and diminishing prospects. 
Scarcely any longer of marriageable age -  this being in the days when women of 
thirty-seven were considered spinsters -  she had few alternatives” (MF, p.83). After 
she agrees to the marriage, Geoffroy’s manservant Hamilton tells Anonyma that the 
baby is a boy, but she agrees to Hamilton’s suggestion to raise the baby as a girl for a 
short time: “[t]here is surely no harm in keeping one in skirts for a short while, and 
there would be nothing unusual in it. Our new boy, Stephen, will be in skirts, too” 
(MF, p.91).
Anonyma is presented as very knowledgeable about matters of gender. She 
uses her job as librarian to study the works of various writers and poets, and through 
her study of “the printed works of [the poet] Mary Day” (MF, p.92) Anonyma
68 The issue of pronouns, especially in relation to ‘genderless’ narrators is the focus of Chapter 4.
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develops ideas of her own: “every human being is part male and part female ... it
was vital for the two halves of the soul to be respected” (MF, p.91). In Anonyma’s
mind, it is better to explore both genders rather than take a position firmly in one,
and by raising Rose, Anonyma has “literally in her hands, in her arms, a chance to
test her theories” (MF, 98) -  particularly the idea “of the androgyne” (MF, p.98):
[a] baby’s inner sense of itself was neither male nor female, until society 
taught it which role it was to assume ... Boys and girls were therefore made 
and not bom, and I would be made. I would without a doubt be the most 
adorable and original child ever bom, and an even more successful adult. 
Perhaps I would be the most perfect person in the world, a symbolic 
challenge to every assumption on heaven or earth. (MF, p.98)
Anonyma’s theories self-evidently owe an unacknowledged debt to Virginia Woolf
here. Anonyma’s belief that “[w]hen men were too manly, they were as inept as
women who were too feminine” (MF, p.98) echoes Virginia Woolfs comment in A
Room o f One’s Own that “[i]t is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple; one
must be woman-manly or man-womanly” (Woolf, 2004, p. 120). Although
Misfortune comes complete with a ‘Suggested Further Reading’ list of some thirty-
two texts, there is no explicit reference to Virginia Woolf anywhere.69 However,
Woolf retains an implicit presence in the text. In A Room o f One’s Own, Woolf
states:
[t]he normal and comfortable state of being is that when the two [parts] live 
in harmony together, spiritually cooperating. If one is a man, still the woman 
part of the brain must have effect; and a woman also must have intercourse 
with the man in her. Coleridge perhaps meant this when he said that a great 
mind is androgynous. It is when this fusion takes place that the mind is fully 
fertilized and uses all its faculties. (Woolf, 2004, p.l 13)
This is reconfigured in Misfortune as “[m]y mother believed that every human being
is part male and part female and that the truly poetic mind should harness both these
forces” (MF, p.97). Thus, even if Woolf is not given recognition, she remains a
69 The ‘Suggested Further Reading’ list, which itself contains several made-up texts, is an example of 
the author mimicking Woolfs literary techniques in such texts as Orlando.
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ghostly presence in the text, conspicuous by her absence. Her suggestion that the
“great mind is androgynous” (Woolf, 2004, p.l 13), which is seized upon by Stace, is
dismissed as obvious by Elaine Showalter:
[e]ven clinical psychology confirms that ‘the really creative individual 
combines “masculine” and “feminine” qualities’; indeed, since masculine and 
feminine personality qualities are stereotypes to begin with, it is virtually a 
tautology to say that creative people are not limited to one set. (Showalter, 
1999, p.284)
As far as Showalter is concerned, “[t]he androgynous mind is ... a utopian projection
of the ideal artist” (Showalter, 1999, p.289). She believes that androgyny is better
understood as the complete understanding of one sex “with all its restrictions of sex
and anger and fear and chaos” (Showalter, 1999, p.289) rather than an attempt to
intimately know both:
[a] thorough understanding of what it means, in every respect, to be a woman, 
could lead the artist to an understanding of what it means to be a man. This 
revelation would not be realized in any mystical way; it would result from 
daring to face and express what is unique, even if unpleasant, or taboo, or 
destructive, in one’s own experience, and thus it would speak to the secret 
heart in all people. (Showalter, 1999, p.289)
It is difficult to quantify what it means to be a woman or a man and it is virtually
impossible to draw upon the different understandings of gender to form one coherent
notion of ‘man’ or ‘woman’. It is more practical, I think, to follow Woolfs idea and
try to harness elements of ‘man’ and ‘woman’, drawing them together and allowing
them to merge, thus expanding the elements of one’s gender expression. Of course,
such gender experiments are easier in theory than in practice: attempts to reconfigure
and play with gender can, in the real world, have devastating (and violent)
70consequences. This is something that Misfortune chooses to ignore, especially in its 
treatment of bathroom politics.
70 “Engendered Penalties”, a paper written for the Equalities Review, reports that “[t]ransgender and 
transsexual people face a lifetime of inequalities and discrimination, despite often being amongst the 
most well educated members of society” (Whittle et al, 2007, p.77). According to Whittle, “[t]rans
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Trivialising the ‘Bathroom Problem’
In Vested Interests, Maijorie Garber declares that “[t]he restroom as a site of gender 
identification accords with a child’s earliest training in the use of public 
accommodations ... and therefore with some of his or her earliest public declarations 
of gender difference” (Garber, 1992, p. 15). However, this issue is trivialised in 
Misfortune, demonstrating Stace’s inability to cope with the gender issues so central 
to the novel. While Rose is playing with her friends, Stephen and Sarah, they 
announce that they “have to piddle” {MF, p. 137), giving Rose an opportunity to see 
(and misread) different bathroom practices. Sarah opts for a modesty that is read as 
appropriate for girls, “duck[ing] down behind a tree so she could squat and lift up her 
skirt in privacy” {MF, p. 137), while Stephen puts on more of a performance: “on the 
other side of a small statue of Cupid [he] stood up and sprayed a generous arc ... 
singing loudly” {MF, p. 137). Witnessing this, Rose reaches the conclusion that,
“[w]e have a choice ” {MF, p. 137, emphasis in original). This response, beyond 
illustrating Rose’s confused belief that men and women have the same anatomy, 
shows that she feels the choice is open to her. Insofar as her parents have taken on 
the role of policing gender to make sure Rose acts appropriately as a girl, their 
methods are unthreatening (“I had always been encouraged to sit down -  more 
ladylike” [MF, p. 137, my emphasis]). Therefore, Rose sees no obstacle to changing 
her behaviours: “[i]t made me curious if it would be more fun to stand and sprinkle, 
and I didn’t see why I couldn’t find out” {MF, p. 137). When Rose finally tries to 
emulate the “freedom in Stephen’s technique” {MF, p. 138), she is caught by her 
mother. There is “sadness and anger in [Anonyma’s] eyes” {MF, p. 174) but Rose is
people fear for their safety, to the extent that those not yet living permanently in their new role do not 
go out in public spaces in their preferred gender. 73% of respondents experienced harassment, with 
10% being victims of threatening behaviour wjiep out in public spaces” (Whittle et al, 2007, p. 18).
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“gently advised that if one sits down, one never misses” {MF, 174). Any sinister 
undertones to this policing are deflected because the scene is framed by the 
reminiscences of the older Rose, who seems to agree with her mother’s ‘suggestion’ 
by describing it as “good advice, which I still practice” {MF, p. 174). Rose never 
makes any mention of the deceit that lies behind Anonyma’s advice, nor explains 
why, when she finds out that she is male, she does not adopt Stephen’s more “fun” 
{MF, p. 137) methods.
Stace’s sanitised account of the bathroom problem completely ignores the 
trauma that often surrounds bathroom experiences for those who do not comfortably
71fit into binaries and the danger that can follow transgression. Garber argues that 
“[t]he signs on the [bathroom] doors do not contain pictures of sex organs; they 
satisfy a desire for cultural binarism rather than for biological certainty” (Garber, 
1992, p. 13). In her reading of the issue, Garber states:
[f]or transvestites and transsexuals, the ‘men’s room’ problem is really a 
challenge to the way such cultural binarism is read. Cross-dressers who want 
to pass prefer to read the stick figures literally: those in pants, in there; those 
in skirts, in here. The public restroom appears repeatedly in transvestite 
accounts of passing in part because it so directly posits the binarism of gender 
(choose either one door or the other) in apparently inflexible terms, and also 
(what is really part of the same point) because it marks a place of taboo. 
(Garber, 1992 pi 4)
At this point, it is worth returning to the novel Stone Butch Blues, which I discussed 
in Chapter 2, in order to remind ourselves of the very real problem of ‘bathroom 
politics’ which Stace treats so glibly. In Stone Butch Blues, Jess trials her male 
identity in the men’s room, and considers it “the most important test of all” {SBB, 
p.l 72). Before she enters, Jess is alert to the possible dangers of infiltrating male
71 Wilchins recalls, “[w]hen people started reading me as a woman, I had to very consciously learn 
how they saw me in order to use the restroom. I had to learn to recognize my voice, my posture, the 
way I appeared in clothing. I had to master an entire set of bathroom-specific communicative 
behaviors just to avoid having the cops called” (Wilchins, 1997, p. 151). The ‘Bathroom Problem’, as 
explained by Judith Halberstam and Maijorie Garber, is discussed in more detail in chapter two.
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space: “I paced outside the men’s room. What would happen if I walked in?” (SBB,
p. 172). Her fear is based, in part, on the prejudice she has already felt in using the
women’s bathroom as a butch woman:
I took a deep breath and entered the women’s bathroom. Two women were 
freshening their makeup in front of the mirror. One glanced at the other and 
finished applying her lipstick.
‘Is that a man or a woman?’ she said to her friend as I passed them ... I 
locked the stall door behind me. Their laughter cut me to the bone. ‘You 
don’t really know if that’s a man or not,’ one woman said to the other. ‘We 
should call security and make sure.’
I flushed the toilet and fumbled with my zipper in fear. Maybe it was just an 
idle threat. Maybe they really would call security. I hurried out of the 
bathroom as soon as I heard both women leave. (SBB, p.59)
The women in the bathroom disapprove of Jess because her appearance challenges
traditional notions of femininity: “[t]he old binarism, the old division ‘between the
sexes,’ the ultimate grade school taboo (boys’ room/girls’ room) becomes a gender
test” (Garber, 1992, p. 15). Feinberg depicts the difficulties of using public bathrooms
-  the fear of negative responses -  as a regular occurrence for butches. In another
scene at the factory, Jess describes “a ruckus near the women’s bathroom -  Butch
Jan squared off with two women and a man. It was a fight I’d engaged in many times
... [Jan] was upset because some women in the bathroom claimed they thought she
was a man” (SBB, p. 120).
In the same way that entering the women’s room without problems can be
read as an acceptance of butches as women, successfully entering the men’s room
without being challenged can be regarded as a major step in Jess’s quest to pass as
man: “I could go to the bathroom whenever and wherever I needed to without
pressure or shame. What an enormous relief’ (SBB, p. 173). This relief is
unfortunately short-lived: an acquaintance at work accidentally reveals that Jess is a
woman, leaving her no choice but to resign -  largely because of how difficult it will
be to use either bathroom in light of the revelation: “I’m out of this job now ... You
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don’t get it, do you? Which bathroom you think I’m going to use on Monday,
Duffy?” (SBB, p.207). Using a public bathroom is a decision fraught with danger for
Jess. Taking a trip across states with her transgender friend Ruth means that the risk
of discovery is doubled, so they decide it is safer to avoid public bathrooms
altogether, using bravado to try and downplay the potential hazard: “[t]he world is
our restroom! That was our motto on the trip upstate. We brought plenty of toilet
paper so we wouldn’t need to risk a rest stop” (SBB, p.278).
Similar points of view to this can be found in both Trumpet and Middlesex,
corroborating my concern with Stace’s treatment In Trumpet, Colman recalls his
father’s refusal to use urinals, something Joss couches in general terms: “they were
common and you could catch things and there were unsavoury men who could be
dangerous” (Tr, p.56). His point of view is influenced by a fear of what could happen
if he is unmasked as a woman. Similarly, Cal (Middlesex) admits that “[djespite my
suit, my haircut, and my height, every time I went into a men’s room a shout rang out
in my head: ‘You’re in the mens!”’ (Mid, p.452). Misfortune completely avoids the
issue of risks even though at the end of the novel Rose discusses the concept of
bathroom segregation:
I remember when there were only two bathrooms in the whole house, and 
neither of them had a flush. Now these lonely private rooms are everywhere, 
each complete with its own noisy flush, and a sign outside for gentlemen or 
ladies, to avoid unwitting blushes, but what difference does it make anyway, 
if everyone’s sitting down? In the baths at Bristol when I was young, men and 
women were never separated, but now it’s all prudery and suspicion.
Anyway, the signs never affected me one way or the other: I went where I 
chose. (MF, p.516)
With Rose’s unconcerned attitude (“I went where I chose” [MF, p.516]), Stace 
disregards the difficulties faced by differently-gendered individuals, and trivialises a
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serious issue which is still relevant today.72 That Stace even has his protagonist ask 
“what difference does it make” (MF, p.516) shows that he does not grasp this 
complicated issue since there is nothing in the narrative to suggest this is a politically 
charged issue.
Narrative Structure
This is not the only point at which Stace struggles with gender issues. Misfortune is
unsuccessful in many ways, most notably in regards to its first-person narrative
structure. In A Room o f One’s Own, Woolf claims that “T  is only a convenient term
for somebody who has no real being” (Woolf, 2004, p.4), while Elaine Showalter
criticises the use of ‘I’ in that text:
despite its illusions of spontaneity and intimacy, A Room o f One’s Own is an 
extremely impersonal and defensive book. Impersonality may seem like the 
wrong word for a book in which a narrative T  appears in every third 
sentence. But a closer look reveals that the T  is a persona, whom the author 
calls ‘Mary Beton,’ and that her views are carefully distanced and 
depersonalized, just as the pronoun ‘one’ in the title depersonalizes, and even 
de-sexes, the subject. (Showalter, 1999, p.282)
Woolfs decision to use the third-person narrator in Orlando enables her to consider
Orlando’s situation in a detached manner that is dependent on notions of ‘truth’:
“[t]he biographer is now faced with a difficulty which it is better perhaps to confess
than to gloss over ... Our simple duty is to state the facts as far as they are known,
and so let the reader make of them what he may” (Woolf, 2006, p.59). The choice of
narration proves most useful when describing Orlando’s transformation from man to
woman: “[w]e may take advantage of this pause in the narrative to make certain
72 In October 2006, the Italian politician Vladimir Luxuria found himself at odds with some members 
of parliament, who disapproved of him using the female bathroom. Luxuria “describes himself as 
‘trans-gender’ and, while never having had a sex change operation, he dresses and behaves entirely as 
a woman” (Hooper, 2006). A complaint was made by a fellow politician, Elisabetta Gardini, who 
stated that encountering Luxuria in the female bathroom made her feel “as if she had been the victim 
of a ‘sex attack’” (Hooper, 2006). The suggestion that the problem could be solved by a third 
bathroom was dismissed by the Christian Democrat party, which “was adamant that ‘there are only 
two genders-male and female’” (Hooper, 2006).
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statements. Orlando had become a woman -  there is no denying it” (Woolf, 2006,
p. 124). With the clarity of a detached observer, Woolf (as the biographer) is ready to
deflect claims that the novel is unbelievable:
[t]he change seemed to have been accomplished painlessly and completely 
and in such a way that Orlando herself showed no surprise at it. Many people, 
taking this into account, and holding that such a change of sex is against 
nature, have been at great pains to prove (1) that Orlando had always been a 
woman, (2) that Orlando is at this moment a man. Let biologists and 
psychologists determine. It is enough for us to state the simple fact; Orlando 
was a man till the age of thirty; when he became a woman and has remained 
so ever since. But let other pens treat of sex and sexuality; we quit such 
odious subjects as soon as we can. (Woolf, 2006, p. 124)
The moment of Orlando’s change is suitably dramatic, as I have indicated:
[w]e are, therefore, now left entirely alone in the room with the sleeping 
Orlando and the trumpeters. The trumpeters, ranging themselves side by side 
in order, blow one terrific blast -  
‘The Tr u t h !’ 
at which Orlando woke.
He stretched himself. He rose. He stood upright in complete nakedness before 
us, and while the trumpets pealed Truth! Truth! Truth! we have no choice left 
but confess -  he was a woman. (Woolf, 2006, p. 123)
This passage has similarities to the moment in Misfortune when Rose discovers the
secret of her birth; the triple word repetition and use of uppercase letters: “BOY on
my bed. BOY in my bed. BOY” (MF, p.224). However, Rose is in despair (“I hated
myself’ [MF, p.226]), confessing that while he was “perfect on the outside” (MF,
p.225), he has lost his sense of self: “[w]hat did I call myself? What would my name
be? From now on, I could refer to myself only in the third person -  was there even an
‘I’ to speak from?” (MF, p.225). In direct opposition to this, Orlando is able to look
at himself “without showing any signs of discomposure” (Woolf, 2006, p. 123)
because he “remained precisely as he had been. The change of sex, though it altered
their future, did nothing whatever to alter their identity” (Woolf, 2006, p. 124).
The major difference between the treatment of gender in Misfortune and
Orlando is that Orlando acknowledges that it is easier to live as a man rather than a
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woman. In Misfortune, Rose struggles to make the transition from female to male, 
claiming that it is more restrictive and less appealing being a man: “I felt 
uncomfortable in everything my alternative wardrobe offered. Anything I tried 
chafed, burned, and abraded” {MF, p.238). Rose’s hatred of male clothing is equalled 
by her love for female outfits: “[a] large skirt is the most convenient and comfortable 
thing in the world, nor did I ever wish for warmer wear during the winters of my 
childhood {MF, p.238)”. This particular opinion is inconsistent with Rose’s dislike of 
female clothes as a child: she feels “hampered by [her] skirt” {MF, p. 167) when 
trying to copy Stephen’s stone skimming, and although Stephen says she throws 
“like a girl” {MF, p. 167), Rose is adamant that “my skirt was the reason” {MF, 
p. 167), believing that if it was not for the skirts, she “could throw farther, faster”
{MF, p.167).
Woolf responds to the clothing issue in a more credible manner, emphasising 
both the positive (attractiveness) and negative (impracticality) aspects of women’s 
clothes:
these skirts are plaguey things to have about one’s heels. Yet the stuff 
(flowered paduasoy) is the loveliest in the world. Never have I seen my own 
skin (here she laid her hand on her knee) look to such advantage as now. 
Could I, however, leap overboard and swim in clothes like these? No! 
Therefore, I should have to trust to the protection of a blue-jacket. (Woolf, 
2006, p. 137)
Woolf goes on to relate the vast effort that is taken by women to make themselves
look appropriately attractive for and to men:
‘women are not (judging by my own short experience of the sex) obedient, 
chaste, scented, and exquisitely apparelled by nature. They can only attain 
these graces, without which they may enjoy none of the delights of life, by 
the most tedious discipline. There’s the hairdressing,’ she thought, ‘that alone 
will take an hour of my morning; there’s looking in the looking-glass, another 
hour; there’s staying and lacing; there’s washing and powdering; there’s 
changing from silk to lace and from lace to paduasoy; there’s being chaste 
year in year out...’ (Woolf, 2006, p. 141)
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Like Orlando, Rose also has to undertake great efforts to appear suitably feminine:
“[o]ur toilet took longer and methods became complex, ever more elaborate
combinations of face powder, mascara, and rouge” (MF, p. 190). However, this is
shown to be a result of her development as a male: “the hair above my upper lip and
around my cheeks had grown thicker and less babyish ... I truly needed the razor ...
[Anonyma] showed me how to take the blade to the hair above my lip and then cover
it with the powder, which made me sneeze” (MF, p. 190). While Orlando points out
the artificiality that is necessary for women to achieve a ‘naturally’ feminine
appearance, Misfortune chooses to focus on the discord between Rose’s female
identity, and her male body.
Once Rose has discovered and come to terms with the lies her parents told
her, she exploits this discord by experimenting with her gender, and this is something
that she is encouraged in by her friends: “[t]hey laid out, side by side, the suit and the
red dress ... Then they left the room. It was my choice” (MF, p.370). The choice
Rose makes is to try and live in between genders: “[m]ustaches came and went as I
grew older, but this one, at this moment, looked most debonair, particularly in the
context of my dress” (MF, p.374). Her experiments do not limit her in any way:
despite the ways in which she manipulates gender, she ends the novel by staking her
claim as the new Lord Loveall while wearing a skirt and “making sure there was a
telling display of stocking and perhaps even a hint of garter” (MF, p.510).
Nonetheless, Rose’s experiments do not actually teach her anything: she gains no
great insights from her gender experiences despite having what Cixous would regard
as the optimum learning experience:
let us imagine a real liberation of sexuality, that is to say, transformation of 
each one’s relationship to his or her body (and to the other body), an 
approximation to the vast, material, organic, sensuous universe that we are ... 
Then ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ would inscribe quite differently their
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effects of difference, their economy, their relationship to expenditure, to lack, 
to the gift. What today appears to be ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’ would no 
longer amount to the same thing. (Cixous, 2004, p.350)
Although Emily Jeremiah claims that Misfortune “frequently challenges the
boundaries between ‘male’ and ‘female’ ... [m]ale and female are slippery terms in
the novel” (Jeremiah, 2007, p. 138), I disagree. Stace has an opportunity to consider
the relationship between gender and the body, and to raise some serious questions
about the validity of gender categories, but he squanders this opportunity. Jeremiah,
however, sees this as evidence that “the text ultimately affirms ‘choice’ as far as
gender is concerned - Rose ‘chooses’ to wear a dress, even as he assumes his
maleness” (Jeremiah, 2007, p. 138). In fact, the dress is almost the only evidence of
the gender difficulties that Rose has been through.
In contrast to Misfortune, Woolf uses her novel to explore the difficulties that
Orlando will encounter as a result of changing from man to woman -  Woolf is
illustrating the limitations Orlando-as-woman will face by comparing them to the
freedoms he had as a man:
I shall never be able to crack a man over the head, or tell him he lies in his 
teeth, or draw my sword and run him through the body, or sit among my 
peers, or wear a coronet, or walk in procession, or sentence a man to death, or 
lead an army, or prance down Whitehall on a charger, or wear seventy-two 
different medals on my breast. All I can do, once I set foot on English soil, it 
to pour out tea and ask my lords how they like it. (Woolf, 2006, p. 142)
Elaine Showalter points out that “whatever the abstract merits of androgyny, the
world that Virginia Woolf inhabited was the last place in which a woman could frilly
express both femaleness and maleness, nurturance and aggression” (Showalter, 1999,
p.263), illustrating what fired Woolfs imagination. Cixous argues that
[organization by hierarchy makes all conceptual organization subject to man. 
Male privilege, shown in the opposition between activity and passivity, which 
he uses to sustain himself. Traditionally, the question of sexual difference is 
treated by coupling it with the opposition: activity/passivity. (Cixous, 2004, 
p.349)
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If masculinity/maleness is represented as active and femininity/femaleness is 
represented as passive, (“woman is always associated with passivity in philosophy ... 
Either woman is passive or she does not exist” [Cixous, 2004, p.349]) then the 
difference between the sexes should be sufficiently noticeable: in Orlando, Woolf 
clearly makes the point that males have greater freedom than females, but despite 
Misfortune being set in the early part of the nineteenth century, Rose has no such 
problems as she trials various identities. Her penchant for wearing dresses and 
referring to herself using male pronouns is no obstacle to marriage or fathering a 
child, “the next heir of Love Hall, Adam Loveall” (MF, p.509).
As a study of gender, Misfortune is neither insightful nor thoughtful enough, 
ignoring the harsh realities of a life lived on the margins of accepted gender 
categories. Although Stace has been undoubtedly inspired by Orlando, he does not 
live up to Woolfs novel, failing to explore gender with the depth and thoughtfulness 
which a postmodernist perspective should allow for. Narrative devices and complex 
plotting fail to mask the novel’s flaws. Rose’s claim that “[she] had been put on earth 
to challenge convention” (MF, p.518) is laughable: although her family try to raise 
her as a girl, it has little effect on her development: she ends the novel as a 
heterosexual man, a husband and a father. Her only ‘challenge’ to convention is to 
wear dresses, but this only works (if it works at all) because the characters around 
Rose maintain a sense of gender stability: without a surrounding context of gender 
stability, Rose’s own instability would be completely meaningless.
In contrast, The Passion o f New Eve is built upon the instability of gender. 
Characters cast off traditional gender roles, and create new gendered identities 
through literal and metaphorical transformations. The breakdown of gender in its 
traditionally understood forms, combined with the mirroring effect of the narrative,
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leads to the creation of a text which prefigures some of Butler’s most important 
insights. Carter turns gender on its head, pointing out its fictive nature. This paves 
the way for the likes of Jeanette Winterson and Claire Messud to try to write beyond 
gender categories by utilising genderless narrators, as I will demonstrate in the next 
chapter.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r : ‘G e n d e r l e s s  N a r r a t o r s ’
A writer must resist the pressure of old formulae and work towards new
combinations of language. (Winterson, 1997, p.76)
*
In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler asks “[h]ow does language construct the categories
of sex?” (Butler, 1999, p.xxx). This question is further developed in Undoing
Gender, when she argues that
[w]hen we ask, what are the conditions of intelligibility by which the human 
emerges, by which the human is recognized, by which some subject becomes 
the subject of human love, we are asking about conditions of intelligibility 
composed of norms, of practices, that have become presuppositional, without 
which we cannot think the human at all. (Butler, 2004, p.57).
In this chapter, I will interrogate these notions of ‘intelligibility’ and the ‘human’ by
concentrating on two novels: Jeanette Winterson’s novel, Written on the Body, and
Claire Messud’s novella, ‘The Hunters’, both of which reconfigure these issues with
their use o f ‘genderless’ narrators. In so doing, I will argue that Winterson is utilising
gender stereotypes to actually create a ‘doubly-gendered’ character. I will also
demonstrate that Winteron’s use of her own biography in her fiction disrupts notions
of true and false, fiction and autobiography, with the result that the relationship
between gender and ‘humanness’ is highlighted. This will relate to my discussion of
‘The Hunters’, where I will demonstrate how the character of Ridley Wandor is
stripped of her humanity through the narrator’s refusal to accept her identity as a
woman.
Gerald Prince explains that “any sign in a narration which represents a narrator’s 
persona, his attitude, his knowledge of worlds other than that of the narrated, or his 
interpretation of the events recounted and evaluation of their importance constitutes a 
sign of the ‘I’” (Prince, 1982, p. 10). Prince’s statement highlights the fact that 
everything that “constitutes a sign of the ‘I’” (Prince, 1982, p. 10) is filtered through
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the lens of he or she (that is, male or female). Winterson and Messud craft narratives 
that withhold the gender of the narrator, demonstrating a reinterpretation of the very 
concept of the narrator. Prince argues that “[t]he intrusiveness of a given narrator, his 
degree of self-consciousness, his reliability, his distance from the narrated or the 
narratee not only help characterize him but also affect our interpretation of and 
response to the narrative” (Prince, 1982, p. 13). Winterson and Messud’s approaches 
affect the way that readers interpret not just the narrators, but their own concepts of 
masculinity, femininity, and humanness, and they achieve this by magnifying the 
reader’s sense of distance from the narrators by stripping the narrators of 
recognisable markers of identity.
Winterson and Messud make full use of the ‘I’ narrator, exploring the failure 
of language to adequately represent ‘ungendered’ characters, and posing a challenge 
to the traditional gender binary which embeds itself within language. Patricia 
Duncker points out that “[i]n Written on the Body, Winterson uses straightforward 
first-person narrative. Incidently, this is the only option if you want to be cagey about 
the narrator’s sex” (Duncker, 1998, p.84). The difficulty of finding a mode in which 
to discuss ‘ungendered’ characters is such that Winterson and Messud’s mode of 
narration is chosen for them by the constraints of the English language: “we need 
more language than just feminine/masculine, straight/gay, either/or. Men are not just 
from Mars and women and not from Venus. We all live on the same planet” 
(Feinberg, 1998, p.28). Winterson and Messud also introduce the possibility of
73 Grice and Woods explain this in Winterson’s case as “bring[ing] the politics of reading gendered 
narratives to the foreground once again” (Grice and Woods, 1998, p.2).
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bisexuality as a means of denying gendered readings of the narrators, a strategy, 
however, that ultimately appears to deny a reading of the narrators as human.74
Written on the Body
When Written on the Body was published, the novel’s reception was defined by the 
author’s personal circumstances. From the beginning of Winterson’s career, 
reviewers have struggled to make a distinction between the ‘real’ life of the author, 
and the lives of her characters, something Winterson herself must take some 
responsibility for:
the stability of ‘fiction’ as a sufficient description of Oranges [Are Not the 
Only Fruit] is called into question immediately because the constructed line 
between first-person fiction and autobiography is barely meaningful as a 
marker of generic territoriality ... Protagonist and author are brought up in 
Lancashire, adopted daughters of an evangelical mother and barely visible 
father, and both are named Jeanette. (Gilmore, 2001, p. 125)75
Leigh Gilmore has further argued that Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit “has installed
the expectation ... that subsequent texts by Winterson can be read within the context
of an autobiographical project, even if Winterson wants to change the rules”
(Gilmore, 1997, p.227). Winterson herself likens Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit to
both Orlando and Gertrude Stein’s Autobiography o f Alive B. Toklas: “fiction
masquerading as a memoir” (AO, p.53), and claims that “[l]ike Stein, I prefer myself
as a character in my own fiction” (AO, p.53). Despite this, Winterson refutes the
notion that she is in any way responsible for ‘mis-readings’ of her work, and blames
any confusion on the “late-twentieth-century vogue for literary biography” (AO,
p.27). Winterson’s writing has been overshadowed by her fame: “in the National
Curriculum for Schools, in undergraduate curricula and in the academic canon of
74 Patricia Duncker argues that “[i]f to be human is to be heterosexual, and there is plenty o f historical 
persecution and available legislation that suggests it is not human to be otherwise, then queer is not 
quite human” (Duncker, 2002a, p.96).
7 Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit is Winterson’s first novel, published in 1985.
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Contemporary Women’s Fiction, Jeanette Winterson has become public property”
(Morrison, 2006, p. 172). This causes a split in her identity: “the writer Jeanette
Winterson, on the one hand, and the polymorphous cultural institution ‘Jeanette
Winterson’ on the other” (Morrison, 2006, p. 170). Winterson makes uses of the
myth of ‘Jeanette Winterson’ even as she claims that,
the intersection between a writer’s life and a writer’s work is irrelevant to the 
reader. The reader is not being offered a chunk of the writer or a direct insight 
into the writer’s mind, the reader is being offered a separate reality. A reality 
separate from the actual world of the reader, and just as importantly, separate 
from the actual world of the writer. (AO, p.27)
Although she claims that “[a]rt must resist autobiography if it hopes to cross
boundaries of class, culture...and... sexuality” (AO, p. 106), Winterson actually
utilises the conflation of art and autobiography as a means of emphasising the
fictionality of her work -  a project that reaches its zenith in Written on the Body.
Fiction and Autobiography
By fictionalising her own life, Winterson affected how her subsequent novels were 
read. Gregory J. Rubinson points out that “[mjany reviewers ... [of Written on the 
Body] assumed that the narrator is female, associating him/her with the author or 
finding hints accreting towards such a reading” (Rubinson, 2005, p. 129), and blames 
this on “the often stereotypical and hetero-normative biases in their own reading 
practices” (Rubinson, 2005, p. 129). While the reading of any novel is undoubtedly 
coloured by the experiences each reader brings to the text, Leigh Gilmore’s 
articulation of Winterson’s work as confusing the boundaries of fiction and 
autobiography offers an important insight into the mechanics of Written on the Body.
Incidentally, Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues has suffered the same fate 
as Written on the Body; in the afterword to Stone Butch Blues, Feinberg describes 
parallels between the categorisation of the book and her own personal struggles:
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[l]ike my own life, this novel defies easy classification. If you found Stone 
Butch Blues in a bookstore or library, which category was it in? lesbian 
fiction? Gender studies? Like the germinal novel The Well o f Loneliness by 
Radclyffe/John Hall, this book is a lesbian novel and a transgender novel -  
making ‘trans’ genre a verb as well as an adjective. (SBB, p.304)
However, unlike Winterson, Feinberg embraces this confusion, believing that the
novel gains its power through reflecting a version of the truth: ‘“ [i]s it fiction?’ I am
frequently asked. Is it true? Is it real? Oh, it’s real all right. So real it bleeds. And yet
it is a remembrance: Never underestimate the power of fiction to tell the truth” (SBB,
p.304). This is in direct opposition to Winterson’s assertion that “[t]he Victorian
denial of art as art (separate, Other, self-contained) was unsustainable ... That art
should not be art but a version of everyday life was absurd” (AO, p.31). Far more
important than art-as-life, for Winterson, is the language that the writer chooses: “[i]f
we admit that language has power over us, not only through what it says but also
through what it is, we will be tolerant of literary experiment... A writer must resist
the pressure of old formulae and work towards new combinations of language” (AO,
p.76).
In trying to discuss the novel and narrator, it is immediately clear that the
English language is not up to the task. On the contrary, it impedes progress and
draws attention to the text itself, as noted by Susana Onega:
[w]e cannot refer to the narrator as a ‘she’ ignoring the text’s insistence that 
we use the slashed forms ‘s/he’ and ‘her/his’ even if having to use the slashes 
is irritating, precisely because it is this irritation that will challenge and set 
into question the objectivity of our patriarchal assumptions about identity. 
(Onega, 2006, p.l 11)
This issue is also raised in ‘The Hunters’, as we shall see, and Virginia Woolf
expresses this same irritation in Orlando when she writes, “[h]is memory -  but in
future we must, for convention’s sake, say ‘her’ for ‘his’, and ‘she’ for ‘he’” (Woolf,
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2006, p. 124). Judith Butler also draws attention to the failure of language, especially
when attempting to refer to the body:
[t]he linguistic categories ... are themselves troubled by a referent that is 
never fully or permanently resolved or contained by any given signified. 
Indeed, that referent persists only as a kind of absence or loss, that which 
language does not capture, but, instead, that which impels language 
repeatedly to attempt that capture, that circumscription -  and to fail. (Butler, 
1993, p.67)
For Winterson, “[t]he art of Orlando is its language. Woolf never lets her words tire 
and slip. It is the taut line, the tightrope of language, that makes possible passages at 
once delicate and audacious” (AO, p.70). It is an “intimate book” (AO, p.70) that uses 
“intimate language” (AO, p.70), a charge that can also be levelled at Written on the 
Body. At one point, the narrator breaks off his/her narrative to address the reader on 
the subject of his/her reliability: “I can tell by now that you are wondering whether I 
can be trusted as a narrator” (WB, p.24), and at another, he/she admits “I can’t be 
relied upon” (WB, p.92). It is this intimacy that obscures the text: the reader is both 
too close to, and too far from, the narrator, able to see that he/she is not trustworthy 
(in part because he/she rejects binary gender categorisation), but unable to see what 
he/she is.
Throughout the course of the novel, he/she engages in many relationships, 
and by the halfway point of the novel, the phrase “I had a girlfriend once” (WB, p. 19) 
has become a familiar refrain. There is “a girlfriend who thought it rude to wear 
shorts in front of public monuments” (WB, p. 12), another girlfriend “who was 
addicted to starlit nights” (WB, p. 19), one “who had been heavily into papier-mache” 
(WB, p.41), Inge (WB, p.21), Jacqueline (WB, p.24), Catherine (WB, p.59), and of 
course, Louise, “another married woman” (WB, p.32) and the focus of much of the 
narrative. Anna Livia argues that “Winterson’s novel is a love story, and since her 
other novels are on lesbian themes, most readers will assume it is a lesbian love
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story” (Livia, 2001, p.79). When Winterson says that “the reader should be wary of 
Orlando's facts, they work too, like wartime signposts, incorrectly pointing the 
traveller in the wrong direction” (AO, p.72), she could be talking about Written on 
the Body.
Up until page 92, it is easy to fall into Winterson’s carefully laid trap, and
believe that the narrator is (like the author) both a woman and a lesbian. However, at
this point, the narrative takes an unexpected turn: “I had a boyfriend once called
Crazy Frank” (WB, p.92). Suddenly, the narrative of Written on the Body has
swerved away from the well-known facts of Winterson’s (real) life. And lest the
reader disregard Crazy Frank as an aberration, more boyfriends emerge, in fleeting
memories ([i]t reminded me of a pair of shorts a boyfriend of mine had once worn”
[WB, p. 143]) and with the same flippant humour used to describe the girlfriends:
I had a boyfriend once, his name was Carlo, he was a dark exciting thing. He 
made me shave off all my body hair and did the same to himself. He claimed 
it would increase sensation but it made me feel like a prisoner in a beehive. I 
wanted to please him, he smelled of fir cones and port, his long body passion- 
damp. We lasted six months and then Carlo met Robert who was taller, 
broader and thinner than me. They exchanged razorblades and cut me out. 
(WB, p. 143)
Foucault argues that “we must try to determine the different ways of not saying ... 
things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed ... 
There is not one but many silences” (Foucault, 1979, p.27). Winterson has chosen to 
withhold the evidence of the narrator’s sexuality. This silence is a deliberate choice, 
and deliberately broken, helping the reader to fall into the trap of reading fiction as 
autobiography. By taking this step, Winterson destabilises the narrative and the 
concept of art as autobiography. Winterson describes how Orlando “calls itself a 
biography with the same playfulness that Gertrude Stein enjoys in the Autobiography 
of Alice B. Toklas. In either case there is an immediate challenge to conventional
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genre-boxing” (AO, p.71), but Winterson expresses dismay that “[Virginia] Woolfs 
fiction has been overwhelmed by facts. Her diaries have given licence to a kind of 
perpetual commentary on every aspect of her being” (VWI). She feels that “a play on 
the facts warps into a documentary of factoids. Under the stress of this tabloid-style 
scholarship, her books disappear” (VWI). Arguing that “[a]rt into autobiography is 
bad enough”, Winterson “wonder[s] if there was a way to open up the work for 
students and the general reader. A way past the gossip into the text” (VWI). By 
changing ‘the facts’ and creating a new history for her narrator, Winterson is trying 
to escape the weight of her own autobiography by employing her own “wartime 
signposts” (AO, p.72) to shake up the expectations of readers.
Gender-Play
Part of Winterson’s game is to exploit the “essentialized and/or stereotypical 
readings of gender” (Rubinson, 2005, p. 130) that Rubinson blames for successive 
‘mis-readings’ of the novel; Winterson provides enough clues for the reader to think 
he or she has unlocked the secrets of the text. Rubinson explains that, while “[Ute] 
Kauer presents an impressive set of evidence to support the notion that the narrator is 
a woman ... The clues we may take to be signs of one gender or the other are, as 
Kauer readily admits, red-herrings” (Rubinson, 2005, p. 130). The narrator invokes 
literary and biblical images in order to confuse the reader, describing him/herself as 
feeling “like the girl in the story of Rumpelstiltskin” (WB, p.44), and playfully saying 
that he/she will “call myself Alice and play with the flamingoes” (WB, p. 10), a 
reference to Alice in Wonderland. However, he/she also remembers Louise gazing at 
him/her “the way God gazed at Adam” (WB, p. 18) and experiences “a brief Samson 
moment” (WB, p. 171) of strength. Although Leigh Gilmore claims that “no gender 
references are permitted about the first-person narrator” (Gilmore, 1997, p.229) it is
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more helpful to read the narrator as doubly-gendered, i.e. ‘queer’: reliant on 
stereotypes of male and female behaviour, identity and action to create an ambiguous 
character. Louise Horskjaer Humphries states that, “[a]t the same time that the 
narrator of Written is not androgynous, Winterson does seem to celebrate some kind 
of double-gendered being as an ideal” (Humphries, 1999, p. 15). Marilyn Farwell 
further suggests that “[t]he irresolvability of the narrator’s gender may be mirrored in 
Winterson’s refusal to assign him/her a consistent narrative voice or narratee” 
(Farwell, 1996, p. 188), and Bente Gade concurs with this view: “the narrative voice 
is not identified as either female or male. Instead of stabilising the narrative position 
through sexing, the gender position of the narrator is perpetually constructed and 
deconstructed” (Gade, 1999, p.30). Kauer asks “whether a gender-free narrator 
implies a narration free from gender” (Kauer, 1998, p.46) and comes to the 
conclusion that “the narrator uses precisely those gender-specific cliches to keep the 
reader in uncertainty about his/her gender. The refusal to admit the gender of the 
narrator is based on a play with stereotypes which the reader is supposed to have” 
(Kauer, 1998, p.46). Furthermore, Lisa Moore argues that “the pastiche of disparate 
narrative styles, points of view and temporal, spatial and bodily locations typical of 
Winterson’s fiction enact a challenge to traditional categories of sexual identity” 
(Moore, 1995, p. 109).
This gender-play envelops most of the other characters in the novel, so that 
the concept of gender that the narrator fights against is destabilised anyway: he/she 
says of his/her ex-girlfriend Bathsheba, “[l]ike Dirk Bogarde she prided herself on 
her profile” (WB, p.46). An ex-boyfriend, Frank, has “the body of a bull, an image he 
intensified by wearing great gold hoops through his nipples. Unfortunately he had 
joined the hoops with a chain of heavy gold links” (WB, p.93). The narrator notes
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that Frank intended an “effect [that] should have been deeply butch” (WB, p.93): 
‘butch’ is an interesting choice of word. ‘Masculine’ would have been a more 
obvious choice, suggesting Frank was attempting to reaffirm his male identity, but 
the use of ‘butch’ invokes thoughts of lesbian identity; a form of female 
masculinity.76 In addition, Frank is not strictly heterosexual: “[h]is ambition was to 
find a hole in every port. He wasn’t fussy about the precise location” (WB, p.93).
Mirroring Frank’s ambivalent identity, the narrator confesses to “years of 
playing the Lothario” (WB, p.20), but this is tempered by the description of him/her 
“quiver[ing] like a schoolgirl” (WB, p.82) when alone with Louise. Louise describes 
him/her as “beautiful” (WB, p.85), which the narrator denies, but he/she describes 
him/herself as “a cheap thug” (WB, p.86). It is Louise who is placed in the role of 
rescuing the narrator, being his/her “knight in shining armour” (WB, p. 123). 
Throughout their relationship, Louise and the narrator switch between active and 
passive sexual roles. He/she begins by saying to her, “I had no dreams to possess you 
but I wanted you to possess me” (WB, p.52), but this gives way to different pleas: 
“Louise let me sail in you” (WB, p. 80), “I want to roll on to you and push myself into 
you” (WB, p.l 10) and “Let me penetrate you” (WB, p.l 19). However, he/she is
77forced to admit that “[Louise] consumes me” (WB, p. 136). Not only is Winterson 
denying a clear reading of sexuality, but also a reading of gendered behaviour within 
sexuality.
In A History o f Sexuality, Foucault explains that “[a]t the beginning of the 
seventeenth century a certain frankness was still common ... Sexual practices had 
little need of secrecy; words were said without undue reticence and ... one had a
76 Judith Halberstam suggests that there is “a word for lesbian masculinity: butch” (Halberstam, 1998,
p. 120).
77 In Trumpet, Millie recounts her sexual relationship with Joss using similar terms: “[h]e straddles 
me. Pushes himself into me” (Tr, p. 197).
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tolerant familiarity with the illicit” (Foucault, 1979, p.3), and he then discusses the
Victorian change in attitudes: “[s]exuality was carefully confined; it moved into the
home ... On the subject of sex, silence became the rule” (Foucault, 1979, p.3).
Sexual behaviour is therefore split into two categories:
[a] single locus of sexuality was acknowledged in social space as well as at 
the heart of every household, but it was a utilitarian and fertile one: the 
parents’ bedroom. The rest had only to remain vague ... sterile behavior 
carried the taint of abnormality; if it insisted on making itself too visible, it 
would be designated accordingly and would have to pay the penalty. 
(Foucault, 1979, p.3)
Foucault goes on to say that,
[i]f sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, non-existence, and 
silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of 
a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in such language places 
himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established 
law. (Foucault, 1979, p.6)
It is possible to read the bisexuality of Winterson’s narrator as a “deliberate
transgression” (Foucault, 1979, p.6) of the homosexual category (which is actually
constructed as the ‘visible’ behaviour in the text via an autobiographical reading). It
is a calculated decision to bring in the character of Frank (and the other boyfriends)
so late in the text, and the category of homosexual is disrupted in a surprising and
deliberate way (“[when] we are conscious of defying established power, our tone of
voice shows that we know we are being subversive” [Foucault, 1979, p.6]).
Ill-Chosen Words
A related trick is Winterson’s habit of obscuring as she seems to reveal. The narrator 
describes him/herself as “wearing baggy shorts which in [damp] weather looked like 
a recruitment campaign for the Boy Scouts” (WB, p.58), but before the reader can 
make a connection between his/her clothes and gender, he/she states “I’m not a Boy 
Scout and never was” (WB, p.58). Similarly, he/she says “I used to read women’s
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magazines when I visited the dentist” (WB, p.74). The reading of women’s 
magazines is undermined by the location of the reading (the waiting room of “the 
dentist” [WB, p.74]) and the lack of further information -  it is not known, for 
example, if he/she ever reads women’s magazines at any other times, and reading 
women’s magazines is not, in itself, proof of a female (or male) identity.
Louise remarks of the narrator that, “[w]hen I saw you two years ago I 
thought you were the most beautiful creature male or female I had ever seen” (WB, 
p.84). “Most beautiful creature” (WB, p.84) -  the sentiment has the power to stand 
alone but Winterson insists on labouring and ultimately diluting the point: “male or 
female” (WB, p.84). Rather than adding to the conundrum at the centre of the text, 
this draws the reader back down to earth with a bump; language is simply not up to 
the task of describing ungendered persons and the use of ‘male or female’ trips the 
reader up.78 Lisa Moore comments that “Winterson carefully structures the gender 
ambiguity of her narrator” (Moore, 1995, p. 109): if Winterson had made other 
references to ‘male or female’ throughout the text, then it would suggest a 
consciousness of the issues she is grappling with, but this sole instance reads as 
momentary slip in the otherwise controlled narrative. Winterson believes that Written 
on the Body proves “[t]hat it is possible to have done with the bricks and mortar of 
conventional narrative, not as monkey-business or magic, but by building a structure 
that is bonded by language” (AO, p. 189). The language is at fault insofar as it reveals 
its limitations, but Winterson’s ability to manipulate language is also at fault: she has 
failed in her self-proclaimed duty as a writer, to “resist the pressure of old formulae
78 Ute Kauer makes a similar point: “[c]arefully, even a little too ostentatiously, the narrator avoids 
both describing him-/herself and reflecting gender in dialogues ... no verbal hint at the gender is 
given. This must appear contrived, as it is not usual in such situations. The difficulty shows in a 
narrated dialogue with Louise, where she tells the narrator that ‘you were the most beautiful creature 
male or female I had ever seen’. The derivation from a ‘normal’ dialogue between lovers, where one 
would talk about the most beautiful man or a woman, is a bit too pointed not to appear as artificial” 
(Kauer, 1998, p.44).
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and work towards new combinations of language” (AO, p.76). Although Winterson 
may be intending to attack traditional concepts of gender, she is in fact reaffirming 
the binary she is trying to fight against.
‘Truth’ and ‘Lies’
The difficulty of so many reviewers and critics to accept the narrator of Written on
the Body within Winterson’s designation of ‘ungendered’ can be understood in terms
of Judith Butler’s assertion that
[t]he category of ‘sex’ is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault has 
called a ‘regulatory ideal.’ In this sense, then, ‘sex’ not only functions as a 
norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, 
that is, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, 
the power to produce -  demarcate, circulate, differentiate -  the bodies it 
controls. (Butler, 1993, p.l)
Reading gender as “the social construction of sex” (Butler, 1993, p.5), Butler goes on
to explain that “if there is no access to this ‘sex’ except by means of its construction,
then it appears not only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that ‘sex’ becomes
something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a prelinguistic
site to which there is no direct access” (Butler, 1993, p.5). In Written on the Body,
the ‘normative’ category of sex, and by extension gender, has been abandoned: there
are no clear points of reference from which the reader can construct a reading of the
narrator as a gendered being, despite Butler’s claim that “the subject, the speaking
‘I,’ is formed by virtue of having gone through such a process of assuming a sex”
(Butler, 1993, p.3). The I-narrator of Written on the Body has been deliberately
constructed by Winterson: “the narrator has no name, is assigned no gender, is age
unspecified, and highly unreliable. I wanted to see how much information I could
leave out - especially the kind of character information that is routine - and still hold
ft sfory together” (Books). In the case of Written on the Body, the subject is formed
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by not assuming a sex; in fact, this is the most distinguishing aspect of the narrator. 
When Butler argues that there is “a linking of this process of ‘assuming’ a sex with 
the question of identification” (Butler, 1993, p.3), this is quite right. The narrator’s 
non-sex and lack of identification paradoxically become his/her identification. 
Countless reviews and articles discuss and, indeed, focus upon, the novel’s 
“ungendered, unnamed narrator” (Gilmore, 2001, p. 123).
The narrator falls into a category that Butler labels “those abjected beings 
who do not appear properly gendered” (Butler, 1993, p.8). Although Butler claims 
that such ‘beings’ find that “their very humanness ... comes into question” (Butler, 
1993, p.8), it is a curious fact that this is not the case in Written on the Body. 
Although many other novels such as Rose Tremain’s Sacred Country, Leslie 
Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues and Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex, have dealt with the 
dehumanising state of being ‘in-between’ genders, Written on the Body avoids this 
issue, presumably because the narrator is not ungendered in the view of the other 
characters.791 would argue that the self-awareness of the narrator indicates that 
he/she is not ungendered within his/her own eyes, either, as he/she deliberately plays 
narrative games. The narrator is characterised through his/her unreliability, through 
the use of circularity, rewriting and a discussion of language. The narrator 
acknowledges his/her failings, and points them out to the reader, responding to 
his/her version of events by admitting that “my syntax has fallen prey to the deceit” 
{WB, p. 15). He/she alludes to a previous disregard for truth when describing his/her 
secret relationship with a previous girlfriend: “[t]elling the truth ... was a luxury we 
could not afford and so lying became a virtue, an economy we had to practise.
79 In Sacred Country, Mary/Martin is attacked by her father and called “an abomination” (SC, p. 102); 
Jess in Stone Butch Blues battles against the common view of her as “twisted and sick” (SBB, p. 178); 
Middlesex's Cal is beaten up and branded a “fucking freak” (Mid, p.476).
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Telling the truth was hurtful and so lying became a good deed” (WB, p. 16). In fact, 
lying becomes their ‘truth’.
‘Truth’ and ‘Lies’ can be regarded as what Cixous would call “dual, 
hierarchical oppositions” (Cixous, 1986, p.64); a division into “Superior/Inferior” 
(Cixous, 1986, p.64) as a result of thought “always work[ing] through opposition ... 
where a law organizes what is thinkable by” (Cixous, 1986, p.63). Cixous goes on to 
ask, “[i]s the fact that Logocentrism subjects thought -  all concepts, codes and values 
-  to a binary system, related to ‘the’ couple, man/woman?” (Cixous, 1986, p.64). If 
the answer to this question is yes, then Winterson’s decision to invert truth and lies 
becomes highly significant in light of her decision to disrupt the man/woman binary 
through the adoption of a ‘genderless’ narrator. In 1994, Winterson published a novel 
entitled Art & Lies: the title positions ‘art’ as synonymous with ‘truth’, despite 
Winterson’s claims that “I did not put my life into Art & Lies, as people commonly
finunderstand the artist at work, but I have put Art & Lies into my life” (AO, p. 160). A 
year later, she published Art Objects. Two different texts, Art & Lies and Art Objects: 
one representing fiction, the other ‘truth’, the similar titles further blur the boundaries 
between ‘art’ and Ties’ (or perhaps art objects and lies), and undermine the concept 
of binaries. Foucault states that “[p]ower is essentially what dictates its law to sex. 
Which means ... that sex is placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, 
permitted and forbidden” (Foucault, 1979, p.83). There is no such system in place in 
Written on the Body: the narrator’s relationships with men and women are equally 
(in)visible. When the narrator of Written on the Body draws attention to his/her 
manipulation of language, he/she also alerts the reader to the possibility that
80 Art & Lies is a novel that again questions gender roles, by reinterpreting Picasso: Winterson’s aim is 
to “take the most famous painter of the twentieth century and re-gender him” (BA&L).
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language, like the binaries that apparently control it, cannot be relied upon for clarity,
and actually obfuscates complexities.
The power of language is most pronounced in the middle section of the book,
“The Cells, Tissues, Systems and Cavities of the Body” (WB, p.l 13). The narrator
has discovered that Louise has cancer, and tries to makes sense of this by entering
into an exploration of the body. Factual descriptions of the body vie with more poetic
interpretations as the narrator tries to find some kind of truth: “T h e  C l a v i c l e  is  a
LONG BONE WHICH HAS A BONY CURVE . . .  THE CLAVICLE PROVIDES THE ONLY BONY
LINK BETWEEN THE UPPER EXTREMITY AND THE AXIAL SKELETON. I Cannot th ink  o f  the
double curve lithe and flowing with movement as a bony ridge, I think of it as the
musical instrument that shares the same root. Clavis. Key. Clavichord” (WB, p. 129).
Christy L. Bums explains how Winterson is “pay[ing] tribute to Monique Wittig’s
erotic work Le Corps Lesbien, where one lover explores the inner places of her
lover’s body in a prose marked by split pronouns (f/e, translated as I) that signify the
narrator’s tom desire for and identification with her love” (Bums, 1996, p.297).
Bums argues that Le Corps Lesbien “reads like an extended and intensive version of
Winterson’s own prose section, as it presses on the link between the body and
language” (Bums, 1996, p.297). However, I believe that Winterson also highlights
the separation of body and language. Many of the texts I have examined in the thesis
focus on the way in which language is lacking. As Winterson describes the body, she
is describing a body far removed from Louise: the body of science. As the narrator
makes clear, science actually strips something away from people:
I can’t enter you in clothes that won’t show the stains, my hands full of tools 
to record and analyse. If I come to you with a torch and a notebook, a medical 
diagram and a cloth to mop up the mess, I’ll have you bagged neat and tidy. 
I’ll store you in plastic like chicken livers. Womb, gut, brain, neatly labelled 
and returned. Is that how to know another human being? (WB, p. 120)
206
The futility of science’s attempts to categorise — to know — the body is in evidence 
here, because in learning the facts, the individual is lost: “[f]rontal bone, palatine 
bones, nasal bones, lacrimal bones, cheek bones, maxilla, vomer, inferior conchae, 
mandible. Those are my shields, those are my blankets, those words don’t remind me 
of your face” {WB, p. 132). Thus, when the narrator declares “[y]ou are what I know” 
{WB, p. 120), this is a knowledge that science cannot achieve. A knowledge rooted in 
feelings and emotion.
Trying to defend his/her behaviour, the narrator wonders why he/she 
“collude [s] in this mis-use of language” {WB, p.56) and wishes he/she could 
“interpret [his/her] actions in plain English” {WB, p.56), but even so, he/she 
frequently disrupts the narrative with untruths, half-truths and games. The narrator 
twice claims that “[i]t’s the cliches that cause the trouble” {WB, p. 10/WB, p. 155), but 
later attributes this to someone else (“Louise once said, ‘It’s the cliches that cause the 
trouble’ [WB, p. 189]), thus raising the issue of authorship. The character “Gail 
Right” {WB, p. 142), a parody of the concept of Mr or Miss Right, the ‘perfect 
partner’, through her self-identified role as “a fat old slag” {WB, p. 149), tells the 
narrator “[t]he trouble with you...is that you want to live in a novel” {WB, p.160).81 
When the narrator later tries, and fails, to find Louise, his/her thoughts turn to the 
same thing: “I couldn’t find her. I couldn’t even get near finding her. It’s as if Louise 
never existed, like a character in a book. Did I invent her?” {WB, p. 189). This 
question, asked on the novel’s penultimate page, destabilises the preceding text by 
questioning the ‘reality’ of Louise, who is literally a fictional character. When Louise 
makes her reappearance on the next (last) page, even the narrator does not know
81 Winterson mentions the concept o f Mr/Miss right in Written on the Body: “[s]till waiting for Mr 
Right? Miss Right? And maybe all the little Rights?” (WB, p. 10). She also questions this notion in her 
novel, Boating for Beginners: ‘“I’ve never found the o n e Did the one exist, though? This was what 
Gloria wanted to know. Wasn’t it rather a fantasy o f romantic propaganda?” (BB, p.93).
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what to make of it, wondering if he/she has gone “stark mad” (WB, p. 190). He/she 
inverts what has gone before by stating that, although he/she does not “know if this is 
a happy ending” (WB, p. 190), the book’s end is actually “where the story starts”
(WB, p. 190). This is only to be expected. Written on the Body breaks down binary 
oppositions: true/false, fiction/autobiography, writer/narrator, beginning/end. This is 
part of a larger project -  the rejection of the male/female binary; a binary that is so 
entrenched in the language and culture that other binaries need to be attacked and 
dismantled in order to accommodate the enormity of this challenge.
‘The Hunters’
This challenge is also undertaken by Claire Messud, albeit in a less politicised way 
than Winterson. Almost ten years after Written on the Body first appeared, Claire 
Messud published The Hunters, a collection of two novellas: ‘A Simple Tale’ and 
‘The Hunters’. The limited critical notice that the collection has received has focused 
more on ‘The Hunters’. In a 2002 review in The Independent, Michael Arditti 
concentrated on his belief that Messud had “adopted the Jeanette Winterson 
technique of leaving [the] gender [of the narrator] unspecified”, concluding that it 
“adds little but obfuscation” (Arditti, 2002). Certainly, like Written on the Body, ‘The 
Hunters’ illuminates the failure of language when dealing with complex or undefined 
expressions of gender. When, in an interview with Messud, Rene Todd raised this 
issue (“he -  or she? The pronoun issue becomes a little troubling” [Todd, 2002, 
p.l 14]), Messud responded with agreement, highlighting the gap between the often 
competing requirements of grammar and clarity: “I know. That’s why I keep saying 
‘they.’ Even though I have in my mind my high school grammar teacher saying, ‘If it 
is singular, it cannot be they’” (Todd, 2002, p.l 14). The use of ‘they’ is necessary -  
although grammatically undesirable -  because of the absence of another suitable
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epicene pronoun: Anna Livia explains that “they has shown a dogged resistance to 
the attempts of conservative grammarians to eradicate it, while the various invented 
pronouns such as ne, nis, ner; ho, hom, hos; and shis, shim, shims, shimself exist only 
in the articles exhorting their use” (Livia, 2001, p.137).82 The failure of invented 
pronouns is attributable to a general distrust of anything that is perceived as a 
challenge to the two-gender system.
The Authority of Absence
The narrator of ‘The Hunters’, as well as challenging the male/female gender binary, 
also challenges the notions of sexuality and humanness. An academic in an 
unfamiliar city (London), the narrator is alone despite the fact he/she “was, officially, 
to have had a companion” (Hunters, 2003, p.99). The narrator alludes to the break-up 
of a romantic relationship with the companion, the most significant aspect of which 
is that the reader is not told whether said companion is male or female. By the end of 
the novella, the narrator has “met someone new -  or rather, had met again someone 
whom I had previously, if only vaguely, known, in a different context and in a 
different way ... [w]e were living together” (Hunters, 2003, p. 145). Like the 
‘companion’ from earlier, this new person’s gender is also obscured, although the 
narrator does state that: “[t]his person was not of the same age, nor even o f the same 
gender, as the previous lover who had so bitterly and yet blithely gutted my life” 
(Hunters, 2003, p. 145, my einphasis).
82 One, which “is used in official documents in preference to generic he or singular they” (Livia, 2001, 
p. 135) is perhaps too formal for this context.
83 As I have previously mentioned, the idea of using “new gender-neutral singular pronouns such as 
tey to replace she and he” (Romaine, 1999, p. 105) suggests an otherness far removed from ‘he’ or 
‘she’. Romaine believes that “pronouns are used to represent not just anatomy, but a complex and 
varying concept of oneself as a gendered person” (Romaine, 1999, p.47). As we shall see, there is a 
correlation between the use of a standard pronoun (‘he’ or ‘she’) to describe somebody and the 
perception of that person as human.
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The narrator expresses discomfort at the “novelty” of the relationship and the 
way “it altered me in ways I had not imagined possible” (Hunters, 2003, p. 145), 
hinting at the connection between sexuality and identity that is explored throughout 
the text. Although it is described as “love at first sight”, the narrator admits his/her 
surprise at having such feelings “for a soul cloaked in that unexpected body, so 
thoroughly other from my former predilections” (Hunters, 2003, p. 146), and asks, 
“who, ever, could have envisaged me in such posture, with such a person? Not I, 
who could not even have wished for it” (Hunters, 2003, p. 167). Michael Arditti, 
already unconvinced of the merits of a gender-unspecified narrator, is further 
unimpressed with the introduction of the gender-unspecified “beloved” (Hunters, 
p. 167), regarding the usage as “doubly alienating” (Arditti, 2002). It is true that the 
use of characters of unspecified gender makes the reading process difficult, if only 
because it keeps stripping away the expected markers through which a reader would 
normally construct a sense of ‘self for the narrator.84 
In Differance, Derrida says,
one puts into question the authority of presence, or of its simple symmetrical 
opposite, absence, or lack. Thus one questions the limit that has always 
constrained us, still constrains us -  as inhabitants of a language and a system 
of thought -  to formulate the meaning of Being in general as presence or 
absence, in the categories of being or beingness. (Derrida, 1991, p.62)
Writing from within a system where “[s]ex, gender, sexuality [are] three terms whose
usage relations and analytical relations are almost irremediably slippery” (Sedgwick,
1991, p.27), the very language fails us. Messud uses ‘they’ to describe the narrator,
even though “[i]f it is singular, it cannot be they” (Todd, 2002, p.l 14) because there
is no appropriate singular pronoun that refers to an ungendered person -  the language
84 Describing her process of reading, Lynne Pearce explains that her involvement in a text is “very 
much mediated through characters to whom I related” (Pearce, 1998, p.32). Such a relationship 
between reader and character is tested if it is impossible to determine even the most basic facts about 
the character. In the case of Written on the Body and ‘The Hunters’, the narrators are only visible via 
their refusal to provide identity information.
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does not exist, therefore there are inadequate terms through which to discuss the
characters of ‘The Hunters’, and language can only render the de-gendered
inanimate. Language controls and limits the ways identity is defined and understood:
[t]he sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself, the present 
thing, ‘thing’ here standing equally for meaning or referent. The sign 
represents the present in its absence. It takes the place of the present. When 
we cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, when 
the present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the 
sign. (Derrida, 1991, p.61).
If there is no sign -  or an inadequate sign -  then we are forced to compromise, to use
the next best sign. In discussing ‘The Hunters’, I have had to make decisions
regarding how to refer to the narrator. The lack of a suitable pronoun has led me to
use he/she, as was the case when discussing Written on the Body. This is
aesthetically unpleasing, and suggests an adherence to the male/female binary that I
am not wholly comfortable with. Cixous has remarked that “[t]hought has always
worked through opposition. Speaking/writing. Parole/Ecriture High/Low. Through
dual, hierarchical oppositions. Superior/Inferior” (Cixous, 1986, p.64). By using
he/she to refer to the narrators, the notion of opposition falls apart: the narrator is
both male and female, superior and inferior, and here I am invoking Cixous’s notion
of bisexuality, “the location within oneself of the presence of both sexes” (Cixous,
1986, p.85). I have, to use Derrida, gone through the detour of the sign. However,
this is not strictly true - the sign has taken me on a detour, forced me to use the words
that come closest to expressing what I want to say, while not maintaining the
precision I would like.
When Rene Todd suggested that Messud had “specifically cho[sen] not to
reveal the narrator’s gender” (Todd, 2002, p.l 13), Messud refuted this claim:
[i]t’s sort of too bad about that - 1 feel that people end up seeing that as the 
main intention of the piece. It’s the first thing people think or ask -  it 
becomes a big preoccupation. And in fact, that was not what I set out to do. I
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heard this voice -  it was very explicit. I had nearly finished the first draft 
when I realized that this person had not disclosed any gender. (Messud, cited 
in Todd, 2002, p. 113)
Winterson struggled to construct a ‘genderless’ narrator, at one point losing her grip
on the language she used, as we have seen, but Messud is attributing her genderless
narrator to an accident of writing, while asserting that as a writer, she has been able
to escape the hegemonic constraints of binary oppositions.85 This idea is especially
difficult to credit when taking in to consideration the careful way that Messud
manipulated language to avoid using gendered pronouns while discussing the
narrator with Todd:
[t]he character is many things, but above all, in the way of voyeurs, is 
someone who does not want to be revealed. And yet, of course, the narrator 
reveals a lot about the selfdespite that. Gender seemed to be exactly the sort 
of thing that this person would withhold, thinking that it would keep them 
mysterious, when in fact we see more profound things about them, deeper 
things, very clearly, just from the things that this person says ... a lot of 
people have a problem with the narrator because it is such a not-nice person. 
(Messud, cited in Todd, 2002, p.l 13, my emphasis)
The fact that Messud uses several ungendered characters in her novella undermines
her claims that this is unintentional. When there are several characters being
discussed, each of whom has to be discussed through the ‘he/she’ term, the
legitimacy of ‘he/she’ is further undermined. In the context of Written on the Body,
Gilmore describes bisexuality as a “nonidentifying answer to the question of gender”
(Gilmore, 1997, p.235). I have already outlined an explanation for the apparent
bisexuality of the narrator of Written on the Body -  Winterson is trying to underline
the fictiveness of the apparent autobiography of her novel by departing from the facts
of her own life. However, ‘The Hunters’ hints at another explanation.
Bisexuality
85 In a review of ‘The Hunters’ Michiko Kakutani emphasises the effort that has gone into it, 
describing it as both a “carefully crafted tale” and “a masterly exercise in craft” (Kakutani, 2001).
212
Bemauer and Mahon describe as one of “the major concerns of [Foucault’s] work ...
how the truth of our sexuality became the hallmark of our true selves” (Bemauer and
Mahon, 1994, p. 149), and argue that
[t]he capacity of sexual desire to become the most revealing sign of our 
truest, deepest selves depends upon a long historical formation through which 
we were constituted as subjects in a special relation to truth and sex. 
(Bemauer and Mahon, 1994, p. 150)
However, they do not take this as far as Judith Butler in Gender Trouble, who argues
that “the ‘unity’ of gender is the effect of a regulatory practice that seeks to render
gender identity uniform through a compulsory heterosexuality” (Butler, 1999, p.42).
Conversely, though, she also claims that “not all gender identification is based on the
successful implementation of the taboo against homosexuality” (Butler, 1999, p.81),
arguing that “[i]f feminine and masculine dispositions are the result of the effective
internalization of that taboo ... then gender identity appears primarily to be the
internalization of a prohibition that proves to be formative of identity” (Butler, 1999,
p.81). Therefore, sexuality is rendered uniform (either heterosexual or homosexual,
but not a conflation of the two) by the “constant application” either of “compulsory
heterosexuality” or the “internalization of [the homosexual] taboo” (Butler, 1999,
p.81).
Butler’s reading offers no space for a bisexual identity; indeed, she describes 
bisexuality as “not a possibility beyond culture, but a concrete cultural possibility 
that is refused and redescribed as impossible” (Butler, 1999, p.98). From this, she 
posits that “[n]ot to have social recognition as an effective heterosexual is to lose one 
possible social identity and perhaps to gain one that is radically less sanctioned. The 
‘unthinkable’ is thus fully within culture, but fully excluded from dominant culture” 
(Butler, 1999, p.99). In Bodies that Matter, which Butler presents “in part as a
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rethinking of some parts of Gender Trouble” (Butler, 1993, p.xii), she appears to be
more open to the explanation of bisexual identity:
the subject, the speaking ‘I,’ is formed by virtue of having gone through such 
a process of assuming a sex.. .linking this process of ‘assuming’ a sex with 
the question of identification, and with the discursive means by which the 
heterosexual imperative enables certain sexed identifications and forecloses 
and/or disavows other identifications. (Butler, 1993, p.3)
However, she again calls attention to heterosexuality as the dominant state, ignoring
the impact of different identities:
the regime of heterosexuality operates to circumscribe and contour the 
‘materiality’ of sex, and that ‘materiality’ is formed and sustained through 
and as a materialization of regulatory norms that are in part those of 
heterosexual hegemony. (Butler, 1993, p.15)86
Through her reading of Freud’s ‘The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego-Ideal)’ it is
possible to understand why Butler reads (or fails to read) bisexuality as she does:
“[t]he conceptualization of bisexuality in terms of dispositions, feminine and
masculine, which have heterosexual aims as their intentional correlates, suggests that
for Freud bisexuality is the coincidence o f two heterosexual desires within a single
psyche” (Butler, 1999, p.77). By reducing bisexuality to “two heterosexual desires
within a single psyche” (Butler, 1999, p.77), Butler is reading bisexuality through the
lens of “compulsory heterosexuality” (Butler, 1999, p.42) that she finds so troubling
in Gender Trouble. Cixous’s understanding of bisexuality (“the location within
oneself of the presence of both sexes” [Cixous, 1986, p.85]) does at least allow space
for an element of homosexual desire in a way that Freud’s does not. Freud’s reading
displaces homosexuality, and posits bisexuality as a doubling of heterosexuality,
while Cixous allows the possibility of homosexuality without explicitly articulating
it.
86 Leigh Gilmore suggests that in autobiography, the “discourse on identity is saturated in a 
presumptive heterosexism that construes heterosexuality as the unmarked category of sexuality, that 
is, as a synonym for sexuality” (Gilmore, 1997, p.228).
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Sedgwick states that “[i]t is certainly true that without a concept of gender 
there could be, quite simply, no concept of homo- or heterosexuality” (Sedgwick, 
1991, p.31). If the narrators of Written on the Body and ‘The Hunters’ had 
relationships with members of only one sex, they could be read as heterosexual (the 
“dominant” [Butler, 1999, p.99] reading) or homosexual. Of course, Winterson’s 
identification as a lesbian author brings into question even the concept of dominant 
readings. Denying attempts to apply gendered readings to the narrators via the lens of 
sexuality challenges the notion of identity. What is at stake is not just the way in 
which gender and sexuality co-exist, but the very reading of the narrators as human. 
This relates back to Butler’s designation of “those abjected beings who do not appear 
properly gendered” (Butler, 1993, p.8). Butler’s terms owe a debt to Kristeva’s 
notions of the abject. Of particular interest here is Kristeva’s belief that “[i]t is thus 
not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, 
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4). 
Fear of the disintegration of the sex-gender-identity order and the abjection it appears 
to threaten is why, as with Written on the Body, so many reviewers feel the necessity 
to impose either a male or female identity on the narrator. Miranda Seymour argues 
that
[t]he American narrator, although specifically genderless, appears to be male. 
(The voice is mildly arch; he can contemplate an evening cruising with a gay 
colleague; his second partner, said to be of a different sex than the first, is 
briefly depicted in what sounds to be a female pose.) (Seymour, 2001, p.2)
Far more troubling than the people who explain why they believe the narrators to be
male or female (and it all comes back to male or female -  there is no other possible
reading acknowledged) are the people who do not even offer a justification for their
reading; the readers who do not even realise how they have manipulated the text to
fit their own world view. Amanda Craig, for example, reads the narrator as male:
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“his intelligence, his wit, his inventiveness all build an edifice of supposition and 
fear” (Craig, 2002, my emphasis). In contrast, James Bradley describes the narrator 
as “an American academic on a working holiday in London. Enclosed in her work 
and a crisis in her personal life” (Bradley, 2002, my emphasis). It should be noted 
that while the female critic reads the narrator as male, the male narrator reads the 
narrator as female: perhaps neither critic wishes their sex to be held responsible for 
the delusions of the narrator. A perfect example of the manipulation of information 
appears in ‘The Hunters’:
‘You’re a professor, aren’t you?’
I winced. ‘How did you know? Did Sheila Cooke say so?’
‘I don’t know Sheila. She’s not upstairs, because upstairs is empty. No, we 
know from the post, of course. On the table downstairs. The postman leaves 
the post on the table downstairs.’
‘Of course he does.’ I tried, again, to smile.
‘Postwoman, actually. She.’ (Hunters, p. 108)
Messud plays with the confusion of ‘postman’ denoting a woman: the language is
perceived as inadequate to define the job in relation to a woman, so a new, but
unsatisfactory term is used, “postwoman” (Hunters, p. 108), which draws attention to
her female status. ‘Postperson’ is never used, nor suggested. ‘Postman’ is regarded as
all-encompassing until the narrator makes the mistake of reading ‘man’ literally.
When Ridley corrects this, she cannot use ‘person’ because it is not specific enough.
The need to be understood overrides the desire to be politically correct. In this same
passage, the information that the narrator is a professor does not tell us whether
he/she is male or female, and this actually highlights a crucial difference between
Written on the Body and ‘The Hunters’: in Written on the Body, Winterson creates a
doubly-gendered character, but in ‘The Hunters’, Messud avoids language that
specifically invokes male or female stereotypes, so that the narrator is ‘de-gendered’.
Messud and Winterson challenge the notion of humanity in an apparently
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‘ungendered’ space, and this is something that Messud further develops with the 
character of Ridley Wandor. The rest of the novella focuses on the narrator’s 
concerted attempts to strip her of her gender, specifically by drawing attention to the 
(allegedly) unsuccessful aspects of her performance.
Ridley Wandor
The name ‘Ridley Wandor’ gives no clue to the gender of this character. When the 
narrator’s evening meal is interrupted by a knock at the door and the words “It’s 
Ridley Wandor, your downstairs neighbour” (Hunters, 2003, p. 105), both narrator 
and reader are unable to place the speaker in a gender category. When Ridley’s 
outline is seen in the darkened hallway, the narrator describes her “significant, 
ungendered bulk” (Hunters, p. 104). By refusing to accept that Ridley is a woman, the 
narrator is also stripping Ridley of her humanity. To the narrator, Ridley appears as 
no more than a “creature” (Hunters, p. 105), but when he/she is finally able to see 
Ridley properly, the narrator is tom between reaffirming Ridley’s genderlessness and 
attacking any hints of femininity. Specifically, the colour of Ridley’s nails comes 
under scmtiny because it marks Ridley as both female and potentially sexual: “a 
pearly shell-pink which on other fingers might have been alluring in its suggestive 
discretion but which, on Ridley Wandor, was offensive and grotesque” (Hunters,
p. 106).
As I have argued, the narrator of Written on the Body gqins a form pf 
identification through his or her lack of identifying markers, and the narrator of ‘The 
Hunters’ imposes this lack upon Ridley: “the ugliness of [her face] resided not in any 
tangible, and hence admirable, disgrace, but in the lack that it represented -  lack of 
color, lack of distinction, lack of features” (Hunters, p. 107). The narrator makes it
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clear that it is through this lack that Ridley’s identity, such as it is, is formed: “I 
could not have described her in any way other than by what she did not have, for all I 
could not have put an age, nor barely, a gender upon her; for all she seemed more 
emphatically not to be than I did, I knew her for the stronger” (Hunters, p.l 10). The 
narrator claims that Ridley “did not call out to be looked at but rather she called out 
to be ignored’ (Hunters, p. 107), an illogical and oxymoronic statement in the sense 
that calling out at once negates the possibility of being ignored, and one that calls 
into question the reliability of the narrator.
After several days pass without seeing Ridley, the narrator is able to convince 
him/herself “that Ridley Wandor had been but a figment, an unfortunate 
hallucination of my overly tired mind” (Hunters, p.l 10). However, he/she soon 
encounters the hated neighbour once again, in the street. Too repulsed by Ridley to 
look directly at her, the narrator avoids her gaze: “I kept my eyes on the central navy 
stripe of her soiled pink and blue shell suit” (Hunters, p.l 11). In doing this, the 
narrator almost fails to register the evidence of Ridley’s body, admitting that “[i]t did 
not immediately occur to me that the amorphous expanse on which I trained my gaze 
was, in fact, her bosom” (Hunters, p.l 11). The issue here is not the disassociation of 
gender and anatomy -  although this is certainly in evidence: by denying Ridley is a 
woman, the narrator has also denied Ridley’s anatomy. However, it is the (belated) 
realisation of this connection that causes the narrator’s embarrassment: “I felt my 
face color from the roots of my hair” (Hunters, p.l 11). His/her staring has placed 
Ridley in the role of sexual object, and him/herself as voyeur.
When Ridley tells the narrator about her friend Terrence, claiming that “he 
has something of a thing for me” (Hunters, p. 153), the narrator is disgusted by the 
“red[ness] and huffing and tittering” (Hunters, p. 153) that accompanies this remark.
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Unable to cope with the idea of Ridley’s sexuality, the narrator is repulsed: “I found
more than ever that I could not look at her” (Hunters, p. 153). His/her voyeurism fails
here not only because he/she does not wish to be perceived as attracted to Ridley, but
because he/she cannot bear to think of Ridley as being attractive to anybody else. In
order to remain composed, the narrator denies the reality that Ridley presents to
him/her: “I thought of [Terrence] as a creation of Ridley Wandor’s (just as she was,
at that stage, only my creation to me) ... Not that I didn’t believe the man existed, but
that I did not believe in her relationship with him” (Hunters, p. 153).
Even when Ridley produces a photograph of herself with Terrence, the
narrator dismisses their relationship:
what did that say or prove of the man in question, but that he was at least 
moderately polite and had acceded to her request for a deathside souvenir 
snap? She described him as her new friend; next to whom I -  who barely 
knew the woman and could not bear her -  apparently qualified as an old 
friend.. .and had she not said that she wanted a similar photograph of me for 
her files? For the doctored autobiography, that is. (Hunters, p. 154)
In one of his/her final meetings with Ridley, the narrator notices that she is “dressed
up, more so than I had ever seen her” (Hunters, p. 158). Echoing their first meeting,
the narrator again notices Ridley’s “perfectly manicured [hands] -  their talons an
unexpected and inescapable vermillion” (Hunters, p. 158). Once again, the narrator is
disturbed by the reinforcement of Ridley-as-woman and tries to destroy it by
conjuring up the animal imagery of “talons” (Hunters, p. 158) and thus detracting
from the idea of Ridley-as-human. In addition, the narrator attacks Ridley’s attempts
to make herself attractive:
[s]he did not have a face that lent itself to maquillage, given that her only 
distinguished feature was the great chin; and the effect, thus, of the kohl and 
creams and shadows was, to my horrified eye, clownishly grotesque, as if her 
eyes had been smeared with soot and her lips with rust-flecked grease. 
(Hunters, p. 158)
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In a reversal of the previous ‘relationship’ between the narrator and Ridley, it is the 
narrator who starts asking questions about Ridley: “[w]here are you off to? ... a 
lunch engagement perhaps?” (Hunters, p. 159). The narrator’s suggestion that Ridley 
might be meeting Terrence causes panic: “[p]lease, no, please, shush ... It’s a very 
thin door, really. Please don’t do this to me. Please. [Mother] may be right there. 
Listening” (Hunters, p. 159). Ridley couples this plea with “a look of such genuine 
distress, of frank misery washed with -  it was unmistakeable -  fear” (Hunters, 
p. 159). The narrator is shaken by Ridley’s fear, not out of any concern for Ridley, 
but because “it rendered [her] unfortunate physiognomy almost, flickeringly, 
loveable; it certainly had the undesired and complicating effect of rendering her fully 
human” (Hunters, p. 160). Ridley’s humanness is undesired because of the narrator’s 
hatred of her, but it is complicating because of the way it means that the narrator has 
to “reconstruct and reconstrue” (Hunters, p. 159) his/her notion of Ridley, something 
that is developed by the novella’s ending. Here, the narrator is reconstructed as a 
god-like figure. He/she creates and defines Ridley and Ridley’s imagined world 
through language, attributing to her a monstrousness that, in fact, may not even exist. 
When Ridley displays her more human qualities, the narrator’s mastery of the 
narrative is challenged; the language is under threat.
Some months later, the narrator discovers that Ridley has died: “[t]hey found 
her body. Fully clothed, in a ditch at the foot of a bluff in the Lake District”
(Hunters, p. 172). When the narrator’s former neighbour, Mrs Lynch, discusses the 
mysterious death, and suggests that Ridley may have killed herself, the narrator steps 
in and dismisses such thoughts as “pure speculation” (Hunters, p. 175). For the 
narrator, his/her beloved, and Mrs Lynch, the “protagonists [of Ridley’s story] were 
made only of words, not flesh” (Hunters, p. 172): despite the narrator’s glimpse of the
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humanity of Ridley, he/she has elected to return to the story that he/she has 
constructed: one where Ridley is nothing more than “the idle mind’s invention of a 
bleak and lonely summer, a summer that in itself had all but ceased to exist”
(Hunters, p. 181). The narrator him/herself speculates that Ridley might have been 
murdered by Terrence, and even constructs a story in his/her mind to explain 
Ridley’s final moments, but he/she admits this was “done to assuage my own guilt” 
(Hunters, p. 180); a guilt borne of his/her failure to regard Ridley as human, and 
his/her desire that Ridley “would not be. That she would simply vanish ... Poof. 
Gone” (Hunters, p.180).87 The novella concludes with the narrator admitting that 
he/she and his/her beloved “have never mentioned [Ridley] since ... because it is all 
but a story to us -  was it ever anything but a story to me? -  and one not ripe for 
retelling because its ending cannot satisfy. Because I’m guilty” (Hunters, p. 181). 
Although the narrator is able to acknowledge that he/she manipulated Ridley’s life 
into a ‘story’, he/she cannot allow him/herself to view Ridley as a person for fear of 
fracturing his/her own narrative. Ultimately, the narrator asserts his/her own 
narrative authority by allowing his/her story to be told. Although the narrator allows 
for the possibility that his/her narrative is not accurate, he/she only allows Ridley to 
speak -  indeed, to exist -  through him/her. Messud uses Ridley as a mirror of the 
narrator, reflecting back his/her own self-loathing and ‘genderless’ status (“part of 
the project was to get into the mindset of a character who is projecting or wanting or 
in some way engaging with the story of somebody else’s life” (Todd, 2002, p.l 13])
87 The narrator’s wish that Ridley would vanish masks a more sinister undertone: the suggestion that 
Ridley should not be allowed to continue to exist because her humanness is in question. Returning 
briefly to Kristeva’s notion of what causes abjection “[w]hat does not respect borders, positions, 
rules” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4), it is clear that Ridley’s intrusive nature at the beginning of the narrative is 
what sparks the narrator’s hatred: “[s]he came in ... I did not want her in my kitchen .. .Even when 
she had gone, it was as if she were still in the room” (Hunters, pp. 105,109). Despite the narrator’s 
attempts to avoid Ridley, to stop Ridley intruding on his/her life, Ridley cannot be avoided: “the 
assault of the doorbell, which had so set me to trembling, was but the first o f many such assaults” 
(Hunters, p. 109).
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but this is a distorted mirror that refuses to reflect Ridley’s gender or happiness back 
upon the narrator.
By utilising a genderless narrator, Winterson is arguing that the labels ‘male’ 
and ‘female’ are inadequate to express identity, and furthering Angela Carter’s work 
in The Passion o f New Eve by expressing one way in which fiction can try to exist 
outside of the gender binary.88 Claire Messud has rejected the idea that her own 
experimentations were deliberate. Nevertheless, her work also highlights the 
inadequacy of the gender binary. By using a number of ungendered characters in 
‘The Hunters’, Messud strips the text of the normal referents through which 
characters are usually understood, which forces the reader to find new ways to think 
about fiction. Winterson and Messud have revealed the inadequacy of language; they 
are not just “work[ing] towards new combinations of language” (AO, p.76), but also 
new combinations of gender.
88 In the absence of the gender referents of ‘male’ or ‘female’, the (monstrous) abject is the only lens 
through which “beings who do not appear properly gendered” (Butler, 1993, p. 8) can be read. David 
Williams explains “[t]he mediaeval concept of the monstrous as a deformation necessary for human 
understanding” (Williams, 1996, p.3), but in the context of Written on the Body and ‘The Hunters’, the 
monstrous detracts from the ability to read the narrators as human. What is illuminated is the 
relationship between language and the monstrous: “[t]he language o f the monstrous is parasitic, 
depending on the existence of conventional language; it feeds, so to speak, at their margins, upon their 
limits, so as to gain the power to transcend these analytic discourses and, true to its etymology 
(monstrare: to show), it points to utterances that lie beyond logic” (Williams, 1996, p. 10). The 
monstrous exists where there is no appropriate language.
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C o n c l u sio n
No age can ever have been as stridently sex-conscious as our own. (Woolf, 
2004, p.114)
*
Writing in 1929, Virginia Woolf could not have predicted that society would remain
as sex- and gender-conscious as ever. Attitudes to sex and gender have changed over
the last eighty years, and developments in science have pushed the boundaries of
what ‘male’ and ‘female’ means, but the failure of language to develop at the same
rate means that any form of gender expression that exists outside of the male/female
gender binary is still rendered ultimately unthinkable. In the twenty-first century
there has been a plethora of works on gender, from theory to television
documentaries and films, which has sought to understand and unpick gender. While
this illustrates the continued fascination that society has for gender, it has not
resulted in greater freedom of gender choice.
Polly Toynbee argues that the policing of gender begins
in infancy, when little girls learn where they belong as soon as they draw 
their first breath. The pink disease is far worse than it was 20 years ago. 
‘Princess on board’, read the yukky signs in family cars. It’s almost 
impossible to buy toys now that are not putridly pink branded or aggressively 
superhero male. Bikes, sleeping bags, lunch boxes, nothing is neutral now, 
everything Barbie and Bratz. (Toynbee, 2008)
The perceived worsening of the ‘pink disease’ can be attributed to increased gender
awareness. Nothing is neutral, because neutrality will not protect the male/female
binary. As I have noted in chapter two, Cal in Middlesex states that “[njormality
wasn’t normal. It couldn’t be. If normality were normal, everybody could leave it
alone. They could sit back and let normality manifest itself’ (Mid, p.446). The fear
that normality might not be normal drives society to aggressively divide people into
male and female. From birth, doctors impose the labels of male and female upon
babies, and strive to protect the binary by intervening if there is any doubt as to the
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child’s sex. The gender of the baby will not even be considered; a biologically male 
baby will be assumed to have a male gender, and a biologically female baby will be 
assumed to have a female gender. Male will automatically be read as masculine, 
female as feminine. Having decided what ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ mean in the 
context of sex, gender and sexuality, doctors try to protect these terms in the way 
they deny or acquiesce to requests for treatment to modify the body. This 
demonstrates a perception within society that there are right and wrong ways of 
‘doing’ gender and sex, as Butler first pointed out in Gender Trouble: “the very 
thinking of what is possible in gendered life is foreclosed by certain habitual and 
violent presumptions” (Butler, 1999, p.viii). The endless promotion within the media 
of what is regarded as appropriate behaviours and appearances then reinforces this 
message.
The control that doctors have, as clearly articulated in the novels examined in
chapter two, has been made explicit in the media treatment of the current real-life
case of Thomas Beatie, a transgender man who, in March 2008, revealed that he was
pregnant as the result of artificial insemination. Beatie “underwent a sex change,
which involved regular injections of testosterone, and having his breasts surgically
removed (but keeping his female reproductive organs) and legally became a man”
(Barkham, 2008).Highlighting the power that doctors wield, Beatie has described
how his failure to fit into preconceived notions of ‘normality’ and maleness has
affected the level of medical care he has been able to access:
Doctors have discriminated against us, turning us away due to their religious 
beliefs. Health care professionals have refused to call me by a male pronoun 
or recognize Nancy as my wife. Receptionists have laughed at us ... The first 
doctor we approached was a reproductive endocrinologist. He was shocked
ftQby our situation and told me to shave my facial hair. After a $300
89 William Leith argues that the request for Beatie to shave “sounds like an appalling reaction. But you 
can see the doctor’s point of view” (Leith, 2008). The view is, of course, that one should not present
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consultation, he reluctantly performed my initial checkups. He then required 
us to see the clinic’s psychologist to see if we were fit to bring a child into 
this world and consulted with the ethics board of his hospital. A few months 
and a couple thousand dollars later, he told us that he would no longer treat 
us, saying he and his staff felt uncomfortable working with ‘someone like 
me.’ In total, nine different doctors have been involved. (Beatie, 2008)
The doctor currently overseeing Beatie’s pregnancy is Dr Kimberly James. In an
appearance on Oprah, Dr James highlighted the way in which even she struggles
with the way that Beatie’s pregnancy place ideas of normality under question: “it’s a
challenge to your thinking of what’s ‘normal’ .. .once you get past that part and just
focus on the pregnancy ... of course this is challenging ... people’s normal
perceptions are going to be challenged” {Oprah, 2008). In part, the prejudice that
Beatie has faced comes from the unwillingness of doctors (and media commentators)
to separate Beatie’s female past and male present. In an article in The Times, Rod
Liddle counters Beatie’s excitement at the birth by suggesting that “[ejveryone else
feels just a tiny bit queasy” (Liddle, 2008). Likewise, William Leith, writing in The
Telegraph, admits that
I found the whole concept deeply disturbing. Lots of people do. The other 
day, commenting on this case, a gay comedian said, ‘I’m not saying it’s 
weird, but even the stork threw up.’ That was, more or less, how I felt. A 
pregnant man? Dear God. I thought it might be a hoax. I hoped it was a hoax. 
But why? What was my reaction based on? (Leith, 2008)
Dismissing the idea that his prejudices might just be that -  prejudices with no
rational basis -  Leith seeks to normalise his reaction. As with Liddle’s reference to
“[ejveryone else” (Liddle, 2008), Leith’s feelings are presented as not unreasonable
because “[ljots of people” (Leith, 2008) share them. More importantly for Leith, his
feelings are also shared by “a gay comedian” (Leith, 2008, my emphasis). In
specifically identifying the comedian as gay, Leith is trying to portray the Beatie
as male and desire pregnancy at the same time, because such an occurrence goes against all ideas of 
pregnancy as an unambiguously female condition.
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pregnancy as repugnant even to somebody who is living outside accepted
heterosexual norms. The message is therefore clear: if the gay comedian, and by
extension the ‘gay community’, cannot accept Beatie, then how (or why) should the
‘straight community’?
Implicit in Leith’s article is the feeling that Beatie is not a ‘real’ man because
he has made the choice to get pregnant. For Leith, “there aren’t many things weirder
than being a pregnant man” (Leith, 2008). Faced with Beatie turning notions of
maleness and masculinity on their heads, Leith admits that, “[m]uch to my relief, it
turned out that he’d started life as a girl” (Leith, 2008). The expression of relief is of
vital importance, as it underpins the entire article: Leith is actually afraid that Beatie
is challenging what it means to ‘be’ a man. Leith goes on the offensive, mixing
pronouns in a bid to remind the reader that Beatie is not a ‘real’ man: “[he] felt that
he was actually a man trapped in a girl’s body. So he, or she, took a course of
testosterone and had an operation to remove his, or her, breasts” (Leith, 2008).
Liddle similarly mixes pronouns, but also deliberately deploys a flippant tone as a
means of protecting his own entrenched position:
Thomas is transgendered; his, or her, real name, or previous name, is Tracy 
Lagondino. But Tracy had certain surgical procedures done, a couple of swift 
hacks up top and a few injections of testosterone and lo, she is now Thomas. 
But clearly the doctors didn’t mess around too much with his womb. Her 
womb. Whatever. (Liddle, 2008)
The “whatever” tacked on the end illustrates Liddle’s apparent lack of interest in
Beatie’s identity. The real issue, for Liddle, is that Beatie must not be allowed to get
away with appropriating a male identity. Instead, Liddle is picking holes in this
identity as he dismisses Beatie’s claims to maleness as “a couple of swift hacks up
top and a few injections of testosterone” (Liddle, 2008). Leith is equally derisive,
describing Beatie as “[h]aving dragged himself across (he threshold of maleness”
226
(Leith, 2008), as though there are clear lines marking the difference between male
and female -  something that this thesis has clearly argued against again and again.
Hoping that Beatie was perpetrating a hoax, Leith turns his thoughts to
James Frey, who had also been a guest on Oprah when he wrote about his 
addictions to alcohol and crack. Frey, it turned out, had written stuff that 
wasn’t strictly true. Later he made another appearance on the Oprah show, 
this time to apologise. (Leith, 2008)
One cannot help but sense Leith’s desperate hope that Beatie, too, will be forced to
make a national apology -  this time for daring/to challenge maleness.
It is clear that Beatie’s critics regard him more as a woman who has taken
testosterone than as a man. The idea of giving birth to a child is fundamentally
incompatible with notions of maleness and masculinity, and so critics seek to
undermine Beatie’s male identity at every turn. Natalie Paris relates the fact that
Beatie “was encouraged to model by her dad and even became a Miss Hawaii Teen
USA finalist” (Paris, 2008), while a BBC article refers to “a thinly bearded Mr
Beatie” (BBC, 2008). The knowledge of Beatie’s past overshadows his attempts to
live as a man, and this is something that Chapter 2 demonstrates in its exploration of
the process of transition between the sexes. Leith raises the issue of “[njews
headlines about Beatie’s case invariably including] a couple of queasily sceptical
quote marks -  as in ‘“Pregnant” man appears on Oprah’” (Leith, 2008).90 Leith’s
primary complaint is that “those quote marks should actually be around the word
‘man’. His female reproductive organs are still intact; legally he’s a man, but
biologically, ip many ways that count, he’s still very much a woman” (Leith, 2008).
So, for Leith, when it comes to determining what makes a man, the “ways that
count” are reduced to the reproductive organs.
90 Leith makes the point that Beatie’s situation is so far removed from ‘normal’ conceptions of 
maleness as to be disgusting. The use o f quote marks around the word pregnant are themselves 
indicative of a belief that what Beatie is doing is too distasteful to warrant the name of pregnancy.
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This attitude is also visible in my discussion of Trumpet in chapter one. In 
spite of Joss’s efforts to hide his female past, it is exposed following his death. In the 
eyes of society, Joss’s male identity is overridden by his female body; his genitals 
become the only acceptable answer to the questions that surround his identity. After 
Joss dies, the doctor examines Joss’s genitals in order “to be quite certain” (Tr, p.44) 
that he is female, the funeral director finds himself “rummaging in the pubic hair”
{Tr, p. 109) in search of a penis, and Joss’s son, Colman, is obsessed with the idea 
that “[m]y father had tits. My father didn’t have a dick. My father had tits. My father 
had a pussy. My father didn’t have any balls” {Tr, p.61). The need to reduce Joss to 
his body parts can be seen as a strategy to protect the labels of ‘male’ and ‘female’, 
and ensure that the labels remain viable.
Discussing the issue of Beatie’s pregnancy with acquaintances, Leith reveals 
that “nobody seemed positive about the idea of male pregnancy. It mostly made them 
feel threatened” (Leith, 2008). Drawing parallels between Beatie’s case and the 1994 
film Junior, starring Arnold Schwarzenegger, he asks “why is Beatie’s situation so 
difficult to stomach?” (Leith, 2008).91 In my view, an equally important question is 
why Schwarzenegger’s pregnancy in Junior is so much easier to accept. The obvious 
answer is that Junior is fiction, and as fiction offers none of the ‘danger’ of a real-life 
transgression of gender boundaries. As fiction, Junior can be laughed at or 
dismissed. As reality, Thomas Beatie makes the seemingly impossible possible, 
challenging what it means to be male or female. But there is another element at work 
here. One of the major reasons for the viewing public’s acceptance of Junior is the 
presence of Sphwarzeneggpr himself. A five-tiipes Mr Universe winner, 
Schwarzenegger has carved a career out of playing excessively masculine figures,
91 Schwarzenegger plays the part of Dr Alex Hesse, a scientist who tests an experimental drug on 
himself and becomes pregnant.
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showcasing his hard-won physique and impressive physical strength. In short, 
Schwarzenegger is able to play a pregnant man without courting controversy because 
of his hyperbolically masculine persona: there is no doubt in the viewers’ minds that 
he is a ‘real’ man.
Leith states that male pregnancy “is not the mild threat of other gender- 
shuffling ideas -  concepts such as the house-husband, the male nanny, the female 
paratrooper, the female President of the United States. These things are a form of 
progress. Male pregnancy does not feel like progress. It feels threatening, and 
horrifying, and appalling” (Leith, 2008). But here we should ask ourselves why a 
male nanny is somehow less ‘frightening’ than a pregnant man. If we look at the 
examples of acceptable “gender-shuffling” (Leith, 2008) that Leith provides, they 
have something in common: the “house-husband, the male nanny, the female 
paratrooper, the female President of the United States” (Leith, 2008). Each example 
has some sort of gender signifier within it: house-husband, male nanny, etc. And this 
has a very specific effect in that it subtly polices gender. If we look at female 
paratrooper, the ‘female’ part of this concept alerts us to the fact that a female is 
undertaking a traditionally male role. ‘Paratrooper’ is understood to refer (almost) 
exclusively to males. The typical maleness of the role is made explicit, as is the 
femaleness of the person taking on this role.
There are links between this and the sort of gender-play that I refer to in 
chapter one. In Tipping the Velvet, Nan performs on the London stage. To make her 
act (male impersonation) more palatable to the audience, it is first necessary to make 
it obvious to all that she is a female taking on a male role, so that there can be no 
blurring of boundaries taking place wifhout the audience’s knowledge. This is related 
to something that I have already stated in chapter one, “the cardinal rule of gender [is
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that] one must be readable at a glance” (Halberstam, 1998, p.23). In a very real
sense, society perceives the most dangerous aspect of blurring gender boundaries as
when it goes undetected, and thus raises issues o f ‘truth’ and ‘realness’.
When Thomas Beatie announced that he was pregnant, he could not be easily
(safely) labelled. He looks like a man, and yet he is engaged in a process that is so
closely tied up with notions of womanhood. In almost every report of Beatie’s
pregnancy, reference is made to his wife, Nancy, and the reason that she is not
carrying their child: “[h]e conceived through donor sperm as Mrs Beatie was unable
to, having suffered endometriosis and undergone a hysterectomy” (Paris, 2008).
Interestingly, nobody questions Nancy’s right to call herself a woman in the absence
of womb, although most commentators seem to agree that Thomas’s womb renders
him female (or at least, not-male). Stephen Whittle points out that
[i]f we look at the origins of the word [‘man’], in Old English it refers to an 
adult male. The taxonomy of male is ‘that which begets offspring -  performs 
the fecundating function’. To fecundate is to render fruitful and productive. 
On that basis there are many human beings, infertile men, who are afforded 
membership of the legal group of ‘men’ but who are not ‘men’. Furthermore 
we need to consider whether the taxonomy afforded means that all people 
who do not perform the fecundatory role are therefore women. If you are not 
situated in one place are you necessarily situated in the other? (Whittle, 1999,
p.20).
The implication here is that, as a ‘real’ woman, if Nancy were able to, she would of 
course have the baby herself. By continually referring to this, journalists are trying to 
preserve pregnancy as a uniquely femule state. In Middlesex, when Callie’s parents 
discover the truth about her condition, the first question that they ask is, “[w]ill she 
be able to have children?” (Mid, p.428). Dr Luce tries to lessen the impact of his 
answer by referring to a patient with the same condition who has “adopted two kids” 
(Mid, p.429): what Luce is actually suggesting is that Callie will be able to live a 
‘normal’ female life, and that such a ‘normal’ life will involve being a mother.
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One of the biggest challenges faced by Joss in Trumpet is his inability to 
father a child. The very phrase ‘father a child’ indicates a lot about what society 
perceives as the fathering role, and how it is so different to mothering. Fathering, 
then, refers to the act of impregnating a woman, while mothering is typically
•  •  Q9understood as a more nurturing role, raising and caring for the child. Because Joss 
is unable to impregnate his wife, he is therefore seen as a failure as a man. The 
adoption of a son alleviates this issue somewhat, as it allows Joss to teach his new 
son, Colman, how to be a man (another important element of fatherhood). Once 
Colman discovers that his father is biologically female, he is plagued by “the image 
of my father in a woman’s body” (Tr, p.63). As I have already stated, as far as 
Colman is concerned, Joss is reduced to his genitals: “[w]hat is it that is eating me? 
I’m not a bitter guy. Don’t get me wrong. Please. It’s probably the fact that my father 
didn’t have a prick. Maybe it’s just as simple as that” (Tr, p.66). It is more than just 
that though. Colman is compelled to state that “[m]y father wasn’t a man like myself, 
showing me the ropes and helping my through puberty” (Tr, p.67). And therein lies 
Colman’s problem: his entire concept of masculinity has been developed through 
imitation and examination of Joss’s masculinity. The idea that Colman has been 
taught how to be a man by someone he comes to regard as a woman has completely 
changed his conception of what it means to be both male and a man.
Pregnancy is so utterly tied up with ideas of femaleness and femininity that 
even the idep of a pregnant man is hard to accept. As discussed in chapter three, 
Angela Carter exploits this in The Passion o f New Eve. Evelyn is kidnapped by a 
group led by “Mother” (Eve, p.49) a grotesque parody of matriarchal power, who 
refers to her followers as “daughters” (Eve, p.49). After forcibly transforming Evelyn
92 These characteristics are visible when Leith states that “we have the brain chemistry of, on the one 
hand, a sperm shooter, or, on the other, an egg protector” (Leith, 2008).
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into Eve, Mother plans to “make [Eve] a perfect specimen of womanhood” (Eve,
p.68) so that she can be impregnated. However, this ‘perfect specimen’ is dependent
on pregnancy to mark Eve’s transformation as successful: as soon as he becomes
pregnant, the last vestiges of his maleness will disappear.
The ‘wrongness’ of male pregnancy is emphasised by Leith, who draws upon
expert opinion to confirm his feelings:
no one I spoke to sounded positive. And remember, these are fertility doctors. 
These are people who have spent their while lives working against the grain 
of popular opinion, on long-shot ideas. These are the promoters of IVF and 
surrogacy, of taking sperm and putting it here, of taking eggs and putting 
them there, always pushing the envelope o f possibility. (Leith, 2008, my 
emphasis)
Leith paints a picture of doctors as being at the forefront of innovation, always
striving to break down prejudice, but this is at odds with the picture of the medical
profession that I have painted in chapter two. Comments made by the director of the
London Fertility Centre, Ian Craft, are worth examining:
[w]hy would a man want to do this? It doesn’t make sense ... I can’t see why 
you’d want to do it in the first place. Why a man would want to have a baby I 
can’t possibly contemplate. To me, it defies credibility that anybody would 
think about doing it. The people who are considering doing it have lost the 
plot. The plot is that women give birth to children -  not men. (Leith, 2008)
The very person who could create a pathway to male pregnancy happens to be
vehemently against the concept, to the point where he cannot even begin to imagine
why any man would wish to do this. Significantly, he expresses doubts about the
sanity of “[t]he people who are considering doing it” (Leith, 2008). The lack of
specificity in this statement -  Craft’s unwillingness to describe them in male terms -
makes his feelings clear: such people are not ‘true men’. Craft -  a man who has the
power to grant or withhold medical treatment to patients -  cannot even
“contemplate” (Leith, 2008) the existence of a pregnant man.
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The ‘problem’, as Leith sees it, is that “the pregnant man would become a 
father. Or rather, a mother. And here’s the thing. We find this unpalatable ... because 
it changes something fundamental about the way we see the world. Or rather, about 
the way we feel” (Leith, 2008). Here, Leith is stating his conjecture as fact, (“[w]e 
find this unpalatable”), forcing the reader into the position of agreeing with him: “[i]t 
shocks us on a very basic level. Naturally, it does” (Leith, 2008, my emphasis). In 
the context of the article, ‘naturally’ is a highly charged word to be using. When men 
are able to give birth, the concept of natural male/female or masculine/feminine 
behaviour is stretched to its limit. If one is naturally shocked by a pregnant man, then 
it follows that a pregnant man is w«natural -  a freak of nature.
Leith ends his article by re-emphasising that Beatie is not really a man: “[w]e 
live in a world that is strictly divided into a male half and a female half... That’s 
why we are so confused and disturbed by the idea of a pregnant man, even when he 
did start out as a woman and will still give birth as a woman” (Leith, 2008). Leith is 
correct when he says that the world remains “strictly divided” (Leith, 2008) 
according to male and female. The division is such that Patrick Barkham wonders 
“how someone can identify themselves as male and yet embrace pregnancy” 
(Barkham, 2008). Beatie explains this himself by arguing that “[sterilization is not a 
requirement for sex reassignment, so I decided to have chest reconstruction and 
testosterone therapy, but kept my reproductive rights. Wanting to have a biological 
child is neither ft male nor female desire, but a human desire” (Beatie, 2008). By 
relocating his situation as a ‘human’ one, Beatie is drawing attention to the 
limitations of language: ‘human’ is ope of the only words that encompasses his 
situation, but too often humanity is forgotten. If one is not ‘properly gendered’ then, 
as I have explained in chapter four, one’s “humanness ... comes into question”
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(Butler, 1993, p.8). Butler goes on to argue that “the construction of gender operates 
through exclusionary means, such that the human is not only produced over and 
against the inhuman, but through a set of foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, 
strictly speaking, refused the possibility of cultural articulation” (Butler, 1993, p.8).
It is the difficulty in making some forms of gendered (and human) identity 
culturally intelligible that is at the core of this thesis. Even as language fails in its 
attempts to capture and define varieties of gender, the arguments surrounding what 
gender ‘is’ or ‘isn’t’ become more intractable. Woolf suggested that “[n]o age can 
ever have been as stridently sex-conscious as our own” (Woolf, 2004, p.l 14), but the 
truth is that every age is sex-conscious. While the central issues of debate might 
change over time, the debate itself never ceases. The more we unpick the knot of 
gender, the tighter it seems to get.
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